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RESOLVING THE REMEDIAL DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION

During the last several decades, courts have undertaken to remedy ongoing constitutional and statutory violations in a variety of
public and private institutions. Once a court determines that an
institutional pattern or practice violates the law, it must face the challenge of structuring a process that will lead to the elimination of the
illegal conditions or practices. Whether this judicial activity is called
"ordinary" or "extraordinary," 1 the remedial process in institutional
reform litigation may lead the trial court to engage in a range of
roles beyond those usually required to resolve a traditional private
dispute.
Courts involved in institutional reform litigation face a serious
remedial dilemma. They are constitutionally compelled to develop a
remedy for conditions and practices that violate a plaintiff's rights.2
However, courts cannot rely entirely on the defendants to eliminate
these unconstitutional conditions because in many instances the
responsible parties either cannot or will not take the steps necessary
to do so.' At the same time, courts must depend on those with
ongoing responsibility for the institution to achieve compliance with
the law. Courts lack the administrative capacity to alter basic institutional practices directly and are constrained by both a limited consti4
tutional mandate and a narrow vision of their role.
The controversy over institutional reform litigation swirls
around this remedial dilemma. The debate is often framed in terms
of whether courts should be involved at all in cases requiring instituI See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 473 (1980).
2 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955); see also Dellinger,
Of Rights and Remedies: The ConstitutionAs a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1972)
(arguing in favor of courts intervening to fulfill constitutional norms); Hill,
ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1158 (1969) ("[Flederal and state
courts, insofar as their ordinary jurisdiction and remedial authority are adequate to
the occasion, are obliged to afford such remedies as are determined, ultimately by the
Supreme Court, to be appropriate in implementation of the Constitution.").
3 See infra notes 133-146 and accompanying text. It is now widely recognized
that injunctions are not self-executing; a court's order to eliminate conditions that
violate the Constitution rarely results in compliance with the law. The struggle for
defendant's acceptance and institutionalization of constitutional and statutory norms
takes place through the remedial process. See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term - Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 52 (1979) ("A remedy.., is
an effort of the court to give meaning to a public value in practice.... [I]t constitutes
the actualization of the right."); Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional
Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 789-90 (1978) (surveying the stages of the
remedial process that follow the initial findings of a violation).
4 See infra notes 301-08 & 438-50 and accompanying text.

808

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:805

tional reform. 5 Advocates of an expansive judicial role tend to
emphasize the courts' duty to intervene in the face of serious constitutional violations, without critically assessing the various forms that
intervention may take or their potential impact on the target institution or the judiciary. 6 Critics emphasize the limitations of judicially
managed change without addressing the failure of the responsible
officials to comply with the law and the absence of any realistic alternative means to remedy ongoing constitutional and statutory
7
violations.
This Article shifts the focus of the debate from whether courts
should intervene to how they should structure the remedial process
to avoid, or at least minimize, the negative consequences of the
remedial dilemma described above.' Several factors justify reframing the inquiry in this manner.
First, courts are already intervening, and there is every indication that they will continue to do so.' Thus, it makes sense to assist
5 See, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46-47 (1982) (discussing challenges to the
legitimacy of courts' remedial intervention in institutional settings); Fiss, supra note 3,
at 5-6 (arguing that the special judicial function of giving meaning to public values
supports court intervention in structural reform cases); Fletcher, The Discretionary
Constitution: Institutional Remedies andJudicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 637 (1982)
(arguing that the trial court remedial discretion in institutional suits is
"'presumptively illegitimate" as such suits are inherently political ); cf. D. HOROWIrz,
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 19-20 (1977) (arguing that courts are ill-suited to

shape social group behavior because of the attributes of adjudication and the nature
of courts). But see Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Changein Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979) (exploring the process ofjudicial
intervention and the nature of the court's role in institutional reform litigation).
6 See, e.g., 0. Fiss, THE CIvIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 18, 86-90 (1978) (advocating
the primacy of the injunction in civil rights cases because of its technical advantages
and allocation of power enabling the success of the civil rights claim); Johnson, The
Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 AtA L. REV. 271, 279 (1981)
(stating that the judiciary must stand ready to intervene where government officials
fail to uphold their constitutional responsibilities toward the deprived).
7 Critics argue that the hazards of expansive judicial institutional reform
include: (1) persistent constitutional violations following court orders, see Brakel,
Prison Reform Litigation: Has the Revolution Gone too Far, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug.

1987, at 160, 164; (2) the potential transformation and delegitimization of the
judiciary, see id. at 162; (3) the usurpation of executive or legislative branch functions,
see Nagel, Separationof Powers and the Scope of FederalEquitableRemedies, 30 STAN. L. REV.
661, 661-64 (1978); and (4) the limitations of the adversary process for remedial fact
finding and planning, see D. HoRowITz, supra note 5, at 45-51.
8 Because this Article focuses on the judicial strategies for managing the
remedial process, it will not discuss at length the various arguments for and against
the legitimacy of judicial intervention, which have been amply discussed in the
literature. See supra sources cited in notes 5-7.
9 Courts continue to be actively involved in institutional reform litigation in a
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courts in reconciling their constitutional mandate with their institutional limitations. Second, courts involved in institutional litigation
cannot avoid deciding how the remedial process will proceed. The
remedy is not simply an order setting forth a fixed set of rules. It is
an ongoing, dynamic process that is structured by the court and
introduced to a bureaucracy situated within a larger political and
social system. In the course of formulating the remedy, overseeing
1°
implementation, monitoring compliance, and enforcing its order,
the court faces a series of strategic choices concerning its approach
to intervention. I
Finally, the various judicial approaches to the remedial process
have yet to be systematically identified and analyzed for their potential impact on the conduct of those whose cooperation is essential to
achieving compliance with the law. Perhaps as a result, courts frequently adopt approaches that are not well-suited to resolving the
dilemma inherent in formulating and implementing a remedy. They
develop their role in reaction to the failures of the compliance process as they arise.1 2 By self-consciously defining their role in the
compliance process, courts may be better equipped to develop a role
that empowers institutional reform without exceeding the bounds of
judicial authority. Judicial intervention that effectively addresses the
remedial dilemma by accounting for how both bureaucracies and
courts operate strengthens the argument for continuing judicial
3
involvement in institutional reform litigation.'
The challenge posed by the remedial dilemma is to structure a
remedial process that allows, indeed, requires necessary changes
within the institution to be developed and implemented at the level
where the actual power to do so effectively exists. An evaluation of
wide variety of areas, including prisons, mental institutions, housing, school
desegregation, environmental remediation and union corruption. In the area of
prison litigation alone, as ofJanuary 1989, there were ten jurisdictions in which the
entire prison system was under court order, thirty jurisdictions in which a major
institution in the state was under court order or consent decree, and eight
jurisdictions with pending system-wide litigation. See Status Report: State Prisons and
the Courts, NAT'L PRISON PROJEcrJ., Winter 1989, at 7, 10-11.
10 For a description of the various stages of the remedial process, see Special

Project, supra note 3, at 788-843.
11 See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 210, 244.
13 This is not to say that the concerns about the legitimacy of judicial
intervention will be fully alleviated by defining an effective judicial role. However,
one major aspect of the legitimacy critique is that courts have exceeded their capacity
in institutional reform cases. Defining an effective judicial role responds to this
concern.
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courts' capacity to meet this challenge necessarily begins with an
analysis of the institutional context that is the object ofjudicial intervention. The organizational dynamics that lock in unconstitutional
conditions and prevent institutional self-correction in the absence of
judicial intervention, which I will refer to as the "dynamics of organizational stasis," define both the need for judicial intervention and
the factors to which the court must respond to promote organizational change. The court's potential to resolve the remedial dilemma
depends upon its capacity to influence the factors underlying the
dynamics of organizational stasis.
This Article explores the dynamics of organizational stasis and
judicial intervention in the prison.1 4 The discussion will focus on
judicial intervention in this particular context, rather than on the
development of a general theory of institutional reform litigation. A
broader theory requires a greater understanding of the extent to
which a particular institutional context presents special demands,
limitations, and potential for judicial intervention than presently
exists. The court's capacity to resolve the remedial dilemma may
vary depending on such factors as the degree of acceptance and clarity of the legal norm, the nature of the organizational and political
obstacles to change, whether the target institution is public or private, and the division of power among the relevant parties. Prior to
evaluating the courts' role in institutional reform litigation in general, it is important to understand the factors underlying organizational stasis in a variety of institutional contexts, the parameters of
judicial involvement in those contexts, and the dynamic relationship
between judicial intervention and organizational change. Only then
can a general theory of judicial intervention that accounts for the
common elements of institutional reform litigation and the variations presented by particular institutional settings be built. This
Article begins this inquiry with the prison.
Part I analyzes the dynamics of organizational stasis within the
prison system, exposing the norms, incentives, information patterns,
and power structure that lock in the current conditions in prisons.
14 This Article focuses on the conditions and practices in prisons-institutions
incarcerating those convicted of crimes and sentenced to prison terms. Although
some of the dynamics ofjails, which incarcerate pre-trial detainees and misdemeanor
offenders serving short sentences, will differ due to such factors as the lack of
continuity of the inmate population and the multiple sources and purposes of jail
incarceration, see R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETrO 2-5 (1975); Garofalo &
Clark, The Inmate Subculture in Jails, 12 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 415, 417 (1985), much of
the analysis that follows will apply to jails as well.
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These dynamics disable regular prison participants from achieving
institutional self-correction. Part II describes the attributes that
enable courts to alter the prisons' norms, incentives, information,
and power so that reform can occur. Acknowledging that the court's
capacity to realize its potential depends on the approach adopted to
manage the compliance process, the Article identifies four characteristic judicial approaches to prison intervention: the deferrer, the
director, the broker, and the catalyst.
Part III examines the capacity of each judicial management strategy to alter the dynamics of organizational stasis. The deferrer
approach in most cases will perpetuate the dynamics that contribute
to the extreme prison conditions warranting judicial intervention.
The director, although effective in introducing discrete programs
that require little organizational change, is likely to fall short of her
remedial goals and may have a negative or regressive impact on the
development of creative, systemic approaches to the problems facing
prisons. The broker approach is likewise ill-suited to prompt significant organizational change.
This Article argues that the catalyst approach is best suited to
address the dynamics of organizational stasis that lock in unconstitutional prison conditions and yet remain within the boundaries of the
judicial role. The catalyst uses a deliberative, participatory process,
backed by traditional judicial sanctions, to engage the necessary parties in effective confrontation of the prison problems.and foster the
internal development of a new normative framework. The use of
sanctions alters the incentive system in place to convince members of
the corrections system that noncompliance carries substantial costs
and that effective participation in the deliberative process is the only
way to eliminate judicial intervention. At the same time, the process
reduces the negative impact of sanctions and rewards those who
assume responsibility for compliance with additional support,
resources, praise, and ultimately, reduced judicial oversight.
Finally, Part IV concludes by discussing possible methods of
promoting effective judicial intervention and the implications of this
analysis for other institutional contexts.
I.

THE DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STASIS IN THE PRISON

Prison reform efforts embrace a wide range of normative goals,
from the elimination of large scale prisons entirely to improvement
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of their rehabilitative capacity. 15 However, the normative goal of the
constitutional enterprise, as currently defined by the courts, is limited, focusing on the elimination of particularly extreme deprivations
and abuses that sometimes characterize imprisonment. Federal
courts may intervene only after determining that either a particular
practice or the totality of prison conditions constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment or violates some other constitutional provision. 6 Furthermore, these practices or conditions must be dramatically and unequivocally inhumane or arbitrary in order to violate the
Constitution. 7 Prisons under judicial decree typically subject
inmates to pervasive violence, physical conditions that threaten their
See, e.g., R. JOHNSON, HARD TIME: UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING THE
4 (1987) (advocating reforms to make imprisonment a "constructively painful
experience" resulting in the correction and rehabilitation of offenders); PRESrDENT'S
15

PRISON

COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 13-14 (1967) (advocating greater use of communitybased facilities); PRISON RESEARCH EDUCATION ACTION PROJECT, INSTEAD OF PRISONS:

A HANDBOOK FOR ABOLITIONIST.; 7 (1976) (advocating abolition of large-scale
prisons).
16 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (finding no cruel and

unusual punishment in housing two inmates in one cell); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 680 (1978) (noting that the trial court had found a violation of the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding fifth and fourteenth amendment right of
meaningful access to courts requires prison authorities to provide law libraries or
legal assistance); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (concluding that
deliberate indifference to medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (finding that the state violates the fifth
and fourteenth amendment right to due process in disciplinary procedures by
revoking credits for good behavior without notice, a hearing, or due process of law);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974) (finding that the first amendment
restricts mail censorship); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 333 (M.D. Ala.
1966), (finding segregation to be a violation of the equal protection prohibition of
race discrimination), aff'd per curian, 393 U.S. 266 (1968).
17 See, e.g., Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352 (double celling not cruel and unusual
punishment); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(eighth amendment addresses cruel, not deficient conditions); Cody v. Hillard, 830
F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1987) (conditions were "light years removed from the
torture, cruel deprivation, and sadistic punishment with which the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is concerned"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1078 (1988); Shrader v.
White, 761 F.2d 975, 977 (4th Cir. 1985) (fear of assault must create significant
mental pain for inmate violence to be unconstitutional); Delgado v. Cady, 576 F.
Supp. 1446, 1451 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (overcrowding is not unconstitutional despite its
extremely harsh impact on inmates). See generally M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER
DECISION:

IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETrINGS

6-7

(1976) (documenting brutal conditions that led to court intervention in four prison
and jail cases).
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health and safety, arbitrary and abusive treatment at the hands of
8
prison officials, or some combination of these conditions.'
Conditions and practices in prisons are notoriously resistant to
change despite general agreement that they are inadequate. 19 Any
meaningful assessment of judicial intervention directed toward
changing prison conditions therefore must begin with an analysis of
the factors that disable the regular participants in the prison system
from eliminating these conditions without outside intervention.
In order to understand the dynamics that lock in "cruel and
unusual" prison conditions, one must move beyond the image of the
organization as a unitary actor rationally pursuing goals and policies
established by the formal leadership. 2 0 The prison functions as a
dynamic system, consisting of both formal organizational structures
and informal subgroups with particular norms, interests, and power
18 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1140, 1150 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting the
trial court's finding that "assault or molestation by fellow inmates was a continual
threat," that the population density of inmates was "shocking," and that there were
"'numerous' instances of '[girievous neglect'" concerning inmate medical care),
modified, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Groseclose v.
Dutton, 609 F. Supp. 1432, 1435, 1446 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (noting expert testimony
that death row at Tennessee State Penitentiary was one of the worst in country),
vacated and remanded, 829 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1987); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F.
Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977) (noting that prisoner "sentenced to a regime in which
he will be forced to live in a state of constant fear of violence, in imminent danger to
his bodily integrity and physical and psychological well-being"), aft'd, 616 F.2d 598
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F.
Supp. 582, 587, 590, 593-95 (D.P.R.) (noting that "[mientally deranged inmates are
placed in . . . dungeons," and that " 'Kangaroo' courts are held by inmates and
sentences, including beatings and stabbings, are imposed"), stay denied, 537 F.2d I
(1st Cir. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977).
19 See R. ROBERG & V. WEBB, CRITICAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS: PROBLEMS,
TRENDS, AND PROSPECTS 14 (1981) [hereinafter CRITICAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS].
20 Courts sometimes assume that prison administrators can and will pursue
organizational goals consistent with the constitution, and that the failure to do so is
caused by guilty individuals who intentionally or negligently resist change. See, e.g.,
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474 (1983) (granting wide-ranging deference to
prison officials in adopting policies for order and security); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 352 (1980) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison
officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution.
...). Yet the
assumption of the classical administrative model that top managers are fully
responsive to public interests and, in turn, have complete policy control over their
subordinates ignores the cumulative and sometimes irrational impact of the
combination of rational individual decisions. SeeJ. KNOTT & G. MILLER, REFORMING
BUREAUCRACY: THE PoLrrTCS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 10-11, 146 (1987). In
addition, this view dramatically over-simplifies the complexities of change within
prison systems by failing to consider the political and organizational dynamics that
influence the possibility and direction of change. Formal organizational structures
and informal subgroups profoundly influence whether change will be initiated at all.
See infra and supra text accompanying notes 15-177.
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bases. The prison organization is further influenced by the political
environment in which it is situated. Any attempted change in the
conditions, policies, or practices is filtered through the dynamics of
interaction both within and among the various participants in the
prison system.
Thus, it is necessary to examine the four factors underlying the
dynamics of organizational stasis in prisons: (1) norms, 2 ' (2) incentives,22 (3) information,2 3 and (4) power.24 Part I of this Article
examines these factors in relation to each major group within the
prison system-inmates, guards, treatment staff, and administrators-as well as the possible sources of external pressure and sup21 Norms establish the standards of conduct that shape the participants' views of
whether change is desirable, acceptable, or unnecessary.
22 Incentives influence individuals to initiate, cooperate in, or resist change by
distributing sanctions for particular behaviors. See J. KNOTT & G. MILLER, supra note
20, at 173-75 ("[T]he structural rules operating in a given organization determine
what behaviors are required of individuals who hope to 'succeed' in those
organizations" and thus establish a set of incentives that shape behavior); see also A.
DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 84-85 (1966) (asserting that the general motives of
officials include money, power, prestige, convenience, security, loyalty, pride in work
performance, desire to serve public interest, and commitment to a specific program
of action); H. KAUFMAN, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 61-65 (1971)
(discussing strategies for reducing incentives to oppose change).
23 The capacity to obtain and use information shapes the nature and
effectiveness of proposed reforms. See Chin & Benne, General Strategiesfor Effecting
Changes in Human Systems, in THE PLANNING OF CHANGE 22, 34-36 (W. Bennis, K.

Benne, R. Chin & K. Corey eds. 3d ed. 1976) (discussing the role of data, feed-back
and problem solving in facilitating change); see also H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 293 (3d
ed. 1976) (noting the limits of individual capacity to process information within
organizations); Calvert, The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of
PoliticalAdvice, 47 J. OF POL. 530, 530 (1985) (noting that decisionmakers must rely
upon advisers to distill information for the decisionmaking process).
24 Power reflects the capacity of an individual or group to influence the behavior
of those whose cooperation is necessary to accomplish the desired change. Power
has been defined as the ability of A to "get B to do something B would not otherwise
do." Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 203 (1957); see also Emerson, PowerDependence Relations, 27 AM. Soc. REV. 31, 32 (1962) (expressing A's power over B as
the amount of B's resistance A can overcome); 1 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
53 (1968) (defining power as "the probability that one actor.., will.., carry out his
own will despite resistance").
Power need not derive solely ftom the organizational position. One important
source of power derives from conirol over the distribution of incentives to others
within the organization. A related aspect of power is the capacity to alter the
perception of others as to how the organization is functioning, through the collection
and dissemination of information. Finally, power also derives from the potential to
create uncertainty with respect to the capacity of various participants to perform their
jobs and satisfy their needs. See M_ CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 158

(1964).
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port for change. The analysis derives from studies of bureaucracies,
prisons in general, groups within the prison, and field studies of particular prisons.2 5 This analysis does not describe every prison or
every group within the prison system. Nor is it an inexorable
dynamic unaffected by the political environment in which the prison
is situated.2 6 Rather, it illustrates patterns among inmates, guards,
treatment staff, and prison administration that tend to determine the
prison dynamic.
This analysis reveals that prisons, in addition to the factors that
predispose "street-level bureaucracies" 27 to maintain the status quo,
are particularly resistant to change in the absence of outside intervention. The normative framework of the prison system predisposes
its participants to preserve the status quo. Participants in the prison
system have strong disincentives to pursue change, due to the political powerlessness of inmates, the structural isolation of corrections
from the community, and the lack of political consensus and support
for reform. Corrections systems exhibit a profound lack of the information and expertise necessary to pursue meaningful change. Internal reformers have limited power to generate the resources and
cooperation necessary to achieve change.
A.

Absence of an Internal Normative Framework Supporting Reform

Virtually unchecked pressure, generated both within the prison
25 The following works generally inform the analysis of the prison that follows:
R. CLOWARD, D. CRESSEY, G. GROSSER, R. MCCLEERY, L. OHLIN, G. SYKES & S.
MESSINGER,

THEORETICAL

STUDIES

IN

SOCIAL

ORGANIZATION

OF

THE

PRISON

(Conference Group on Correctional Behavior Social Science Research Council ed.
1960) [hereinafter THEORETICAL STUDIES]; M. CROZIER, supra note 24; A. DOWNS,

supra note 22; E.

GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL

PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961); M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17; J.
IRWIN, PRISONS IN TURMOIL (1980); J. JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN
MASS SOCIETY (1977); H. KAUFMAN, supra note 22; M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980); L.
LOMBARDO, GUARDS IMPRISONED: CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AT WORK (1981); C.
PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1986); G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF

CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (1958).
26 Indeed, the external political environment is often a critical factor in
determining the degree of internal resistance to change and the need for outside
intervention to achieve meaningful reform. See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note

17, at 83.
27 Martin Lipsky introduced this term in Street-Level Bureaucracies to describe
public service organizations composed primarily of "[p]ublic service workers [streetlevel bureaucrats] who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and
who have substantial discretion in the exercise of their work." M. LIPSKY, supra note

25, at 3.
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system and by the external political environment, channels prison

resources and the attention and energy of prison staff to the task of
processing inmates efficiently and avoiding visible disruption. Those
in a position to define the normative agenda-the guards, "traditionalist" administrators, and political actors setting corrections policyembrace order and autonomy to the exclusion of other values.
Those within the prison community who embrace the norms of providing humane treatment and maintaining public accountabilityinmates, treatment staff, and reform-minded administrators, frequently lack the status and power necessary to institutionalize those
norms within the prison system.
1. Guardians of Order and Autonomy: Guards, "Traditionalist"
Administrators, and Politicians
Guards as a group are critical to the successful implementation
of prison reform policies. They are the filter through which reforms
concerning treatment of inmates, programming, and service delivery
must pass. 28 Yet guards are the group within the prison most
directly invested in the norms underlying the status quo. Orderthe absence of disruption, the smooth, predictable, controlled operation of the prison-is central to the guards' normative agenda.
Many factors shape and influence guards' preoccupation with
order. Informal indoctrination 2 9 and formal training, to the extent
28 All groups within the prison are dependent on guards for the orderly
functioning of the system. Inmates are dependent on guards for goods, services,
protection, and movement. Staff and professionals are dependent on guards for the
delivery of inmates to their sessions and the communication of the need for services
to and from inmates. Administrators are dependent on guards for the maintenance
of order, the communication of new policies to the inmates, and the implementation
of those policies.
29 Guards develop their approach to the job experientially. They are schooled
by their peers, inmates, and immediate superiors in the existing norms of the prison;
not in the formal goals or aspiralions of corrections, but in the standards and
routines of day-to-day practice. See B. CROUCH & J. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO
JUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS 54-55 (1989).

Corrections work at

the guard level remains largely unprofessionalized. Although this situation has
begun to change in some prison systems, sometimes in the wake of prison litigation,
see, e.g., Jurik, Individual and Organizational Determinants of Correctional Officer Attitudes
Toward Inmates, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523-24 (1985) (describing recent efforts to

recruit "degree-bearing individuals," women, and minorities and to professionalize
prison workers in security positions), the quality of training and of performance of
prison guards is a serious problem. The status of prison guards is low, and in some
communities the job carries a stigma that discourages guards from developing a
strong professional identity. See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 162-63. As there is
little shared, generally accessible knowledge concerning corrections practice,
training remains limited and largely skills oriented. See L. CARROLL, HACKS, BLACKS
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that guards receive any, often focus on techniques that maintain or
restore order." The formal duties of guards revolve around surveillance and supervision designed to enforce a routine.3 1 Because
guards bear responsibility for maintaining order, they stand to
increase their power by promoting the importance of order to the
institution.3 2 Limited resources exacerbate the tendency to choose
processing over service.3 ' Finally, order functions as a coping mechanism that enables guards to handle the stress created by the combiAND

CONS: RACE RELATIONS

IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON

47-61 (1974); L.

supra note 25, at 28-37; Jacobs & Crotty, The Guard's World, in J. JACOBS,
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 133, 135 (1983); see also Holt v.
Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 201 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (finding that guards recruited from
small rural towns near prisons were young, poorly paid, poorly educated, poorly
trained, and had little general experience), aff'd in part andrev'd in part sub nom. Finney
v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
30 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 34-36.
3I Traditionally, guards derived significant authority over inmates from their
absolute discretion and control over the inmates' day-to-day lives. See G. SYKES, supra
note 25, at 50; cf B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 62-63, 66-68, 75-84
(describing the wide discretion and authority guards had over the lives of the
prisoners through the official and unofficial reward and punishment system in the
Texas prison system, including requiring inmates to stand with their toes and nose
against the wall, threatening inmates with force or severe punishment, and using
physical force). Guards could manipulate rewards, threats, punishments, and the use
of force to induce compliance with the organizational routine. See, e.g., id. at 78-84
(describing three increasingly harsh types of physical coercion employed by the
guards, "tune-ups" or "attitude adjustments," "ass whippings" and severe beatings,
and noting the importance of such punishment and its deterrent effects as important
elements of the overall control strategy).
32 Guards strive to attain the authority, discretion, and control that they
perceive is necessary in order to maintain order in a system occupied by unwilling
inhabitants. See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 52 (noting that authority of guards
viewed as crucial to order maintenance role). Guards will enhance the status of
inmates who have developed power over other inmates through violence in exchange
for their assistance in maintaining order. See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note
17, at 51 (describing inmates' role in maintaining order); J. IRWIN, supra note 25, at
23-24 ("[G]uards granted privileges to key prisoners in return for their support in
maintaining order.").
33 See H. KAUFMAN, supra note 22, at 23-29; M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 125-28.
The perceived importance of maintaining order is accentuated by the huge inmate to
guard ratio, which requires the guards to respond to a large group of individuals and
yet maintain order and institutional routine. See M. LIPsKY, supra note 25, at 117,
119; C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINALJUSTICE 393-95 (1978); G. SYKES,
supra note 25, at 17, 21-25. Prison overcrowding exacerbates this tendency. See Ellis,
Crowdingand Prison Violence: Integration of Research and Theory, 11 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
277, 292-95, 301 (1984); Toch, Warehousesfor People?, 478 ANNALS 58 (1985). Also,
because the threat of disorder and resistance is ever-present in the prison, there is a
tendency to treat every situation as potentially explosive, thus warranting extreme
measures at the expense of the inmate. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 84. This
tendency is exacerbated by the fear of personal injury that guards in a volatile system
experience.
LOMBARDO,
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nation of conflicting factors that typically afflict the street-level
bureaucrat: wide-ranging discretion, inadequate resources and con34
flicting demands.
These factors predispose guards to exhibit the phenomenon of
goal displacement: order becomes the predominant institutional
goal. All other institutional goals (such as service delivery, rehabilitation, and even punishmen) are subordinated to and furthered by
the pursuit of order. 3 ' The status of the inmate is defined in relation
to the goal of order, rather than in relation to an externally defined
or moral norm. Responding to individual demands for service
imposes costs on and threatens the smooth functioning of the system.36 Dehumanization must be tolerated, if not celebrated, to
37
maintain order.
Reform poses a threat to guards' normative commitment to
order, autonomy, and authority. The introduction of legal norms
and the professionalization of corrections administration have lim3 8
ited guards' recourse to their traditional control mechanisms.
34 See M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 44-45; R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 195-205 (1957); cf. P. BLAU & M. MEYER, BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN
SOCIETY 142-45 (1987) (arguing that bureaucracies encourage strict rules and rigidity
which result in increased tension when unexpected situations arise).
35 See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 45-46 (demonstrating how the system of

total control as the basis of order at Stateville was repackaged in terms of
rehabilitation, but the practices remained the same); M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 44
("The study of street-level bureaucrats may be seen as a study in goal displacement
when the norm of individual client orientation becomes subordinated to the needs
for mass processing.").
36 Consequently, movement of any kind is discouraged because it poses the risk
of disruption. See, e.g., B. CROUCH & J MARQUART, supra note 29, at 60-61 (noting
that inmate movement was strictly regimented and limited before the 1980s in
Texas).
37 The commitment to order provides guards with a justification for brutal
punishments and harsh disciplinary measures. See J.JACOBS, supra note 25, at 41-42,
47 (describing various methods of punishment used to maintain control); Marquart,
Prison Guards and the Use of Coercion as a Mechanism of PrisonerControl, 24 CRIMINOLOGY

347, 355-56 (documenting how and why guards in Texas penitentiary used physical
force as routine mechanism of social control).
38 See Special Project,JudicialIntervention in Corrections: The CaliforniaExperienceAn Empirical Study, 20 UCLA L. REV. 452, 493 (1973).

Some traditional methods of maintaining order and authority have been
restricted by the courts. Corporal punishment is no longer embraced, at least
publicly, as an appropriate mechanism of control, and has been declared illegal by
the courts. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1968) (finding
whipping to be cruel and unusual punishment). Guards may no longer legally
impose arbitrary or summary punishment on inmates. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). Finally, guards may not legally prevent inmates from
communicating with the outside world. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415
(1974) (holding that mail censorship regulations violate first amendment). But see
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Reforms often diminish guards' autonomy by intensifying supervision of their conduct. Change also disrupts the routines established
by guards to maintain order. It introduces uncertainty and ambiguity to the lives of both inmates and guards-factors which guards
associate with disruption and disorder. Reforms that introduce programs and services increase the movement of inmates through the
prison and impose additional demands on guards to provide services
and supervision. This higher level of activity increases the difficulty
39
of maintaining order.
Change tends to upset the power structure that guards have
developed among inmates to maintain control. Guards perceive that
the traditional sources of their authority and power have not been
replaced.4" The introduction of new participants, programs, and
objectives often circumvents the lines of authority and communication that have been under the control of guards under the old sysaccess to sources of illicit benefits
tem. 4 1 It may also affect guards'
42
system.
old
the
derived under
Thus, guards are more likely to embrace traditional norms and
goals. Change is perceived as inconsistent with guards' overriding
concern for order, authority, and autonomy. The norm of resistance
to external authority develops in response to perceived attacks on
guards' authority and autonomy. Indeed, guards often view reforms
imposed upon them by administrators or through the judicial process to be unwise, unsound, and likely to lead to the system's
collapse. 4 3
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (holding that regulations
prohibiting correspondence between inmates at different prisons do not violate first
amendment).
39 See Special Project, supra note 38, at 493, 497-501. In order to handle the
complexity of tasks or an increased level of activity, individuals often create routines
to better manage their performance. See M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 83-86; R.
MERTON, supra note 34, at 195-205.
40 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 78; Hepburn, The Prison Control Structure and
its Effects on Work Attitudes: The Perceptions and Attitudes of Prison Guards, 15J. OF CRxM.
JUST. 49, 50, 52-57 (1987) (describing surveys documenting guards' concern over
loss of control and increase in inmates' power and rights).
41 See McCleery, Corrections Administration and Political Change, in PRISON WITHIN
SociETv 113, 127-29 (L. Hazelrigg ed. 1968) (describing how new patterns and lines
of communication formed in the treatment unit and by-passed the monopoly of
communication once enjoyed by the custodial force).
42 See id.; see also Colvin, The 1980 New Mexico Prison Riot, 29 Soc. PROBS. 449,
453 (1982) (explaining that prison staff members who colluded with drug traffickers
needed to protect drug rackets since disruptions might jeopardize drug connections
and "bring the heat down" upon the traffickers).
43 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 129-32 (documenting guards' cynical

820

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:805

"Traditionalist" administrators tend to share the guards' custodial perspective and are likely to embrace the norm of order and control as the predominant institutional goal. Many have been in the
criminal justice system for an extensive period and have been
schooled in the norms, patterns, and practices of the existing system.4 4 This background predisposes traditionalist administrators to
adhere to an instrumental view of the status of the inmate by defining that status in terms of the needs of the prison to maintain order,
rather than in relation to service delivery or rehabilitative values. 45
Consequently, "traditionalist" administrators tend to reject the
notion that systemic change is either required or desired for a prison
system operating under the traditional control model. Some may
not see brutal or inhumane prison conditions as remediable or problematic.4 6 They are more likely to accept current limitations on
resources as given and to work within them to maintain order and
control. To the extent that they pursue reform, it is more likely to be
in the direction of "returning to the good old days"-restoring
order, discipline, and control.4 7 Traditionalist administrators pursue
status and power by attempting to preserve their position, enhance
attitude toward leadership qualities of correctional administrators and effectiveness
of their programs); J. WYNNE, PRISON EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: THE IMPACT OF
CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRAMS 24-25, 62-63 (1978); Hepburn, supra
note 40, at 50 ("[G]uards subscribe to a normative system that stresses distrust and
cynicism toward administration.").
44 See, e.g., B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 43 (describing how Jim
Estelle, appointed director of Texas prisons in 1972, started as a prison guard and
rose through the ranks);J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 28-29 (noting that warden Ragen
of Stateville was a former sheriff from a small rural Illinois town and had only a ninth
grade education and a "provincial background"). Traditionalist administrators
frequently receive little or no training in management prior to assuming the position
of commissioner or warden. See Cohn, The Failureof CorrectionalManagement, in IssuEs
IN CORRECTIONS AND ADMINISTRATION 119, 126-27 (G. Killinger, P. Cromwell & B.

Cromwell eds. 1976).
45 See, e.g., B. CROUCH & J.

MARQ.UART,

supra note 29, at 40 (arguing that Beto

and Ragen shared a philosophy of maintaining tight disciplinary control).

46 See, e.g., The Clement E. Vose Memorial Colloquium, The Organizational
Consequences of Remedial Law: A Working Conference 6 (R. Wood & R. Murphy

eds. Apr. 24, 1987) [hereinafter The Organizational Consequences of Remedial Law]
(describing how Rhode Island administrators were oblivious to despicable conditions
of the state's prison facilities and the brutality and favoritism practiced by the

guards); Elvin, Oklahoma PrisonerEarnsPlace in History: The Story of Battle v. Anderson,
10 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 1, 4-5 (1986) (discussing depositions taken from
correctional personnel which candidly described prison conditions and revealed the
personnel's matter of fact attitude that "[n]obody's going to interfere with us, how
dare you poke your nose in here").
47 See B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 44; McCleery, supra note 41,
at 128.
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the prison, and maintain and
their autonomy and authority within
48
bureaucracy.
prison
the
expand
Unlike traditionalist administrators, professional managers
often come from outside the corrections hierarchy and bring to the
prison system a set of values they developed through professional
training.4 9 These values may conflict to some extent with the prisons' status quo. As their training is usually in management or business, professional managers tend to consider efficiency and conflict
management to be the keys to redressing the problems afflicting the
prison.5 ° Professional managers may not have a coherent, welldeveloped philosophy of corrections, and they are more likely to
think of themselves as "keepers" hired to ensure that inmates are
kept in, kept alive, and serviced efficiently within the existing
resource limitations.5 1 Their managerial focus shapes their value
structure and priorities. They are explicitly committed to order, centralization, and efficiency, and they may not view it as their job to
develop norms apart from the bureaucratic imperative.
These professional managers believe that the prison must be
changed because it is inefficient, not because it is brutal.5 2 Inmates
must be accommodated to the extent necessary to achieve compliance and order. Guards remain the keystone to attaining the organizational goal-order. Guards' power and autonomy, however, must
be routinized, rationalized, and subjected to central control. 55 Managers will attempt to run the institution according to rules and
48 See, e.g., J.JACOBS, supra note 25, at 28 (stating that Ragen developed a system
of control by gaining a large measure of economic, political and moral autonomy).
49 See, e.g., id. at 73-104 (describing the emergence of a professional
administration); see also Letter from Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander to State
Representative Michael D. Murphy (April 12, 1985) (announcing appointment of new
Commissioner of Correction with background as manager and planner in areas other
than corrections, whose strength is "planning and management").
50 SeeJ. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 75.
51 See, e.g., id. at 103-04 (describing how professional manager brought to prison
a commitment to scientific management rather than to any correctional ideology); see
also L. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
IN THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM 56 (1989) (explaining that the hospital was
understaffed due to a lack of funding and that the staff was "doing the best that could
be expected under the circumstances"); Alexander, The New Prison Administrators and
the Court: New Directions in Prison Law, 56 TEx. L. REV. 963, 967-71 (1978) (arguing
that new administrators adapted inmate protections to existing bureaucratic
functioning of organization, changing practices only when necessary to smooth
bureaucratic procedures and functions).
52 See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 91 (stating that administrator abolished
isolation, arguing that "throwing six inmates into a cramped cell, where it was likely
that one or more would be beaten and raped, was not sound prison management").
53 See, e.g., id. at 88 ("[Stateville] must develop tables of organization, lines of
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tightly-defined procedures, responding only to normative constraints imposed from the outside.5 4
Professional managers do not challenge the prison's normative
commitment to order. They have no normative or moral agenda
aimed at restoring the prisoners' dignity. Rather, the inmates' status
is important to the manager only to the extent that it directly affects
the efficient operation of the prison. Managers are thus reluctant to
undertake any major change, given its potentially disruptive influence, unless such a change -is legally required or will contribute to
the orderly processing of inmates.5 5
The political system frequently reinforces values and norms that
perpetuate the status quo. Society lacks a political consensus about
the goals, purposes, and legitimacy of imprisonment. 5 6 Prisons
today must fulfill a series of conflicting goals, and the political system
cannot or will not provide a clear message as to what constitutes
acceptable conditions and practices within the prison.
In the face
authority and accountability. It must meet deadlines of all sorts imposed by [the
central office]. Most important, it must adhere to the Administrative Regulations.").
54 See, e.g., id. at 103-04 (revealing that the "primary commitment is to running a
safe, clean, program-oriented institution which functions smoothly on a day-to-day
basis and that is not in violation of code provisions, Administrative Regulations, or
court orders").
55 See, e.g., id. at 91 ("[The] main emphasis was upon building a modem
organization."); see also Alexander, supra note 51, at 967-71 (explaining how
managers "neutralize" external requirements in order to maintain control).
56 There is fundamental disagreement over the goals of incarceration and the
role of prisons in achieving these goals. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Compare the Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981),
declaring: "To the extent that [prison] conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they
are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,"
id. at 347, with the position taken by the Prison Research Education Action Project:
"Abolishing the punishment of prison is a fundamental step in abolishing the present
punitive criminal (in)justice systems."
PRISON RESEARCH EDUCATION ACTION
PROJECT, supra note 15, at 22. See also R. MARTINSON, T. PALMER & S. ADAMS,
REHABILITATION, RECIDIVISM, AND RESEARCH 10 (1976) (finding that the various
rehabilitative effects reported have in common their failure to curb recidivism); H.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36 (1968) ("[T]here are two ...
ultimate purposes to be served by criminal punishment: the deserved infliction of
suffering on evildoers and the prevention of crime."); Greenberg, The Correctional
Effects of Corrections:A Survey of Evaluations, in 8 CORRECTIONS AND PUNISHMENT 111,
140-41 (D. Greenberg ed. 1977) (advocating corrections programs committed "to
the avoidance of illegal behavior" rather than "conventionally imagined therapeutic
effects"); What Are Prisons For?, TIME, Sept. 13, 1982, at 38 (surveying American
attitudes on the goals of correctional facilities and discussing current schools of
thought in penology).
57 See Marshall, Correctional Treatment Processes: Rehabilitation Reconsidered, in
CRITICAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 31; Culbertson, Achieving
CorrectionalReform, in id. at 316.
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of this normative conflict, many corrections administrators will avoid
articulating or pursuing a particular set of goals to avoid creating an
5
inevitable controversy. 8
The public tends to be ignorant about and indifferent to the
quality of prison conditions. 5 9 Public outcry concerning prison conditions or the correctional system often only follows a publicized
scandal, riot, escape, release of inmates due to overcrowding, or violent crime by a person who is under the jurisdiction of the corrections system. 60 Public response to prison conditions tends to be
episodic, reactive, and directed to restoring order (and invisibility)
rather than restructuring prison practices to conform to a different
norm. 61 Legislators perceive the public as indignant about prisons'
62
operating expenses and insistent upon cost-cutting.
Legislators and executives are likely to respond to perceived
public antipathy to prison reform by opposing all funding increases
and reform initiatives except those intended to expand available
prison space. 63 The political system conveys to the prison bureaucracy a preoccupation with reducing costs and enhancing "incapaci58 See Cohn, supra note 44, at 125; cf L. CARROLL, supra note 29, at 51
(explaining why the resources of the institution are not committed to any goal
beyond self-maintenance, one guard said, "It's like having a ship without a
rudder.... If you say we're supposed to rehabilitate people, we don't do that. If
we're supposed to produce things, we don't do that either because we don't work
them enough. And all these changes mean we don't punish them either. Nobody
knows what we're supposed to do so we don't do anything").
59 See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 8-9; Giari, In Oklahoma,
Building More PrisonsHas Solved No Problems, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 450, 454-55 (1979).
60 See The Organizational Consequences of Remedial Law, supra note 46, at 16;
Toch, supra note 33, at 69-70.
61 See, e.g., T. WICKER, A TIME TO DIE 278-98 (1975) (discussing how the public
outcry over the violence during the Attica prison riots resulted in increased security
and the imposition by prison authorities of more repressive means of maintaining
order).
62 See, e.g., Austin, Using Early Release to Relieve Prison Crowding, 32 CRIME &
DELINQ.. 404, 412 (1986) (noting that although the public favors "'get tough'
policies, they are not always willing to pay for them"); Mullen, Prison Crowdingand the
Evolution of Public Policy, 478 ANNALS 31, 39 (1985) (explaining that the public's
"reluctance to spend money on prisoners" is responsible for the lack of support for
prison construction proposals); New Jails: Boom for Builders, Bust for Budgets, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 9, 1981, at 74-75 (relaying public sentiment as "[p]ut the prisoners in pup tents
behind barbed wire and give the guards machine guns- that's good enough"). In
part, this may reflect the view that prison conditions should be harsh and that
prisoners have a weak claim on public resources.
63 See Giari, supra note 59, at 460-61.
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This dynamic reinforces the prison
tation, control, and custody."'
65
system's commitment to ordler.
2.

Paralyzed Proponents of Change: Inmates, Treatment Staff,
and Progressive Administrators

There are, nevertheless, some internal sources of support for
the norms underlying reform. Inmates, treatment staff, and reformminded or professional managers may embrace the norm of promoting individual dignity and rehabilitation. However, reform-minded
members of the prison community frequently lack the power and
public support necessary to institutionalize their normative
framework.
Inmates are the group most naturally interested in reform and
supportive of the norm of promoting individual dignity and rehabilitation. Inmates continually suffer from the conditions violating the
Constitution. Under the traditional, closed system of social control,
their needs are subordinated entirely to the demands of maintaining
66
order, discipline and, in some prisons, a productive labor force.
Prison reform promotes the view that inmates deserve decent treatment and respect as individuals with basic human rights.6 7 The
reform process elevates the prisoners' status both in the prison and
68
in society generally.
64 See

Marshall, Correctional Treatment Processes: Rehabilitation Reconsidered, in

CRITICAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 31.

65 See, e.g., J. IRWIN, supra note 25, at 129-30 (noting that custody concerns
dominate the decisionmaking process of even those who are committed to
treatment); M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 44-45 (explaining how public service workers
must sacrifice individual treatment in order to meet the requirements of mass
processing).
66 See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 102-04 (1971).

The status

of inmates in prison is a particular example of a more general phenomenon
characterizing the status of clients in "street-level bureaucracies." See M. LIPSKY,
supra note 25, at 57-58. Prisons exhibit a particularly pronounced version of the
subordination of clients' needs and interests to the demands of processing,
disciplining, and maintaining order due to their punitive purpose and their character
as "total institutions"-institutions "symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse
with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the physical plant ...
E. GOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 4-5.
67 SeeJ. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 93; Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its
Impacts, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT, supra note 29, at 35-45.
68 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 203 (noting that reforms

stemming from law suit were viewed as changing status of prison in eyes ofJefferson
Parish officials and general citizenry). Politicized inmates link their status to broader
patterns of racism and class domination in society and view prison reform as part of a
larger goal of more fundamental political change. SeeJ. IRWIN, supra note 25, at 9498; Jacobs, supra note 67, at 36.
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Inmates may increase their autonomy by involving outsiders
who do not share the perspective and concerns of the prison community. Outside scrutiny limits the discretion and authority of guards
and administrators and increases the autonomy and freedom of the
inmates.6 9 Many of the substantive changes sought and won in the
courts involve limiting the discretion and arbitrary control of the
prison officials (i.e. preserving the inmates' rights to due process)
and enhancing the freedom of inmates (to exercise, participate in
programs, read, communicate with the outside world, etc.). 7"
Despite inmates' natural potential to serve as catalysts for
change, their institutional position, social and political status, and
mechanisms for coping with the pains of imprisonment constrain
their role in promoting prison reform. Inmates subject to daily deprivation and institutionalized powerlessness are likely to be most
interested in enhancing their place within the prison's social structure. Power is an end in itself, a means of coping with the vulnerability of prison life and possibly even continuing power struggles that
began on the street. 7 This tendency is heightened by the existence
of group affiliations that begin on the outside and continue within
the prison. Inmates derive their sense of self, their support, their
power, and their protection within the prison from the group. 72 The
ability to change conditions within the prison becomes a means of
furthering the power and resources of the group, rather than a
means of improving their living conditions. Thus, a large part of
group activity within the prison is used to exert power over others
within the prison, rather than to attempt to improve conditions
generally.
The elite group of inmates who achieve power and prestige by
bargaining with guards tend to have strong interests in maintaining
order. Official support for their privileged position depends on their
69

See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 67, at 36 ("Just by opening a forum in which

prisoners' grievances could be heard, the federal courts destroyed the custodians'
absolute power and the prisoners' isolation from the larger of society.").
70 See supra notes 16-18, 38 and accompanying text.
71 See B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 203;J. IRWIN, supra note 25,
at 8-16; see also Gigot,Assaults, Drug Traffic and Powerful Gangs Plaguea Penitentiary, Wall
St.J., Aug. 20, 1981, at 1, 19, col. 1 (reporting that prison authorities estimated that
80% of the inmates in Stateville belong to the five major Chicago gangs and that
within the prison the gangs engage in a daily struggle for control).
72 See J. IRWIN, supra note 25, at 60; see also Penn, Prison Gangs Formed By Racial
Groups Pose BigProblem in West, Wall St.J., May 11, 1983, at 1, 24, col. 1 (reporting that

inmates join gangs for self-preservation, protection, and access to favorable jobs and
money).
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ability to maintain order.7 3 The perquisites of their status, such as
access to privileged information, good food, privacy, and the ability
to defy the institution's rules with impunity,74 provide significant
incentives to adopt the normative commitment to order. Because
change tends to open up the system of privilege and undermine their
power, it is not uncommon for the old inmate elite to oppose prison
reform.

75

Treatment staff constitute another group within the prison that
aspires to norms inconsistent with the status quo. Many treatment
staff members bring to the job a commitment to the norm of promoting individual dignity and rehabilitation developed outside of the
prison system.7 6 Their responsibilities are frequently diffuse, but
clearly they define their role as providing individual inmates with
support, advocacy, and counseling.7 7 Treatment staff therefore
introduce into the prison system a limited form of internal accountability. Uncomfortable with their role in perpetuating inhumane
prison conditions, counselors seemingly represent a constituency
whose norms and interests coincide with the reform agenda.
Inmate-oriented reform both conforms to counselors' goals and selfimage and enhances their power within the prison.
Despite this natural alliance with a change agenda, treatment
staff are generally not an important internal source of change. They
routinely encounter resistance to the efforts they make to provide
services; counselors' challenges to the prevailing normative structure
are almost always rebuffed. They are, for the most part, powerless in
the face of the system-wide intransigence. Often counselors end up
73 See, e.g., B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 41 (describing how the
Director of the Department of Corrections in Texas maintained a building tender
system because it was an important s;ource of information and control). The ability of
inmates to conduct illicit activities also depends upon the maintenance of order. See
Colvin, supra note 42, at 453.
74 See, e.g., B. CROUCH & J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 108-09 (describing
privileges that flowed from elite status, such as pressed clothes, freedom of
movement, permission to have weapons, and immunity from punishment).
75 See, e.g., Cloward, Social Control in the Prison, in PRISON WITHIN SOCIETY 78,
103-04 (L. Hazelrigg ed. 1968) (describing how the elite prisoners strongly defend
their privileged position against encroachment by other inmates).
76 See, e.g., C. PRotrr & R. Ross, CARE AND PUNISHMENT: THE DILEMMAS OF
PRISON MEDICINE 56-59, 81-82, 154 (1988) (describing how many of those on the
staff of the prison health project saw themselves as health advocates for the inmates
and were dedicated to the struggle for justice, liberty, and equal rights within the
prison).
77 See J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 94.
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adapting their norms to conform to the institution's dominant
8
ethic.
Reform-minded administrators appear to be uniquely situated
to introduce norms consistent with change. Administrators interested in reform often come from outside the prison system they seek
to change. 79 Many have training in social work, counseling, or
another therapeutic discipline, and have varying de'rees of experience within a prison.8 0 These administrators bring to corrections
the belief that the prison system's norms must be reoriented away
from a primarily custodial or punitive orientation to focus on the
inmates' needs for individual attention, rehabilitation, and services.8 ' Job satisfaction depends on success in implementing change.
Thus, their normative framework and goals tend to conflict with the
value system and normative framework of the existing custodial
order.
Although reform administrators are a potential internal source
of change, they also confront substantial obstacles to the pursuit of a
reform agenda. A systemic preoccupation with order, shared by
guards and conservative administrators and reinforced by the political system, undermines potential internal reformers' efforts to institutionalize their normative framework.
Moreover, reform
administrators frequently lack the information, expertise, and power
necessary to implement change.
B. Incentive System Reinforcing the Status Quo
The system of incentives that has developed around each major
group within the system tends to reinforce a normative commitment
78

See id. at 98-99.

79 See, e.g., L. CARROLL, supra note 29, at 44 (explaining that the new warden,

hired to move the prison in the direction of "therapeutic atmosphere," was an
outsider to system); J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 74-75 (noting that reform
administration with strong academic orientation came from outside the system);
McCleery, supra note 41, at 122 (describing how new warden and his top staff "were
unfamiliar with and shocked by the detailed processes" of prison government).
80 See, e.g., Jacobs & Crotty, supra note 29, at 140 (listing the warden's priorities
as "(1) the procurement of professional treatment personnel and the establishment
of treatment programs, (2) the education of his staff in the perspective of treatment
ideology , and (3) a further relaxation of custodial measures"); cf Cohn, supra note
44, at 126-27 (social work is seen as ideal educational background for correctional
workers).
81 See, e.g., L. CARROLL, supra note 29, at 48-50 (noting the "new breed" of
administrators that were college-educated in sociology and psychology); McCleery,
supra note 41, at 122-27 (documenting new administration's commitment to reform
and the rehabilitative ideal).
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to order at the expense of the individual. There are few, if any, positive incentives to challenge the status quo. Sanctions are rarely
imposed for narrowly defining tasks and disclaiming responsibility
for the prison's problems.
The risks and costs associated with seeking change outweigh the
meager and uncertain benefits associated with undertaking reform.
Prison officials are essentially left alone as long as they maintain
order. Those in a position to facilitate or frustrate order tend to
wield tremendous informal power within the prison and seek to
retain the existing set of norms and incentives.
The status and condition of inmates diminishes their incentive
to engage in reform activities. Imprisonment constantly reminds
inmates of their vulnerability and dependence, reducing their will to
act. Some prisoners respond by withdrawing; they define their existence very narrowly, focus on surviving their prison term, and simply
try to stay out of the way of guards and fellow inmates and "do their
own time." 8 2 Efforts to initiate change are shunned because they are
likely to increase inmates' visibility and offend those in a position to
retaliate against "trouble-makers." 8 " Those most vulnerable may be
the least willing or able to take an active role in challenging those
84
conditions.

Guards have strong incentives to preserve the status quo. Their
performance is evaluated in relation to their ability to maintain
order.8 5 Advancement may depend on demonstrating toughness
and the ability to control inmates.8 6 By asserting authority and control, guards also seek to enhance their power and make their work
82 See J. IRWIN, supra note 25, at 197-205. This reaction is encouraged by the
attitudes of prison authorities. See, e.g., Cloward, supra note 75, at 83 (noting that
prison officials believe that "the mcdel prisoner is the isolated prisoner").
83 See, e.g., Flittie, The Class Representative: A PersonalExperience, 13 NAT'L PRISON
PROJECT J. 19, 19 (1987) (describing life of class representative as "experienced
various forms of retaliation by prison officials, threats, harassment, cell shakedowns,
denied visits, denied parole three times, denied any outside the walls activities").
84 See Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062, 1079 & n.88
(1979).
85 See B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 56-57; M. LIPSKY, supra note

25, at 11-12.
86 See, e.g., B. CROUCH & J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 53 (noting that to

advance in the security hierarchy, officers must demonstrate a familiarity with the
guard subculture, and thus "in the background of almost all ranking officers and
wardens was a reputation for being able to manage, physically as well as
psychologically, inmates who balked at compliance with rules or orders" ); Marquart,
supra note 37, at 358-60.
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safer and more predictable.8 7 These values also promote guard
autonomy. Guards are often subject to strict scrutiny from above
and formal disciplinary measures.8 8 Like many workers, guards seek
to increase their autonomy by defining
a realm within the hierarchy
89
control.
exclusive
their
under
that is
By exploiting their discretion and autonomy, guards can create
and benefit from a system of bargaining and exchange with inmates.
Some guards, particularly veterans who worked under the old regime
and have developed a power base within the prison community, illicitly supplement their income and benefits through the system of
90
exchange worked out in part to maintain order.
Guards have few substantial incentives or opportunities to
embrace a reform agenda. Opportunities for advancement are not
tied to demonstrated commitment to efficient and sensitive service
delivery.9 Salary and benefits are strictly governed by seniority and
civil service provisions and thus do not relate to the quality of service
delivery. 92 Guards have few incentives to support reform efforts initiated by those who embrace a contrary perspective and for whom
they have little empathy.
Guard unions and senior guards may exert substantial pressure
upon the rank-and-file workers not to engage in reform activity.
Those who support reform efforts perceived by the union or its
senior membership as inconsistent with the union's interests are
often ostracized or otherwise informally punished.93 Demoralized
87

See, e.g., B. GROUCH &J.

MARQUART,

supra note 29, at 56-60 (explaining how

guards maintained control through a show of force).
88

See, e.g., J.JAcoBs, supra note 25, at 39 (describing tight control exercised over

guards); L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 134 (describing infantilization and
dehumanization of guards by administration); Jacobs & Crotty, supra note 29, at 139

(noting that a "line officer is often scrutinized as closely as the inmate under his
surveillance").
89 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 45-46; cf M. CROZIER, supra note 24, at 5455 (explaining that people build bureaucracies to evade dependence and obtain
protection from arbitrary decisions).
90 See, e.g., C. SILBERMAN, supra note 33, at 402 (explaining that prison officials
regulate, rather than suppress, illegal activity); B. Chilton, Guthrie v. Evans: Civil
Rights, Prison Reform, and Institutional Reform Litigation 91 (1989) (unpublished
dissertation) (describing how guards allowed inmates to keep weapons and sell
contraband).
91 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 152.
92 See infra note 127 and accompanying text; see also M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at
48-52 (describing difficulty of developing effective performance measures and
institutionalizing them in street-level bureaucracies).
93 See Sturm, The Rhode Island Prison Decree, in G. HAZARD & D. LouISELL, CASES
ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 110, 114 (4th ed. 1979).
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and dissatisfied employees will typically resign or decrease the extent
94
of their commitment to their job rather than support change.
Indeed, guards often use their seniority to obtain positions that
enable them to avoid interaction with inmates and other staff, such as
tower duty.9 5 Inmates create further pressure for guards to limit
their involvement. In prisons where group conflict is pervasive,
prison officials have themselves sometimes responded by withdrawing and abdicating responsibility for prison conditions to the prison9 6
ers themselves.
Treatment staff similarly confront substantial disincentives to
pursuing reform. They tend to receive meager support for their
work from the administration. 9 7 They are frequently hired in insufficient numbers relative to their caseload.9 8 The prison administration rarely provides them with the assistance necessary to improve
their human services capacity. Instead, in addition to huge
caseloads, they are given responsibility for significant bureaucratic
functions, such as processing requests for information, evaluating
inmates, sitting on disciplinary committees, and expediting information.9 9
Counselors tend to find their human services duties
0
subordinated to people processing.'1
94 See M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 142-43 (describing how in the face of their

perceived loss of power, autonomy, and status within the prison, some guards adapt
by withdrawing from the workplace, either by leaving or by "withdraw[ing]
psychologically without actually quitting, rejecting personal responsibility for agency
performance" ); see also Gigot, supra note 71, at 1, col. 1 ("Many honest guards are
afraid and frustrated, which helps to explain why 25% of the guards call in sick each
day.").
95 See Toch, supra note 33, at 62.
96 SeeJ. IRWIN, supra note 25, at 23-24; C. SILBERMAN, supra note 33, at 399; see

also Lieber, The American Prison, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 26, 35,
57 ("[O]fficers often appear to hang back in the sally ports and administrative desk
areas ...[I]n many institutions guards will not even go into the buildings at night, a
procedure that permits unbridled conduct among inmates."). Inmates' resulting
power and autonomy predisposes leaders of inmate groups to resist any steps that
would cut back on that autonomy and power.
97 See, e.g., C. PROUT & R. Ross, CARE AND PUNISHMENT: THE DILEMMAS OF
PRISON MEDICINE 81-82 (1988) (documenting the lack of support received by prison

health project from administration and legislature); J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 96-98
(documenting how counselors backed down in a dispute over their role in the prison
when they failed to receive any administrative support).
98 See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 96, at 35, 56 (reporting that in Indiana, where ten
counselors are on the staff, if they work eight hours a day interviewing inmates, they
cannot give each prisoner an hour per month of services).
99 See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 97-100 (documenting counselors'
assignment of "go for" duties and participation on numerous prison committees).
100 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 86, 138-39 (noting that expert at trial

reported that classification teams ignored their own procedures in a rush to move
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Guards frequently resist the treatment staff's efforts to perform
their duties. As relative newcomers to the prison system, the college-educated counselors challenge the existing control model, 1
and threaten guards' status within the prison.1 0 2 Counselors undercut guards' role by taking over the treatment and advocacy functions
previously performed by guards.10 3 Treatment staff intensify guard
hostility by frequently siding with inmates in disputes with guards.
Counselors also encounter resistance from inmates. Counselors,
teachers, and other civilian staff often take over some of the jobs previously occupied by inmates. 10 4 Furthermore, inmates are not
always willing participants in the rehabilitative enterprise. The structure of service delivery in the prison predisposes them to view "rehabilitation" as another form of social control. Instead, they tend to
use counselors as advocates to intervene on their behalf in institutional problems and as a means of getting information and
05

services. 1

Limited expertise and support inhibit the ability of treatment
staff to pursue goals contrary to the prevailing ethic. Counselors lack
the professional skills and status to make a strong case for independence and discretion, even in the performance of their counseling
prisoners through the system). See generally M. LIPsxY, supra note 25, at 140-42
(analyzing the tendency of street-level bureaucrats to focus on people-processing
rather than counseling, treatment, or advocacy).
101 In the wake of renewed interest in the 1950s and 1960s in the prison as a
vehicle for rehabilitating offenders, civilian staff and professionals were hired to
perform service functions for the inmates. Although previously there were
professionals who provided medical services and limited psychiatric services, they
were usually part time, had huge caseloads, and were uninvolved with the day-to-day
functioning of the institution. In the 1950s and 1960s, prisons began to hire full time
civilian staff to perform many of the service functions previously performed by
guards. SeeJacobs & Crotty, supra note 29, at 140.
102 See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 96 (noting that the introduction of,
counselors traumatized the guard force because they posed a threat to the ultimate
control of the prison).
1o3 See, e.g., id. at 96 (reporting that counselors were hired to carry out "clean
work" previously performed by guards while guards continued to be responsible for
"dirty work").
104 See, e.g., M.K. HARRMS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 111 (discussing the
"converting [of the Arkansas] prison system from a system run by inmates to a
system run by free personnel"); J. JACoBs, supra note 25, at 93 (noting that the
introduction of civilian counselors "served to eliminate inmates from some of the
most self-respecting work in the prison"); Colvin, supra note 42, at 454 (noting that
the administration removed all inmates from administrative positions in programs).
105 See, e.g., J. JAcoBs, supra note 25, at 95 ("[Inmates were more interested in
enlisting the counselors as advocates than as therapists.").
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duties. 10 6 Counselors often respond to this situation by quitting or
withdrawing from the job psychologically. 0 7 Others embrace the
control function of the institution and become more actively
involved in administrative processing activities.'1 8 Neither of these
approaches serves as an impetus to institutional change.
Prison administrators face substantial pressures, both from
within the prison system and from the external political environment, to avoid rocking the boat. They are immediately accountable
to the political official who atppointed them, whose major concern, in
many cases, is "keeping the lid on" the prison system. 10 9 Given the
political powerlessness of inmates and the lack of widespread support for prison reform, there is little political advantage to be gained
by pursuing corrections reform. Not surprisingly, corrections tends
to be low on the state's list of policy priorities. The governor is often
concerned with keeping inmates in, costs down, and visible disturbances out of the news. Thus, administrators are expected to avoid
major scandals or disruption. Failure to do so may lead to a change
in administration and will certainly lead to a loss of the current
administration's credibility. Because change is perceived as posing a
substantial risk of disruption, the governor's office frequently
enhances the pressure toward custody, order, and the status quo.
The budgetary process frequently reinforces this drive to preserve the status quo. Concerned with keeping costs (and taxes)
down, the governor and his or her budgetary staff frequently use current programs, staffing, and resources as the framework for the next
year's allocations.' t° Unless there is a dramatic increase in prison
population; there is little support for a substantial increase in fund106 See, e.g., id. at 94 (noting that counselors were not social workers or
psychologists, and only a few had any experience in any kind of counseling).
107 See, e.g., id. at 98 (de,.cribing counselors' passive revolt against the
organization, during which they "retreated into psychological alienation and physical
isolation"); M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 143 (noting that the discrepancy between
what workers are supposed to do and what they can actually accomplish led many
either to quit or to withdraw psychologically).
108 See, e.g., M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 144.
109 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 93, at 116; see also B. McELENEY, CORRECTIONAL
REFORM IN NEW YORK: THE ROCKEFELLER YEARS AND BEYOND 30 (1985) (noting that
the "Governor's priority ... was . . . a pragmatic maintenance of the status quo in
most issue areas ....
Because Corrections had traditionally been accorded a low
priority and there were ... no public riots nor demonstrations within the prisons that
demanded Gubernatorial reaction, the Division of the Budget was granted virtual
autonomy in the trimming or amendment of the original Correction Department
budget").
110 See B. McELENEY, supra note 109, at 26-31; T. Storey, Courts and
Corrections: The New York CityJail Litigation 8 (1988) (unpublished paper) (on file
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ing, particularly for innovative or service-oriented programs."'1
Because many prison systems are critically overcrowded, money that
might otherwise have been budgeted for improvements in the quality
of service delivery is likely to be diverted to provision of additional
2
bed-space."
Administrative reform also tends to trigger strong and immediate resistance from the guard force-both line staff and supervisors.1 13

The normative structure, values, and incentives of the

guards predispose most to perceive the reform administrator as
threatening to the guards' role, autonomy, and power. 11 4 Through
withdrawal, disruption, and resistance, guards can neutralize policy
reforms and force new administrators to deal with immediate crises5
of control, diverting attention and energy from reform programs. 1
The resulting publicity and disorder threaten the fragile external
support structure upon which the administrator depends. The governor and sympathetic legislators, concerned about the potential for
disruption, have strong incentives to back down in the face of
opposition.' 16
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (stating that the budget process
"tended to magnify the low level of political support jails received").
I I I See, e.g., Judges' Authority in Prison Reform Attacked, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1982,
at Al, col. 2, A21, col. 2 [hereinafterJudges'Authority](reporting that New York State
voters "rejected a $500 million bond issue intended to provide more state and
county cell space"); supra note 62 (noting public reluctance to spend money on
prisons).
112 See, e.g., Giari, supra note 59, at 454 (noting that when the Oklahoma
legislature authorized funds for hew construction, it slashed operating expenses);
Thomas, Stribling, Chaka, Clemons, Secret & Neal, Prison Conditionsand Penal Trends,
CRIME & SOCIALJUsTnCE 49, 49 (Summer 1981) (reporting that in Illinois, less than
.006% of the total corrections budget was allocated to improving existing
conditions). Overcrowding not only threatens the viability of programs designed to
improve prison conditions, but also degrades the quality of existing services, since
increases in population frequently are not accompanied by increases in staff, services,
or equipment. See Toch, supra note 33, at 62-65. Thus, overcrowding dramatically
increases the pressure toward mass processing at the expense of meeting the basic
human needs of inmates. See Ellis, supra note 33, at 296.
113 See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 176 (describing the resentment of the
Stateville prison guards when reform was instituted by the new "pro-inmate"
warden).
114 See, e.g., id. at 82-83 (describing the increasing embitterment of the Stateville
guards as their traditional roles were undermined by reform measures).
115 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 164-66. Guards derive some power
simply from their longevity in the organization. Many are likely to have seen
administrations come and go, along with their various reform proposals. See, e.g., J.
KNOTr & G. MILLER, supra note 20, at 158 (describing the relative control of the
president over lower-level permanent bureaucrats, who know that they "will still be
there when the present administration has come and gone").
116 Cf Alexander, supra note 51, at 970 & n.38 (explaining that, in order to
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The corrections profession also fails to provide sufficient external incentives for administrators to undertake reform. Although
there are professional organizations, such as the National Institute of
Corrections, that provide technical assistance and expertise to state
systems seeking such support,' 17 the corrections profession has not
developed the power, visibility, or credibility to counteract the local
pressures facing corrections administrators. The profession lacks
the capacity to hold its members accountable for their performance. 1 8 Until recently, most prisons functioned as isolated, inwarddirected systems with little outside contact." 9 Some administrators
continue to resist the input of national professional organizations
and outside expertise, and perceive the development of professional
standards as an imposition on their autonomy.' 20 Many state and
local prison administrators continue to function with little substantive interaction with others in the discipline.
Thus, members of the prison community have few effective
incentives supporting their efforts to introduce significant change.
avoid adverse publicity, the new administrator will "take a firm stand only against
rampant brutality while accommodating union demands that guards not be held
accountable for isolated incidents of force against inmates").
117 The National Institute of Corrections is a federal agency that plays a
significant role in promoting progressive reform in prisons. It has sponsored
research conferences and training programi in such areas as the development and
implementation of grievance procedures and the training of special masters to carry
out their role of monitoring couri decrees in prison cases. Seg J. JACOBS, supra note
29, at 47. The American Correctional Association serves as a mechanism for
exchanging information and ideas. "More important is the ACA's substantial
accreditation project ... which attempts to hold state and local prisons and jails to
comprehensive and progressive confinement conditions and practices." Id.; see AM.
CORRECTIONAL Ass'N, ACCREDITATION:

BLUE PRINT FOR CORRECTIONS (1978).

118 See Cohn, supra note 44, at 128. For this reason, some argue that the
accreditation process set up by the American Correctional Association has not been
effective in achieving broad scale compliance with minimum standards of decency.
See Conrad, Chartinga Coursefor Imprisonment Policy, 478 ANNALS 123, 124 (1985).
119 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 84 (recounting that the
Arkansas prison system was closed to public and court scrutiny prior to 1965); J.
JACOBS, supra note 25, at 19, 35-37 (noting that prison officials were reluctant to
involve intellectuals in the daily operations of the prison and restricted public access
to the prison in order to suppress the flow of information about the prison to
"outsiders").
120 Cf Conrad, supra note 118, at 124 (noting that "the Maryland legislature has
prohibited its prison administrators from spending state funds to engage in the
accreditation process"). There are strong indications that high-level corrections
administration is in the midst of a trend toward professionalization, see infra notes 248
& 338, influenced at least in part by pressure generated by judicial intervention.
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C.

Inadequate Information Exchange and Expertise

Prison systems generally lack mechanisms for gathering information about daily activities and communicating it to those in policymaking positions.1 2 Administrators tend to have little contact with
or knowledge of day-to-day activities within the prison and are
dependent on those inside for information. Administrators tend to
be isolated from the informal network of relationships that effectively
governs daily life in the prison system. Guards and inmates, who
possess information about how the system is functioning, frequently
have neither the incentive nor the opportunity to communicate this
information to the administration.
Guards have firsthand knowledge of the prison's potential problem areas, inmates' responses to the system, and how proposed
changes are likely to affect their work. However, guards have no formal access to high-level administrators and, like many street-level
bureaucrats, are likely to suppress negative information that might
adversely affect their position in the organization.' 2 2 Administrators
frequently contribute to this tendency by stereotyping, guards as
incompetent and resistant to change. 123 Rather than rely on insiders
for information and advice regarding policy, administrators often
remove themselves from direct contact with the prison and surround
themselves with a cadre of outside staff who are sympathetic to the
121 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 299 (describing the
record-keeping system in Orleans Parish Prison as nonexistent or indecipherable);
M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 29 (describing the general absence of mechanisms for
effective information exchange in street-level bureaucracies); Plan: Corrections
Panel, Spear v. Ariyoshi, November 5, 1985, at 13 (indicating that creation of a
management information system is crucial to safe and orderly operations).
122

See, e.g.,

THE

CENTER

FOR

COMMUNITY JUSTICE,

PRISON

GRIEVANCE

MECHANISMS MANUAL 19-20 (1977) [hereinafter PRISON GRIEVANCE MANUAL]
(describing the control over information flow enjoyed by line officers); see also M.K.
HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 36-39 (documenting that silence about guard

and prisoner behavior in general and about the informal use of force by officers in
particular is an important norm); L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 126 (documenting
inadequate communication between departmental and institutional administration
and corrections officers). This lack of communication between guards and
administrators is a particularly acute example of a general pattern in bureaucracies:
subordinates are afraid or unwilling to pass bad news up the organizational ladder.
See C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 61 (1975); H. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 42-48 (1967).
This tendency is particularly pronounced in organizations in which there is little

perceived benefit in risk taking. See C. PERROW,N supra note 25, at 29, 33-34.
123 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 122; Jacobs & Crotty, supra note 29, at
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reform agenda.12 4 Guards typically have no role in developing or
implementing changes that profoundly affect their work, are basically
excluded from any access to decisionmaking or policy, and lack an
effective means of communicating information about the problems
1 25
of the current system.
Unionization has enhanced the power of guards and their capacity to express their concern; about prison conditions and practices.
Management must deal with guards' concerns at least in the context
of contract negotiations and grievances. In some instances, guard
unions have introduced concerns about prison overpopulation,
26
guards' powerlessness, and the failure to control inmate violence.
The context of the interaction between guards and management is
quite limited, however, and ordinarily does not address the kinds of
policies and behavior that contribute to unconstitutional prison conditions. Management has been quite resistant to the involvement of
guard unions in administrative decisionmaking and has for the most
part treated union negotiations as a separate management problem
to be handled. Moreover, unions have frequently focused their
attention on increasing their control over job and shift assignments,
preserving the interests of senior guards, and increasing guards' pay
and benefits.

127

124 See, e.g., J.JACOBS, supra note 25, at 83-84 ("For the captains who once made
and interpreted policy, access to the warden became increasingly restricted. The
formulation of policy became increasingly separate from its implementation.");
McCleery, supra note 41, at 133 (describing how, in his role as superintendent, one
former treatment worker "gradually became less receptive to the transmission of
problems from below, limited the access of subordinates to the warden, and
permitted the atrophy of various channels of communication which had marked the
administration in its most vigorous phase").
125 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 123-25 (describing guards' lack of
opportunities for effective input); Hepburn, supra note 40, at 51 ("Prison guards
frequently and publicly voice thenr feeling that they have too little influence in
decisions about the operations and goals of the prison.").
126 SeeJ.JACOBS, supra note 29, at 143-46;J. WYNNE,,supra note 43, at 214-15; see
also ACI Guards Protest Overcrowding; Cite "Mismanagement", Providence J., Sept. 16,
1988, at 4, col. 1 (reporting that the union would conduct a peaceful picket but
threatened to strike to protest overcrowding, mandatory overtime, staff shortages
and general mismanagement).
127 See, e.g., J. WYNNE, supra note 43, at 156-87 (characterizing the chief product
of collective bargaining between prson management and guards' unions as contracts
primarily dealing with economics, employee organizations, and operations, and
noting that "[miost employee demands that directly affect policy . . . are not settled
through collective bargaining"). Union control over job assignment has, in some
systems, contributed to the problem of maintaining order because unions have
assigned jobs based on seniority. As a result, those with seniority have selected jobs
with little inmate contact, relegating the jobs requiring the greatest skill and
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Inmates are in a position to experience directly the prison system's failures. They know how bad the food is, who is abusing
inmates, how the medical care system is failing, which guards are
dealing in contraband, and which inmates are terrorizing others. Yet
inmates rarely have the opportunity to communicate information
about systemic inadequacies to those with the formal power to
implement change. 28 Although some systems have instituted
inmate grievance mechanisms that provide some outlet for inmate
complaints, the scope of these systems and the degree to which they
are integrated into policymaking is usually restricted.1 2 1 In addition,
inmates have few incentives to communicate this information to
prison officials. In fact, the inmate code strongly sanctions giving
information to or forming relationships with prison officials. 1 30
Consequently, administrators frequently lack the information
essential to making an accurate assessment of the current status of
the institution when addressing immediate problems or developing
long-range policies."' This dearth of information is exacerbated by
the absence of a professional network of resources and expertise to
facilitate the development of creative, pragmatic approaches to
corrections.' 32
D. Insufficient Power to Institutionalize Reform

Prison administrators sit at the top of the formal prison hierarchy.' 3 3 They are the individuals responsible for establishing policy,
experience to the most junior, least experienced guards. See supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
128 See PRISON GRIEVANCE MANUAL, supra note 122, at 19-20.
129 See id. at 15-21.
13o See, e.g., B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 74 (asserting that the
universal element of the inmate code is that inmates will not give information to
authorities about other inmates on pain of ostracism or even death); G, SYKES, supra
note 25, at 87 (describing the label "rat" or "squealer" as "the most serious
accusation that one inmate can level against another"). As an inmate in Alabama put
it, "if you wanted to live and be healthy you kept your mouth shut no matter what."
L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 88 n.6.
131 See PRISON GRIEVANCE MANUAL, supra note 122, at 20.
132 See Cohn, supra note 44, at 127-28 (criticizing the absence of a professional
body of knowledge and strong professional referent group); cf. Gilmore & McCann,
Designing Effective Transitionsfor New Correctional Leaders, in CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS:
IDEALS AND REALITIES 125, 131 (J. Doig ed. 1983) (asserting that prison executives
should have a "national professional network" in order to discuss common concerns
but that in reality few executives are "connected with well-developed networks of this
kind").
133 Most prison systems today have a centralized administration, with a
commissioner or director bearing responsibility for setting policy, submitting the
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implementing change, and managing the organization. They also
must implement judicial decrees. Based on the organizational chart,
prison administrators appear to have substantial power to determine
agency policy and direction. If competent administrators could use
their formal powers to bring about change, then the solution to
prison problems would be relatively straight-forward: develop and
hire competent administrators.
Despite their formal power, administrators often lack the
resources, information, and support needed to implement reform.
They are essentially dependent on their capacity to persuade relevant actors to cooperate. Administrators must rely on guards, staff,
and inmates for implementation of new rules and programs. They
must depend on executive officials, legislators, and judges for necessary resources and population control. The structure and politics of
the prison community create both the opportunity and the incentive
to resist and frustrate administrative attempts at reform.
Guards' pivotal role in processing inmates and maintaining
order affords them the opportunity to resist change effectively in several ways. Resistance and disruption provide guards their most
effective means of exerting power. Guards can refuse to maintain
order or even promote disorder.'
They can engage in a work slowdown or strike. Although some jurisdictions impose legal impediments to such collective action,' 35 the threat of a strike and the
potential disruptive effects of such an action give guards considera36
ble power to influence administrators.'
Guards can use disorder within the prison, even in the absence
of a strike, to undercut administrative initiatives. By refusing to act,
failing to exercise the authority necessary to maintain control, and in
some instances actively contributing to disruption, guards can place
budget, dealing with the legislature and the governor, supervising the department.
Depending on the size and structure of the department, there may also be assistant
directors or commissioners responsible for overseeing particular substantive areas,
such as treatment, security, and personnel. In addition, a warden or superintendent
has responsibility for overseeing the day-to-day functioning of a particular prison.
See Gilmore & McCann, supra note 132, at 125.
134 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 164-65; J. WYNNE, supra note 43, at 20407.
135 For example, see New York State's Taylor Law, Public Employees Fair
Employment Act, N.Y. CIv. SERV_ LAW § 210 (McKinney 1983 Supp. 1990), which
provides sanctions against individual strikers (two days salary lost for each day on
strike), see id. at § 210 (2) (g), and the union (loss of dues check off), see id. at § 210
(3), if it has authorized or condoned the walkout. In addition, courts, at the request
of the state, may issue injunctions against such walkouts, see id. at § 211.
136 See Alexander, supra note 51, at 970.
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considerable pressure on administrative reformers to return to the
37
traditional control model of administration.1
Guards also possess considerable power in the form of discretion and resistance. Because of the nature of their work and the hierarchical structure of the organization, it is very difficult for higher
ups to hold them accountable for implementing changes instituted
from above. Guards can simply refuse to implement change or can
communicate new policies in such a way as to thwart their effectiveness.13 8 Guards can and do reinterpret administrative policies into
goals and practices that fit within their routines and serve their own
3 9
ends of maintaining order, authority, and autonomy.1
Administrators have only limited power to overcome internal
resistance to reform. 1 40 They frequently lack effective control over
employee policies such as hiring, promotion, transfer, salary, and
discipline.' 4 ' Those who attempt to take direct steps to discipline,
transfer, or assign guards face strong resistance from the guards or
the union. 4 2 Similarly, inmates who perceive proposed reforms as
threatening their status or interests, or who perceive that the reforms
are insufficient, can thwart implementation by resisting programmatic changes.' 14 Thus, administrators are limited in their capacity
to influence the conduct of powerful groups within the prison whose
interests may conflict with their reform agenda.
In addition to the obstacles posed by the internal power structure, the administrator's power to bring about change is reduced by
the absence of a viable political constituency that supports expenditures necessary to improve prison conditions.' 44 The administrator
is dependent on legislative and executive support for new programs
and increased expenditures to improve existing facility, staffing, and
137 See, e.g., McCleery,supra note 41, at 138 (arguing that "the custodial force [of
Ohau Prison] did not really try to quell the riot. It was as though they took the
position that the superintendent, having started the trouble, could take care of it
himself").
138 See L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 124, 167.
139 See M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 13-14; C. SILBERMAN supra note 33, at 407-08.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
141 SeeJ. KNOTT & G. MILLER, supra note 20, at 157-58; cf. G. CHASE & E. REVEAL,
How To MANAGE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 69 (1983) (noting the inability of public

managers to control hiring, firing, and promotion).
142 See infra note 115-16 and accompanying text.
143 See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
144 See, e.g., F. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 64-69
(1969) (discussing the variable power of a public agency, and arguing that the extent
of an agency's power depends on the prestige, geographic dispersion, and
organization of its clientele).
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services. Frequently change can only occur with the infusion of new
resources into the system.' 4 5 Moreover, many of the most pressing
problems within the prison are related to inadequate facilities, staff,
14 6
and other resources.
Legislators and high level executive officials are frequently resistent to requests for increased expenditures to improve prison conditions.' 47 Many legislators are concerned with avoiding the
appearance of coddling criminals, and because of inmates' lack of
political power, stand to lose little in the way of electoral support for
taking a hard line on prisons. 1 48 To the extent that corrections has
been the repository for political patronage appointments, legislators
are also unlikely to support a regime that will undercut their informal
relationships with the prison.
Even in the face of riots, violence, or public exposure of brutal
conditions, legislatures frequently provide minimal support for
change. The familiar study commission or task force conducts a public hearing or investigation, culminating in a report with recommendations that are infrequently enacted into law.' 4 ° Even when the

legislature does respond to abuse with legislation, there is little
accountability for its enforcement and the administration may comfortably ignore it without legislative sanction.
The administrator depends on outside agencies to control the
size of the population within the prison. Prison administrators have
145 See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 7; cf. H. KAUFMAN, supra note
22, at 23-31 (describing how resource limitations can prevent organizational change).
146 See, e.g., Judges' Authority, svpra note 111, at A21, col. 2 (suggesting that the

courts and state offitials in states where severe financial constraints result in a lack of
prison resources generally have the greatest difficulty instituting reforms).
147 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 15-16 (noting that the
legislature and city administration resisted reform initiatives and refused to
appropriate the additional funds necessary to accomplish change); supra note 62
(noting public reluctance to spend money on prisons).
148 See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 84 (noting that public
opinion against prison reform was perceived clearly by the Arkansas legislature,
"which was described as adamantly opposed to appropriating money for prison
operations during the period preceding Holt v. Sarver"); cf What Are Prisons For?,
TIME, Sept. 13, 1982, at 41 (describing how legislators chastised corrections
commissioner for being "'soft on crime'" and noting that "'the people at home
want us to get tough' "(quoting Mississippi Corrections Commissioner Thigpen)).
149 See, e.g., B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 118-19 (finding that an
investigation by joint House and Senate legislative committee produced numerous
indictments of Texas prison system and recommendations for change, yet produced
no results); Mullen, supra note 62, at 43 ("Most task forces have essentially performed
as study groups whose ultimate accomplishment consists of a set of
recommendations for change ....
[I]n too many cases the effect of commission
recommendations has been negligible.").
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virtually no direct control over who is admitted to prison and limited
control over which inmates will be released. Legislatively-determined sentencing policy and cutbacks in good time and other early
release programs have recently contributed to prison overcrowding
by increasing the proportion of individuals sentenced to prison.' 50
Judges implement sentencing policy, thereby determining on a dayto-day basis how many new inmates will be added to the prison population and how long they will remain in prison. 5 1 Parole boards
determine when inmates will be released prior to the expiration of
their sentence.' 52 None of these organizations takes formal responsibility for prison conditions; none is accountable to the prison
administration; and none has strong incentives or channels for taking correctional concerns into account. 5
Thus, the administrator's capacity to control the size of the
prison population is limited. Overpopulation is a fact of life in
American prisons today, and it is a major obstacle to meaningful
programmatic reform.' 5 4 Overcrowding strains resources, undercuts the capacity to meet inmates' basic needs, exacerbates tensions,
and heightens the tendency to process inmates efficiently at the
expense of individual needs.' 55 Yet in the absence of judicial pressure, administrators are often unable to develop the coordinated,
systemic approach to the overpopulation problem that is necessary
150 See Austin & Krisberg, Incarcerationin the United States: The Extent and Future of
the Problem, 478 ANNALS 15, 27 (1985); see also B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note
29, at 120-21 (attributing growth of Texas prison population to strong community
and legislative attitudes against convicted offenders and tough sentencing
sentiment); Edelson, Court Orders South Carolina to Comply with Decree, 9 NAT'L PRISON
PROJECT J. 4 (Fall 1986) (noting that the stricter sentencing statutes passed by the
South Carolina Legislature contributed to increased prison population).
151 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 159 (noting that "on the
few occasions when the population of the prison had exceeded the limit, the judge
had been notified and the population reduced in less than the allowable time").
152 See 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 622 (C. Torcia ed. 12th ed. 1976);
Finn, Prison Crowding: The Response of Probation and Parole, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 141,
142-49 (1984) (documenting impact of probation and parole practices and policies
on overcrowding).
153 SeeJ. KNOTT & G. MILLER, supra note 20, at 146-50 (noting that multiplicity
of decision centers leads to "functional fiefdoms"); Finn, supra note 152, at 149
(noting that some governors, legislatures, judges and district attorneys have publicly
objected to use of parole to reduce population and that media publicity surrounding
crimes committed by parolees has generated hostility to the use of parole).
154 See, e.g., supra notes 33; see also M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 7
(commenting that overcrowding in the Arkansas system resulted in inmates sleeping
on cell floors and in corridors).
155 See Toch, supra note 33, at-59-6 1; supra notes 33 & 154.
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to remedy it.15 6 Thus, administrators who undertake the goal of
prison reform face significant constraints on their power to influence
the behavior of actors within the prison system and its political
environment.
Other change agents within the prison system lack the power to
mobilize resources and support necessary for reform. Although
inmates possess significant sources of power to initiate reform, their
transformative role is limited by their institutional position, social
and political status, and the mechanisms they develop for dealing
with the difficulty of imprisonment. Treatment staff are extremely
limited in their power to implement change.
One important source of inmates' power is their ability to
expose the prison system's inadequacies. As inmates gain access to
lawyers, legislators, and the media, they develop the capacity to use
their information about abuses within the system in order to involve
outsiders in the prison and create pressure on prison officials to
explain or change prison practices and conditions.' 5 7 Prison officials' autonomy and control depend on the insulation of the prison
from meaningful outside scrutiny."18 By exposing inadequacies in
the prison system, inmates retain a potent means of circumscribing
official autonomy and influencing outsiders' perspective on the
prison.
Inmates also possess substantial power based on their capacity
for disruption and violence.' 59 Guards can perform their jobs successfully only if inmates cooperate with them. 6 ' Guards' desire to
156 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 118, at 127 (calling for a systemic, integrated
approach to penal policy to address overcrowding); Mullen, supra note 62, at 34
(describing the need for a coherent corrections policy).
157 See, e.g., Cobb, Home Truths About Prison Overcrowding, 478 ANNALS 73, 83
(1985) (inmate author describing how he kept in constant contact with media to
promote change and protect himself from retaliation).
158 See, e.g., S. MARTIN & S. EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS: THE WALLS CAME
TUMBLING DOWN 24 (1988) (noting the censoring of prisoner communications as a
means of preserving authority in Texas prisons); C. SILBERMAN, supra note 33, at 396
(discussing the destruction of prisoner initiative by means of a near-monopoly on
information). To preserve this autonomy, prison officials, like other officials in
closed institutions, develop patterns of institutional display designed to give visitors
an "appropriate image" of the institution, insulating the less socially acceptable
conditions and forms of social control from outside intervention. See E. GOFFMAN,
supra note 25, at 102, 106.
159 See, e.g., B. Chilton, supra note 90, at 79 (describing inmates' strikes as a
means of obtaining an audience with prison officials).
160 In some systems, guards' dependency on inmates to maintain control is
formalized. For example, in Texas, prior to the court's intervention, inmates had
supervisory authority over other inmates, and used violence and the threat of
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obtain cooperation and avoid disruption gives inmates substantial
power. Similarly, administrators are predisposed to focus primarily
on maintaining order and avoiding disruption."6 ' Violence and the
threat of violence force administrators and the public to pay attention to inmate concerns, at least to the extent necessary to restore
and maintain order.' 6 2 It also may have the effect of provoking public debate about prison conditions and attracting the attention of
advocacy groups to the plight of inmates.' 6 ' Thus, inmates have the
potential to serve as a catalyst for change within the prison.
However, inmates' capacity to promote meaningful prison
reform activity is quite limited. Prison systems rely on regimentation, surveillance, and ritualized degradation to maintain order and
control.' 6 4 Even though the strict disciplinary control that traditionally characterized prisons has been tempered in a number of systems,
many prison systems continue to function based on the old organizational structure. This approach deprives inmates of any formal institutional power. Inmates are systematically and ceremonially
stripped of their status upon entry into the prison. Organized prison
reform activities are strongly discouraged, and in many institutions,
prohibited.' 6 5
Inmates cannot respond to unacceptable or brutal treatment by
seeking services elsewhere, nor can they directly sanction their keepviolence to maintain order, force inmates to work, and maintain their power. See L.
YACKLE, supra note 51, at 80. The prison situation thus provides a telling example of
how power derives from the capacity to create uncertainty and disruption; cf M.
CROZIER, supra note 24, at 109-10 (describing analogous symbiotic power
relationships in industrial bureaucracies).
161 See supra note 44-58, 109-20 and accompanying text. Thus, for example,
although the prison directors in the Texas system recognized the trustee system as a
dangerous and violent method of prisoner management and considered eliminating
the trustee system, they decided to maintain it because they concluded that "these
inmate intermediaries were a crucial source of intelligence and helped to maintain
control." B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 91.
162 See Toch, supra note 33, at 69; see also Officers Recapture New Mexico Prison
Without Resistance, N. Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at Al, col. 2 ("Prison officials made
among them less crowding, better food, improved
public I1 demands by inmates ....
recreational and education facilities, a halt to 'harassment' and no retaliation for the
uprising.").
163 See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 29, at 39 (detailing the accomplishments of
advocacy groups on behalf of prisoners).
164 See B. GROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 65-66; E. GOFFMAN, supra
note 25, at 14, 18; C. SILBERMAN, supra note 33, at 395; Cloward, supra note 75, at ??
78-79.
165 The Supreme Court upheld prison officials' prohibition of inmates'
organizing activities in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119
(1977).
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ers for brutality.' 6 6 Prison systems are established and mandated by
law. The state holds a monopoly on the provision of services, and
there is little concern that the institution's existence will be
1 67
threatened by inadequate service delivery.
There are also serious limitations to disruption and violence as
means of transforming prison conditions. It is true that violence
often attracts immediate attention and gives inmates a platform for
airing their grievances to the public.' 6 Inmate violence, however,
tends to reinforce the image of inmates as unworthy and uncontrollable, thus providing a justification for the use of repressive measures to maintain control.' 6 9 Inmates are likely to get attention, but it
may not be the kind they want. They have little control over the
response to disruption. In fact, using violence as power tends to
reinforce the primacy of order over humanity in the prison. Violence
tends to perpetuate the cycle of prison reform by leading to more
repressive control measures exercised in the name of restoring
order. 170

Inmates' power to influence outsiders, other than the court, to
166 See, e.g., M. LIPSKY, supra note 25, at 54-56 (because non-voluntary clients
can neither avoid nor withdraw from encounters with workers, they have a reduced
capacity to discipline street-level bureaucrats and little bargaining power). Indeed,
inmates can neither leave the institution nor, in the absence of litigation, express
their dissatisfaction directly to management, thus leaving prisoners without either the
"exit" or "voice" options identified by Albert Hirschman as mechanisms for
recuperation in Exit, Voice and Loyalty. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 34 (1970).
167 The current interest in privatizing aspects of prison administration is not
likely to pose a serious threat to the state's monopoly. Privatization has generated
substantial controversy over its legality and morality. It has not yet been widely
adopted, and where it has it has been largely restricted to transitional institutions,
minimum security facilities, or discrete aspects of service delivery, such as medical
care. See generally Symposium: Privatization of Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REv. (May 1987);
Note, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1987); Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring
Private Prisons, 96 YALE LJ. 353 (1986).
168

This attention is frequently short-lived. See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at

46-47 (describing short-lived public attention in response to a violent uprising in an
Alabama penitentiary). Inmates also run the risk that their attempts at disruption will
be promptly contained and severely sanctioned without public exposure of their
agenda.
169 See, e.g., J. IRWIN, supra note 25, at 140-41 (noting that after the Attica riot,
administrators who believed in cu.tody displaced those who believed in treatment).
170 See, e.g., id. at 144 (discussing the hostile reaction of townspeople towards
the Attica inmates); J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 25 (lock-up following riots was a
tradition at Stateville in times of crisis); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 47 (noting that
official response to inmate violence was to arm penal authorities in kind); B. Chilton,
supra note 90, at 92 (in response to violence, state appropriated funds to be used on
increasing security).
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take action to change existing conditions is also limited. Until
recently, inmates' access to the outside world was quite limited,17 1
and even today, prison officials try to minimize inmates' access to
lawyers, legislators, and the media.' 7 2 Moreover, inmates as a group
lack substantial political power. In many states they are not allowed
to vote, even after they have completed their sentence and returned
to the community. 17 3 Many prisoners come from groups that already
74
suffer from political powerlessness-people of color and the poor.1
Inmates' families are not a viable source of external pressure, in part
because of their low socio-economic status and their reluctance to be
publicly linked with the criminal justice system. In addition, inmates
suffer from a credibility problem; individuals convicted of a crime are
not considered reliable sources of information, particularly when
1 75
their self-interest is concerned.
Treatment staff are similarly constrained by their institutional
position. Counselors lack formal power within the prison system. In
most systems they are simply appended to the existing organizational hierarchy and are thus outside the control and decisionmaking
structures.' 77 They depend on guards for inmate movement and on
the administration for all policy decisions. They have little access to
information about either day-to-day conditions or policy.' 7 7 Unlike
guards and inmates, their potential for disruption is limited because
171 See, e.g., B. CROUCH & J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 60 ("Texas prison
officials enjoyed great autonomy when it came to controlling inmates ... due to the
prison system's geographic, political and legal isolation.").
172 See, e.g., B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 123 (describing how
prison officials viewed all writ writers as trouble makers and transferred them to limit
their activity);J.JACOBS, supra note 25, at 122 (describing how prison staff resisted the
intrusion of a legal services program).
173 The Supreme Court has upheld state laws permanently disenfranchising
felons. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding state laws
disenfranchising ex-felons); see also J. JACOBS, supra note 29, at 27-28 (discussing
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws); Goldberg & Marsh, Ex-Offenders Find
Doors Closed on Voting Rights, 3 NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ. 3 (Spring 1985).
174 SeeJ. JACOBS, supra note 29, at 61; Austin & Krisberg, supra note 150, at 16.
175 See L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 81.
176 Counselors and professional staff often are placed under the supervisory
control of custodial staff. See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 139 (noting that the
personnel responsible for classification reported to a line officer, resulting in the
subversion of classification to security concerns). Professional staff are often isolated
from the chain of command so that they have little or no contact with or input into
internal decisionmaking. See, e.g., J.JACOBS, supra note 25, at 97 (discussing a "lack of
concrete line authority").
177 See, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 99 ("The individual counselor still
remained outside of the central chain of command and without 'professional' duties
and responsibilities.").
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their duties lie outside the primary value system of the organization
and its participants. Thus, they are unlikely to have the capacity to
play a significant role in redirecting prison practices and programs.
Thus, those who pursue change lack the power to influence
those whose cooperation and support are necessary to transform
prison conditions and practices. Opponents of change are well-situated to thwart the efforts of internal advocates for reform. The
absence of a viable political constituency for prison reform, coupled
with public ambivalence or antipathy toward inmates, further limit
the power of internal prison reformers.
II.

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL STASIS

Court intervention takes place in the context of the dynamics of
organizational stasis. Because prison systems lack the normative
framework, incentive systems, information mechanisms, and power
structure to achieve institutional self-correction, the court's capacity
to resolve the remedial dilemma depends upon the court's ability to
alter these dynamics underlying organizational stasis. Part II of this
Article discusses the institutional attributes that enable courts to
bring about effective reform and the strategies that courts use to
manage the remedial process.
A.

Courts' Institutional Potentialto Unlock OrganizationalStasis

Courts are equipped to alter and reform each of the four factors
underlying organizational stasis and thereby institute meaningful
78
reform. The court is an external source of normative authority'
that is insulated from the direct political pressures that pervade the
prison dynamic.' 79 The court has the power to affect conduct by distributing both formal and informal rewards and sanctions to the
178 The term "norms" refers here to both principles of right action binding on
members of a group and to particular authoritative standards imposed to
institutionalize proper behavior. Courts are authoritative both in the sense that it is a
judicial function to declare norms and that they have access to the power of the state
to enforce those norms.
179 The federal judiciary's political insulation derives chiefly from the
constitutional grant of life tenure to federal judges. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Of
course, federal judges are not completely insulated from political pressures that may
limit their role as protectors of constitutional norms. Adverse publicity and social
ostracism may accompany judicial actions taken on behalf of inmates, as well as other
unpopular groups. See generally J. PELTASON, FIFT EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961).

District court judges may be personally affected by these pressures, and unwilling to
undertake unpopular or controversial action in the face of them.
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prison system's participants.' 8 0 By using this power the court can
alter the prison's incentive system and thereby encourage change.
Active judicial oversight and intervention can foster the development
of both new channels of information and expertise within the prison
system. The court can employ various information gathering mechanisms to create a common factual base from which to proceed."
Because judicial pronouncements are public and highly visible, they
expose prison conditions to public scrutiny." 2 Finally, by using its
formal and informal power to promote change, the court can shift
the power balance within the prison system to enable responsible
participants to bring about change. The court has the authority and
power to induce the prison system's various participants to assume
responsibility for institutional reform.18 3 Nevertheless, each of the
180 The potential of the court to influence power relations affecting the
institution at issue raises questions about the proper role of the court. If the court
acts as a "power broker," that role arguably threatens the court's legitimacy by
undermining its conception as neutral, passive, and objective. See Diver, supra note 5,
at 88-105. Although there is merit to this concern, several factors justify proceeding
to evaluate the court's capacity to influence the power dynamics of prison systems.
First, the linkage of passivity and judicial legitimacy has become more attenuated as
litigation grows more complex and multifaceted. See Fiss, supra note 3, at 6-16;
Resnik, ManagerialJudges,96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-80 (1982). The ideal of L~assivity
conflicts with the demands and realities of much modem day litigation. See id. Nor is
it clear that passivity is a positive judicial value regardless of the context of the
judicial activity. This Article shows that in the prison context, judicial passivity
results in three delegitimizing consequences for the court: (1) toleration of ongoing
violations, (2) judicial role definition in response to the conduct of political actors,
and (3) failure to institutionalize legal norms. Second, the dramatic failure of the
political process in the area of prisons, which is likely to continue given the dynamics
of organizational stasis, provides an argument, at least in theory, supporting judicial
alteration of the balance of power. See Diver, supra note 5, at 92-93; cf. Cover, The
Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE LJ. 1287, 1291-92
(1982) (justifying an activist judicial role to protect rights that are vulnerable to
"perversions by the majoritarian process"). Finally, this Article proceeds from the
premise that impact can be divorced from role definition, and that the court's
positive political impact may be the greatest when it performs a more traditional, less
political role. See infra text accompanying notes 410-20.
181 The use of special masters, monitors and experts expands the court's
information gathering capacity, along with defendants' obligations to report
regularly to the court. See Note, supra note 84, at 1072; Special Project, supra note 3,
at 826-37. The criticisms of courts' information gathering capacity, while not entirely
unfounded, often fail to take into account the availability of these mechanisms. See,
e.g., D. HOROWITZ, supra note 5, at 1-67. One interesting question, which is the
subject of a forthcoming article, is the extent to which courts' fact-finding role at the
remedial stage can and should differ from its role in adjudicating cases.
182 Prison cases tend to receive extensive media coverage. See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS
& D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 9, 84 (noting that extensive coverage of prison
overcrowding cases was vital to arousing strong public concern).
183 See infra notes 333-40 & 426-28 and accompanying text.
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factors of organizational stasis has the potential to neutralize or
divert judicially initiated change.
B. A Typology ofJudicialApproaches to the Remedial Process

The approach adopted to manage the compliance process
directly affects a court's capacity to alter the underlying dynamics of
organizational stasis. Each judge responsible for developing a remedy for unconstitutional prison conditions and practices necessarily
chooses how to formulate relief, who will participate in this process,
what incentives should be used to induce the cooperation of necessary parties, how to monitor compliance, and how to deal with the
noncompliance of prison officials.' 8 4 These choices must be made
from among a variety options and techniques. Generally, the choices
made by a particular court reflect the presiding judge's underlying
ideological approach to judicial intervention.
A review of the choices actually made by trial judges in a wide
range of prison cases reveals four basic strategic approaches to the
remedial process: (1) the deferrer, (2) the director, 8 5 (3) the broker,
and (4) the catalyst." 6 Distinct and coherent philosophies underlie
and unify the different managerial styles and inform the choice of
methoas made by the judge in the course of the remedial process.
Each approach reflects a set of assumptions and theories about prisons and prison management, institutional reform, the propriety and
184 See generally Special Project, supra note 3, at 790-843 (describing stages of
remedial process). Judges are not always aware of the range of options available for
each of these decisions, or even that they are making a choice. One of the purposes
of this Article is to demonstrate that judges necessarily make choices among different
approaches that may have a dramatic impact on their effectiveness, and thus to
enhance the awareness of judges and participants in the remedial process of the
importance of self-consciously structuring the judicial role.
185 The term "director" as used in this Article refers to the judicial approach
identified here and explored below. This term is not to be confused with prison
directors- the executive officials responsible for managing the prison system. These
officials are referred to as "administrators" or "managers."
186 These four remedial approaches emerged from several sources: (1) an
analysis of data obtained by tracing the progress of reported prison cases; (2)
reviewing numerous case studies documenting the judicial approaches adopted in
particular prison cases; (3) participating in the process of defining the judicial role as
part of the office of Special Master in Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I.
1977); (4) serving as law clerk to Judge Charles E. Stewart in Powell v. Ward, 487 F.
Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); modified, 643 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
832 (1981); (5) conducting a study of the role of special masters in five prison cases,
culminating in a Note entitled 'Maste ng' Intervention in Prisons, supra note 84; and (6)
engaging in numerous interviews and discussions with lawyers, judges,
administrators and masters concerning the nature of the judicial role.
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proper extent of the judicial role, and the nature of organizational
87
response to intervention.
This typology ofjudicial approaches-deferrer, director, broker,
and catalyst-provides a framework for organizing, analyzing, and
evaluating judicial intervention. Judges do not necessarily recognize
and make explicit the managerial strategy they employ.'
Furthermore these styles rarely appear in their pure form; a judge will frequently utilize more than one approach or change her approach at
different points in the process.' 9 The four models constitute the
range of strategies adopted by courts in prison cases. It is necessary
to identify the basic attributes and the underlying ideology of each
model before analyzing and comparing the efficacy of each of the
four models.
1. The Deferrer
The deferrer entrusts the defendants with the responsibility for
the remedial process. Typically, she orders the defendants to
develop a remedy and, in some instances, report to the court about
the plans formulated in response to this order. 9 ° The court relies
on the defendants to take the steps necessary to achieve compliance.
Responsibility for monitoring compliance is left to the parties. The
court becomes involved in the compliance process only in response
187 The factors which most typically affect a court's decision about adoption of a
particular managerial style include: (1) the judge's current view of the nature and
limitations of the court's role and the legitimacy of actively intervening in the
management of a state institution, both in principle and in the eyes of the anticipated
appellate reviewer; (2) the judge's view of the underlying causes of the
unconstitutional prison conditions and her expectations of prison officials' response
to the judicial mandate; (3) the judge's view of the nature of prison as an institution,
and the role and capacity of prison management; (4) a re-evaluation of the
assumptions underlying previous judicial strategies in light of experience, or in
response to the court's frustration or dissatisfaction with the institution's failure to
comply with the constitutional norm.
188 Indeed, I argue that lack of awareness of the managerial choices available in
the remedial process impedes the court's capacity to resolve the remedial dilemma.
189 See infra text accompanying notes 244-46.
190 There are degrees of deference in remedy formulation. The most extreme
form of deference consists of simply ordering the defendants to eliminate the
offending conditions and practices with no guidance as to the remedy. This strategy
does occur, although it is not common. A more usual approach is to specify areas of
concern that must be addressed by the defendants, or to offer general guidelines to
be followed by the defendants in developing and implementing the remedy. See, e.g.,
Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467, 484, 496 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (setting forth
guidelines for submission of plan by defendants), appeal dismissed, stay denied, 841 F.2d
1126 (6th Cir. 1988) Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1125-32 (M.D. Tenn.
1982) (same).
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to specific complaints by the parties. The court responds to noncompliance by reaffirming the defendants' constitutional duties and
affording them additional tirae to comply.' 9 ' This approach is quite
common, particularly in the early stages of the remedial process.
The deferrer's managerial style is informed by a passive and
noninterventionist conception of the court's role in prison reform.
The structure ofjudges' daily experience and their faith in thejudiciary's normative and symbolic power predispose them to believe that
orders will be respected and. followed simply because they emanate
from a court.' 9 2 The deferrer maintains that prison officials should
retain exclusive responsibility and control over the prison. 93 She
perceives prison administrators as experts whose judgments should
not be second-guessed by a court. The deferrer is also anxious to
avoid a confrontation between the federal court and state executive
officials.
Instrumental concerns may also account for the court's adoption
of the deferrer approach. The court may believe that any other
approach will alienate the defendants and thereby undermine
attempts to obtain the defendants' cooperation. 1 94 Some courts justify deference as the best way to co-opt prison officials into the remedial process. 9 5- Finally, a court may simply be disinclined to become
entangled in the complexities of a more active role. The judge may
be discouraged by the political unpopularity of inmates or of an
activist judiciary. She may be tired of the case after a long trial.' 96 A
191 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 700 F. Supp. 1180, 1184-86 (D.R.I. 1988)
(describing delays, repeated requests for extensions, and modifications of order by
court in response); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, Nos. 74-172 & 75-032 slip op. at 2-4
(D.R.I. Jan. 4, 1982) (same).
192 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 90 (the district court
had an "expectation that the defendants would comply with all of the court orders").
193 In Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), the judge viewed the
court's most important contribution as "bring[ing the] problems to the attention of
the public and let[ting] the public administrators do their jobs ....
In the final
analysis, the state had to reform its own institutions." M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER,
supra note 17, at 88. Deferrers may also believe that noncompliance is the result of
factors beyond the control of the prison officials, and thus an inappropriate basis for
greater judicial response. See Diver, supra note 5, at 100.
194 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 88-89 (discussing how
in Holt v. Sarver the judge believed that to ensure compliance it was essential that the
public and public administrators have a receptive attitude toward any judicial decrees
and therefore framed general, non-specific, and moderate orders to minimize
antagonisms).
195 See, e.g., id.
196 See, e.g., Knowles, Monitoring Committee on Prisons in Alabama Folds; Court Gives
Up Jurisdiction, 20 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 1, 7 (Summer 1989) (implementation
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deferrer may fear that any other course of action would invite reversal on appeal.' 9 7
A prime example of the deferrer approach to remedial intervention is Holt v. Sarver.'9 8 After finding massive and systemic constitu-

tional violations,' 9 9 the judge assigned the defendants full
responsibility for decree formulation. 20 0 The court mandated general improvements in prison conditions and ordered the defendants
to prepare a plan for formulating and implementing the remedy.
The court never scrutinized or incorporated this plan into a court
order.20 1 The court did not become actively involved in monitoring
or responding to the defendants' noncompliance. It dismissed a
motion for contempt without a hearing and continued to rely upon
general orders, reporting requirements, and exhortations even in the
by
face of continuing noncompliance. 20 2 The case was characterized
' 20 3
a "conspicuous absence of enforcement mechanisms."
2.

The Director

The director judge assumes direct responsibility for developing
and implementing the remedy. She formulates a remedy, either on
Committee wished to terminate its involvement in part because its members "all
were burned out on the case").
197 In at least several circuits, the appellate courts have articulated standards for
reviewing remedial decisions that increase the likelihood that the trial courts will
adopt the deferrer approach. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 440 (6th Cir.
1984) (district court should impose the least intrusive remedy available); Ruiz v.
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that the "relief ordered.., must
be 'consistent with the policy of minimum intrusion.. . .' Conservative treatment is
essential because it is more readily administered, less costly to the state, and not
irreversible. Therefore, the remedy should begin with what is absolutely necessary.
If these measures later prove ineffective, more stringent ones should be considered."
(quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 571 (5th Cir. 1981))), modified, 688 F.2d 266
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). The role of appellate courts in
institutional reform litigation is critical to the process of defining a proper and
effective approach to court intervention in institutional reform cases, and is the
subject of a forthcoming article.
198 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). This and other examples are used only
to illustrate the models. As noted above, a court will rarely adopt only the techniques
characteristic of one model. See infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
199 See Holt, 309 F. Supp. at 372-8 1.
200 See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 12.
201 See Holt, 309 F. Supp. at 383. The court simply ordered the defendants to
"make a prompt and reasonable start toward eliminating the [unconstitutional]
conditions." The court orders for the most part remained general and flexible,
tracking the pleading and the general requirements to eliminate unconstitutional
conditions. See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 89.
202 See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 106.
203 See id. at 105.

852

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:805

her own or with the aid of the plaintiffs' counsel or a court-appointed
expert, and imposes it on the defendants.20 4 If additional resources
or expertise are needed to implement particular programs, the director undertakes to obtain them, and may bring in outsiders to perform necessary work. The director works directly with those parties
whose cooperation is needed to implement the decree. 20 5 Monitoring compliance becomes part of the task of administering the decree.
The director responds to a defendant's noncompliance or noncooperation by assuming greater control over the implementation of the
decree. She increases the specificity of its orders to reduce the
probability of evasion and to enhance its control.20 6 The director
attempts to alter conduct within the prison by assuming direct
responsibility for administering particular provisions of the
decree 2 0 7 or seeking to transFer or fire those who subvert compliance
efforts.20 8 She may require the defendants to use court appointed
204 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977) (judge
imposes detailed remedy); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (judge
issued detailed remedy); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F.Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970)
(judge issues detailed findings of unconstitutional conditions; master formulates
relief).
205 In Georgia, the judge met privately with the governor to work out
compliance plans. See B. Chilton, supra note 90, at 99. In Alabama, Judge Johnson
met with key legislators to facilitate their cooperation with the court order. See L.
YACKLE, supra note 51, at 41.
206 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 68-69 (concluding that
court responded to noncompliance by ordering the special master to develop specific
plans, which were then adopted by the court). The director may also use increased
control over the remedy as a means of inducing the defendants to assume
responsibility for the compliance process. See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 17
(telling how Judge Johnson established his own prescriptive standards to convince
the defendants that he was serious about compliance). However, by assuming
greater control, the court may in fact create a situation in which the defendants will
contest the court's authority, evade or ignore the court's order, or abdicate
responsibility entirely. See infra notes 278-300 and accompanying text.
207 See, e.g., Knop v.Johnson, 685 F. Supp. 636, 640 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (court
mandated particular disciplinary actions in the event racially derogatory conduct
occurred); Harris v. Pernsley, No. 82-1847, slip op. at (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1987)
(ordering the creation of a "[b]ailcare program); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 103-04
(noting that the court ordered creation of a Human Rights Committee with fairly
broad powers "to 'monitor implementation' of the standards fixed by [its] order").
208 The director may attempt informally to achieve the discharge of officials
frustrating the compliance effort. See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 118 (asserting
that the Chair of the Human Rights Committee met with the Lieutenant Governor,
representatives of the Governor, key legislators, and the Board of Corrections, to
urge that the Commissioner be fired and replaced by a more able administrator). In
Alabama, the commissioner also ordered the discharge of hold-over officers from a
prior administration. See id. at 189.
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agents to carry out specific provisions of the order.2 " 9 The director
approach is particularly common at the decree formulation stage,
210
and as a follow-up to the deferrer approach to implementation.
The conception of the judicial role underlying the director
approach is activist and managerial. Directors believe that a court's
constitutional and equitable duty to intervene effectively in response
to executive and legislative failure to fulfill their constitutional
responsibilities justifies an expansive, managerial approach. 2 1 1 The
director perceives that the responsible officials cannot or will not
undertake meaningful compliance activity on their own-a view that
may derive from defendants' conduct at trial or the court's prior
experience with the relevant officials. 2 1 2 The quickest and easiest
way to achieve compliance, then, is for the court to go in, do what
needs to be done, and get out. The director is confident that the
court has the capacity to formulate and implement effective solutions
to the problems causing unconstitutional prison conditions. Instead
of promoting the internal development of reform mechanisms within
the prison community, the director assumes responsibility for some
or all of the implementation process.
Judge Johnson's approach to the remedial process in Pugh v.
Locke 213 exemplifies the director approach. After an extensive trial
on the issue of liability,,Judge Johnson issued an order setting forth
detailed requirements touching on the conditions of daily life in the
209

See, e.g., id. at 103-04 (discussing order in Pugh that Board of Governors

contract with the Center for Correctional Psychology to undertake revamping of
classification system and reclassification of inmates, and power of oversight
committee to hire "independent specialists" to aid compliance).
210

See, e.g., Knop, 685 F. Supp. at 640 ("[The prison administrators have

demonstrated their unwillingness or inability to deal with this problem in a realistic,
firm manner. The Court has no alternative, given this situation, but to usurp some
measure of the defendants' discretion as administrators in order to insure that the
constitutional violation is remedied."). When the deferrer approach proved
unsatisfactory, the court appointed a special master to formulate relief and adopted

the Master's Report and Recommendations in Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp.
549 (E.D. La. 1972). See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 13.
211 See, e.g., Johnson, The Constitution and the FederalDistrictJudge, 54 TEx. L. REv.
903, 905 (1976) (arguing that courts must act where the legislature or appointed

officials do not).
212 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 101 (noting that in Pugh v. Locke, 406
F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), Judge Johnson "had reached the conclusion that the

state authorities would not respond readily and must, therefore, be given explicit
commands.... He held state authorities to a series of specific directions, most of
which touched on the conditions of daily life in the prisons.").
213 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub noma.
Newman v. Alabama, 559
F.2d 283 (1977), rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781

(1978) (per curiam).

854

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:805

prisons.2 14 The order was developed unilaterally by the court, without significant input from the parties, and relied on evidence
obtained at the trial on the merits.21 5 The court undertook to
enforce compliance by appointing a 39-member Human Rights
Committee with the authority to "take any action reasonably necessary to accomplish its function,""' ' increasing the specificity of its
orders, and, in particular areas, assuming direct control over implementation. For example, the court ordered the state to contract out
responsibility for reclassifying inmates to the Center for Correctional
Psychology, a program selected by the court.2 17 The court declined
to utilize contempt sanctions, damages awards, or release of inmates
in order to coerce the defendants into compliance, instead responding by modifying its orders to increase their specificity and
appointing the Governor of Alabama as receiver of the prison
system.

2 18

3. The Broker
The broker uses informal judicial power, exercised primarily
through counsel, to engineer agreements among the parties and
induce remedial action by the defendants.2 9 She formulates the
remedy by working with counsel to encourage, and if necessary
coerce, the parties to reach agreement. 2 20 The broker rejects formal
214 See L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 101-02.
215 See id. at 101-04.
216 Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 332. The Court of Appeals found that the Human
Rights Committee "impermissibly intrude[d]" into the daily operation of the prison.

See Newman v, Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other
grounds and remanded sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam).
217 See L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 139-40, 146.
218 See id. at 183-84; Knowles, supra note 196, at 2.
219 The broker approach is not intended to exemplify the range of possible
approaches to settlement. However, there is a marked and dramatic tendency among
courts involved in developing institutional remedies, at least in prison litigation, to
rely on counsel to negotiate agreements within the framework of the adversary
process employed during the liability phase. Thus, counsel are the primary
participants, and the focus is on the legal result, rather than the participants or
process by which it was reached. The prevalence and significance of this approach
warrants its treatment as a separate judicial strategy. The catalyst differs from the
broker in that it focuses on the nature of the process rather than the achievement of
agreement, it directly involves the participants in the institution, and it backs up its
process with the use of formal judicial sanctions. See infra text accompanying notes
230-43.
220 See, e.g., Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 285 (D. Md. 1972) (court
required counsel for both sides to meet and try to reach agreement on a remedial
order); M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 12 (noting a number of cases,

including Collins, in which the court has acted as a broker).
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sanctions and instead exerts pressure through its informal bargaining power."' She establishes guidelines, offers informal suggestions
to encourage acquiescence, publicly praises compliance efforts, and
threatens the imposition of sanctions or more intrusive remedies in
the event of noncompliance.2 2 2 The broker strives to achieve a compromise if the parties reach an impasse by serving as an intermediary
between counsel and encouraging the parties to moderate their
demands. 2 23 The court rejects formal monitoring techniques such as
hearings because of their tendency to polarize the parties.
The broker values voluntarism and consent as a means of producing a fair result that the defendants will accept. She focuses primarily on inducing the parties to agree to the terms of the remedy.
The processes by which the decree is formulated, the participation of
the parties responsible for implementation and the substantive outcome of the negotiations are secondary to the goal of achieving
agreement. The broker functions within and has faith in the effectiveness of the adjudicatory framework, relying primarily on counsel
to the parties to negotiate disputes and communicate the results to
the court and the parties.
The broker's emphasis on negotiated agreement reflects an
underlying ideology valuing the minimization of the extent to which
the court intrudes on the decisionmaking processes of the prison.
The broker treats the remedial process as a series of ongoing disputes between the parties. The broker is typically uncomfortable
with a more activist role and seeks to avoid the drain on judicial
resources that often accompanies a more activist approach.2 2 4 Like
221 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 197 (noting that in
Holland v. Donelon, No. 71-1442 .(E.D. La. May 16, 1972), "the judge took a
moderate approach in [response] to compliance failures . . . regard[ing] sanctions
such as finding the defendants in contempt of court to be very drastic and wish[ing]
to avoid [the use of] such sanctions"); id. at 393 (stating that in Collins, "[t]he court
used informal pressure and positive reinforcement in contrast to punitive
enforcement devices").
222 See, e.g., id' at 12 (noting that in Collins, "[tihejudge played a strong role in
the process by exerting pressure on both sides to moderate and compromise."); id. at
197-98 (discussing Holland, where Judge Rubin used informal action, including
conferences, informal rebukes, and reviewing the order line-by-line with members of
parish council to ensure that they knew their obligations);Judge: R.I. Must Act on Prison
Crowding, ProvidenceJ. Bull., December 16, 1988, at 1, col. I (reporting that a federal
judge threatened the state with contempt if the state missed the deadline for
submitting the remedial plan or failed to implement the plan).
223 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 12 (stating that the
judge in Collins played a strong role in formulation, exerting pressure on both sides
to moderate and compromise).
224 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 193 (Judge Varner was disinclined to
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the deferrer, the broker may believe that voluntary cooperation is a
prerequisite to compliance and that a less intrusive approach is the
22 5
only way to induce the defendants' participation.
The broker approach to remedial intervention was employed in
Collins v. Schoonfield.2 26 In Collins, thejudge required counsel for both

sides to meet and try to reach agreement on an order. 2 27 The primary parties played a minimal role in the negotiations. The judge
"played a strong role in the process by exerting pressure on both
sides to moderate and compromise." 2 28 He left the process of
implementing the agreement largely to the parties, intervening primarily at the request of plaintiffs' counsel to threaten or cajole
2 29
defendants to live up to the terms of their agreement.
4. The Catalyst
The catalyst creates processes and incentives in order to induce
the parties to participate in a deliberative process to formulate and
implement an effective remedy. The judge employs a two-prong
approach combining a deliberative remedial formulation process
with the use of traditional sanctions to induce the necessary parties
to participate. The responsible parties must identify the conditions
causing the constitutional violation, gather information and expertise required to formulate an effective remedy, 2 30 and involve the
actors essential to successful reform.23 1 The catalyst evaluates the
challenge the lawyers when their efforts allowed him "to escape a time-consuming
evidentiary hearing.").
225 As this Article argues below, the broker's emphasis on the outcome of the
process and reliance on lawyers as the primary participants in the remedial stage
undercuts the effectiveness of the broker approach as a means of "coopting" the
defendants into the compliance process. See infra text accompanying note 313-16.
226 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
227 See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 12.
228 Id.

229 See id. at 365, 393 (after issuing two "interim decrees," court only issued
subsequent relief at suggestion of counsel for both sides; monitoring performed
primarily by counsel for plaintiffs .... The court used informal pressure and positive
reinforcement in contrast to punitive enforcement devices.").
230 See, e.g., Spear v. Ariyoshi, No. 84-1104, Consent Decree at 3 (D. Haw. June
12, 1985) ("Defendants and plaintiffs shall agree upon a panel of experts for each of
the substantive areas covered in this Decree. Each panel shall consist of a
representative of the Division of Corrections, and two experts who are designated by
the parties. The panel shall study the issues and develop specific implementation
plans for the various substantive areas set forth in . . . this Decree .... "); cf
Memorandum from Gordon Bonnyman to Co-Counsel, May 14, 1985, at 4 (July
order required "coherent analysis and informed planning").
231 In Guthrie v. Evans, No. 73-3068 (S.D. Ga. 1973), the court obtained the
parties' agreement to attempt to participate in mediation to produce a compliance
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resulting remedy by assessing both the adequacy of the process by
which it was developed and its reasonableness in light of the information gathered. 3 2
The court uses its informal power to make resources available
and contributes expertise. The court also establishes and adheres to
regular deadlines for evaluating compliance progress, and takes
steps to obtain the information necessary to monitor compliance.
Defendants are required to develop information-gathering systems
to inform the compliance process and enable the court to evaluate
progress.2 3
The catalyst responds to defendants' noncooperation by using
the traditional judicial power of compensating plaintiffs and sanctioning defendants for ongoing violations of the court order. 2 34 The
catalyst's reaction to noncompliance does not itself institutionalize a
constitutional norm. It does, however, reinforce the importance of
plan. The commissioner of corrections, the warden, several inmates, and the assistant
attorney general, participated directly in the negotiating process. The general goals
of the plan were produced through mediation. The specifics of the plan were
developed by the Commissioner and the Department staff and approved by the court.
See B. Chilton, supra note 90, at 77-78.
232 See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 928, 1056 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (mandating modification of parties' agreement due to its failure to address
significant issues identified in the Independent Expert's report). Deliberation
operates here as a mechanism for both legitimizing and inculcating norms through
participation in their formulation and achieving substantively just results. See Chin &
Benne, supra note 23, at 31-36; cf Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1550 (1988) ("The requirements of deliberation embodies substantive
limitations that in some settings lead to vaguely correct outcomes."). This approach
leads the court to employ masters, compliance aids, and expert panels to assist in
remedy formulation and compliance monitoring. See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER,
supra note 17, at 187 (noting that in Holland v. Donelon, No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. May
26, 1971) the court used a master to work with the sheriff and coroner to develop
specific compliance plans).
233 See, e.g., Spear v. Ariyoshi, No. 84-1104, at 13, (D. Haw. Nov. 5, 1985)
(mandating the creation of a system-wide management information system and task
force to explore the need for it); Grubbs v. Pellegrin, Nos. 80-3404, 80-3518, 803616, 80-3617, Order at 3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 18, 1983) (ordering defendants to
gather and provide information to the court concerning the prison population level).
234 See, e.g., Michigan, 680 F. Supp. at 1053 (holding defendants in contempt for
failing to implement overcrowding and classification plan, with opportunity to purge
themselves of contempt and avoid fines of $10,000 a day by complying with the
Consent Decree); id. at 1047 (enjoining prison from receiving any new inmates for
five day period); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 171 (noting thatJudge Pointer, in Wyatt
v. Walker, Civ. Action No. 76-P-0775-W (N.D. Ala.) and in Thomas v. Gloor, Civ.
Action No. 77-P66-S (N.D. Ala. ), "held local and state officials in contempt for
failing to comply with his orders .... ", levied fines for noncompliance, and required
part of the money exacted in Birmingham to be paid directly to the prisoners
affected).
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the constitutional norm and the defendants' responsibility for
achieving it. Thus, the catalyst's approach reflects both the boundaries of judicial power and the importance of utilizing that power to
induce the prison officials to act. 2 35 The court combines externally

imposed pressure with internally organized response to induce the
defendants to institute the required changes.
The catalyst approach is process-oriented, and its underlying
philosophy of the judicial role is one of structured or bounded activism. The court employs its information-gathering tools and traditional sanctions to force responsible officials to take the
constitutional standards seriously and induce them to perform. The
catalyst therefore focuses on inducing prison officials to change their
conduct through the development of resources and expertise, channels for participation, and the use of traditional sanctions.
The catalyst believes that prison officials will remain unable or
unwilling to initiate meaningful compliance in the absence of a
strong judicial presence during the remedial implementation
stage. 23 6' Nevertheless, the catalyst has limited confidence in the
court's capacity to manage change directly. In the view of the catalyst, noncompliance with prison decrees is no different than similar
235 The use of sanctions and awarding of damages to plaintiffs conflicts with the
judicial orientations of the three other models of remedial intervention and is
therefore not part of the normal repertoire of the deferrer, director or broker. The
deferrer eschews sanctions due to their intrusiveness on prison officials and is
unwilling to attribute failure to and impose sanctions on prison officials for
noncompliance. See supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text. The director views
contempt as inappropriate or ineffective because of prison officials' incompetence or

resistance

to meaningful

compliance

activity.

See supra notes

206-13

and

accompanying text. The broker views contempt as counter-productive because of its
tendency to polarize the defendants and undermine their cooperation. The broker
also shares the view that the imposition of sanctions intrudes on defendants'
autonomy. See supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text. Judges may also believe
that it is unfair to impose sanctions or award damages because noncompliance is at
least in part caused by factors beyond defendants' control, or that the problems
underlying noncompliance are too complex and political to warrant sanctions. By
refusing to use the traditional judicial tools available to enforce their decrees, the
deferrer, director, and broker relinquish the tools often needed to induce prison
officials to take court intervention seriously and assume responsibility for
institutional change. Arguably, by failing to treat prison officials' noncompliance in
the same manner as violations of "ordinary" court orders, the court is
inappropriately acting on "political" concerns. By so departing from its proper
judicial role the court undermines its effectiveness and legitimacy.
236 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 700 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (D.R.I. 1988)
(" '[Tihe pattern is always the same: without monitoring, prison officials permitted
the kitchen to get into a deplorable state.., they failed to provide adequate medical
staff for an increase in population of which they have been aware for years' " (quoting
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 639 F. Supp. 244, 258 (D.R.I. 1986))).
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resistance in less controversial cases, and protection of the court's
authority requires enforcement of its mandate.23 7
Judge Spaeth's strategy in the early stages of Jackson v. Hendrick 238 is an example of the catalyst approach. In Jackson, the court

rejected the plaintiffs' request for unilateral imposition of specific
relief and instead appointed a special master to work with the
responsible parties to fashion a systemic remedy. 23 9 Consent
decrees were entered covering the range of constitutional violations
identified at trial.2 4 ° The master was also retained to facilitate the
compliance effort and report to the court on the defendants' progress. The City defendants then failed to comply with several important provisions of the decree. Rather than assuming direct control or
attempting to cajole the City into compliance, the court responded
"by holding the defendants in contempt of court and fining the City
$325,000.,,241

The consent decree issued in Spear v. Ariyosha 24 2 further illustrates the catalyst approach. In Spear, the parties negotiated a settlement prior to trial that incorporates the catalyst approach to remedy
formulation. The decree identified a series of problem areas and
established a set of performance standards to be addressed through
the remedy formulation process. The decree also set up three
panels, each including an expert nominated by the plaintiffs, one
nominated by the defendants, and a member of the division of corrections. The panels were given ninety days to develop a plan in
consultation with members of the prison system and outside experts.
Disagreements between the experts or the parties were to be submitted for mediation prior to resolution by the court. Once the remedy
was formulated, the expert panels assumed responsibility for
inspecting the facilities and reporting on the plan's
implementation.243
237 See, e.g., Knowles, supra note 196, at 4 (conservative judge who assumed

responsibility for Pugh v. Locke "was willing to be more forceful in attempting to
force compliance with the court's orders than Judge Johnson had been").
238 457 Pa. 405, 321 A.2d 603 (1974). Judge Spaeth's involvement in the case
ended when he left the bench and the federal court assumed active supervision of the
overcrowding aspect of the case. See Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d 338 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 965 (1985).
239 See Jackson, 457 Pa. at 406, 321 A.2d at 604 (affirming order appointing
master to formulate remedial plan); Rudovsky, Litigating Prison Conditions in
Philadelphia, 1 THE PRIsoNJ. 64, 68 (1985).
240

See Rudovsky, supra note 239, at 68.

Id.
242 No. 84-1104 (D. Haw. June 12, 1985).
243 See id. Consent Decree at I 1-13; Janger, Expert Negotiation Brings New Approach
241
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CombiningJudicialApproaches

This description of the four judicial approaches to formulating
and implementing remedies presents each as a pure model, followed
throughout the litigation. However, in many cases judges use a combination of strategies through the course of the litigation. 24 4 A court
may appoint a master or other compliance official who employs an
approach different from that of the judge. 2 45 Judges also may tailor
their approach to the type of issue before the court. For example,
many judges who are reluctant to use the director approach generally will dictate and implement specific relief in the areas of due process and law libraries-areas in which the court may perceive itself to
have special expertise. Similarly, areas the court believes require
professional expertise beyond the defendants' capacity, such as medical care, have been singled out for the director or catalyst approach.
Finally, in areas that pose an imminent threat to inmates' safety or
survival, courts otherwise reluctant to assume an activist role have
employed the director or catalyst approach.
This typology affords a :framework for assessing each approach,
whether employed in its pure form or in combination with other
to Prison Litigation in Hawaii, 6 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 6, 7 (Winter 1985);
McClymont, Hard-FoughtSettlement Reached in Hawaii Case, 5 NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ.
3,4 (Fall 1985). A variation on the catalyst approach to implementation was adopted
in the New York City jail litigation. See Lasker, Prison Litigation: Many Years Toward
Compliance, 11 NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ. 9, 10 (Spring 1987) (describing the Office of
Compliance Consultants, appointed in Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.
1974), as compliance monitors, consisting of a director "experienced in corrections
matters but unrelated to the parties, and a small staff of Corrections Department
personnel on leave. OCC deals with compliance on an item by item basis, making
suggestions to the parties, mediating and conciliating between them, and reporting
at regular intervals to the court on the particulars of compliance and the rate of
progress.").
244 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Gatrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977) (using all
four approaches), af'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980);
Ney, Judge Bans Further Intake of Prisoners at D.C. Jail, 5 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 6, 7
(Fall 1985) (quoting court order prohibiting further intake of prisoners in Campbell
v. McGruder, No. 71-1462, at 50 (D.D.C. July 15, 1985) (memorandum and order)
stating: "[t]ime and again, defendants have requested the court to defer to their
accumulated wisdom, to stay its hand, and to give them more time. Time and again,
these requests have been honored in the hope and expectation that defendants
would solve these problems expeditiously and effectively. However, instead of
matters improving, they have deteriorated.").
245 See, e.g., Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982)
(exemplifying court as deferrer, master as catalyst); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 110
(stating that Judge Johnson established the Human Relations Committee with the
hope that it would form a cooperative relationship with the prison authorities and act
as a catalyst, preventing the need for further direct intervention by the court).
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approaches, based on its relative capacity to influence the norms,
incentives, information exchange, and power structure within the
24 6
prison so that meaningful change can occur.

III.

THE IMPACT OF THE STRATEGIES OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON
THE FACTORS UNDERLYING ORGANIZATIONAL STASIS

A court's capacity to unlock the dynamics of organizational stasis
in the prison depends on the particular strategy it adopts for formulating and implementing the remedy. 47 Part III of this Article analyzes each strategy in terms of its capacity to affect the four factors
that contribute to organizational stasis-norms, incentives, information exchange, and power.
A.

The Court's Capacity to Institute a Competing Normative Framework

One aspect of the dynamic contributing to unconstitutional
prison conditions is the absence of an internal normative framework
supporting reform. Judicial intervention can introduce and legitimize the competing norm of promoting and protecting individual
dignity.2 48 The very determination of liability signifies that the
246 It may be useful to visualize the analysis that follows in relation to the
following matrix:
Deferrer
Director
Broker
Catalyst
Norms
Incentives
Information
Power
247 This is not to say that the judicial approach is the only constraint affecting
the court's potential impact, or even the most significant factor in a particular case.
Other factors, such as the political environment, the skill and influence of counsel,
and the management ability of those responsible for prison conditions are likely to
come into play, and may in fact influence the approach adopted by the court. See, e.g.,
P. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 233-36 (1988). However, this Article focuses
only on the potential impact of the judicial strategy adopted by the court.
248 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 312 (noting that a
particular prison reform lawsuit was said to have "elevated status of prisoners and
caused prison personnel to treat them with dignity and respect"). Evidence suggests
that at least a core group of corrections administrators has internalized the
constitutional norms and is pursuing strategies for achieving progressive reform.
For example, a group of corrections commissioners currently participates in a
Program of Correctional Leadership and Innovation supported by the Wharton
Center for Applied Research and the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. See T.
Gilmore, Program on Correctional Leadership and Innovation: Introduction to
Program Strategy (August 1985) (unpublished paper) (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
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prison's normative framework is unacceptable.2 4 9 Prison officials
must conform to a normative perspective that respects the inviolability of certain basic needs and rights, even in pursuit of the legitimate
goals of order, efficiency, and security.
The authoritative pronouncement of norms that differ from
those currently dominating the prison can legitimize the goals and
values of those actors committed to change. Thejudicial prohibition
of practices that deprive inmates of their rights elevates inmates' status within the institution. Reform advocates legitimately may claim
that inmates' needs must be treated as organizational imperatives.
The determination of liability and the court's subsequent pronouncements challenge the internal norm of preserving the status
quo by acknowledging that change is imperative regardless of its
potential for disruption. 5 0 The normative framework introduced
and enforced by the court prevents the prison administration from
resorting to the traditional means of maintaining order within the
prison."' 1 Unless the defendants are willing to abandon the organizational goals of order and efficiency, those charged with administering the prison must formulate new methods of maintaining order
consistent with the norm of promoting individual dignity. 2 52 The
249 See supra note 16-18 and accompanying text for a review of the constitutional
standards.
250 The assault on the existing normative structure often leads to the
resignation or removal of officials most committed to maintaining it. A dramatic
example of this phenomenon occurred in Texas during the early 1980s where there
was a tremendous turnover at both the administrative and staff level following the
issuance of special master's report concerning the illegal maintenance of the trusty
system. A new commissioner was brought in from the outside, and did not share the
commitment to the control structure represented by the trusty system. The new
guards had not been schooled in the desirability or inevitability of the trusty system.
According to the special master, the new regime is now as opposed to the trusty
system as the old regime was committed to it. See Telephone interview with Vincent

Nathan (Dec. 26, 1988); see, e.g., B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 226-229

(describing the changeover in staff attitudes).
251 See supra note 31. Courts prohibit the use of violence, either officially or
unofficially, to maintain day-to-day control. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,
579 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that whipping as a disciplinary measure violates the
eighth amendment). Threats of uncertain, summary, and harsh punishment are no
longer available as control mechanisms. Privileges that were reserved for those
inmates who aided the maintenance of order in the prison will be equally available to
all inmates. In many jurisdictions, courts will proscribe the utilization of inmate
trusties to maintain order. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1177-79 (5th Cir.
1982) (listing district court's order on impermissible inmate conduct and privileges),
modified, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1985); Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. 362, 365, 383-84 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (holding trustee system as administered
violated eighth amendment), aff'd, 442 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1971).
252 Some commentators have linked court intervention, as well as any effort to
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court can stimulate the implementation of progressive methods of
managing inmates to replace the old methods no longer available to
prison administrators. Moreover, by attracting attention and
resources to the prison problem and creating incentives for prison
officials to end judicial oversight, the court may foster the internal
development of professional norms and standards. 2 53 Consequently, judicial intervention can create conditions that force prison
officials to respond affirmatively to meet the organizational goal of
order.

25 4

Judicial intervention also limits society's capacity to delegate
total responsibility for the conditions of imprisonment to administrative officials. Most court proceedings and rulings are open to the
public and frequently receive extensive media coverage. 2 55 By
exposing prison conditions to public scrutiny, courts encourage
prison officials, politicians, and the public to engage in a dialogue
about prison conditions, purposes, and practices. 256 This dialogue
compels prison officials to consider and accommodate values exterinstitute major change in the prison system, with at least a short term increase in
violence within the prison system. See, e.g., J. DIIULIo, GOVERNING PRISONS: A

219, 226, 229 (1987) (detailing
surge of violence in Texas prisons); Engel & Rothman, Prison Violence and the Paradox
of Reform, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 91, 94, 100-101 (Fall 1983) (linking increased
violence to prison reforms). But these studies "generally fail to establish a causal
chain between court decisions and the alleged consequences of those decisions." M.
Feeley & R. Hanson, What We Know, Think We Know and Would Like to Know
About the Impact of Court Orders on Prison Conditions and Jail Crowding 29
(unpublished paper prepared for a meeting of the Working Group on Jail and Prison
Crowding) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Others have
strongly disagreed with the opinion that judicial intervention inevitably leads to
violence. See S. MARTIN & S. EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 158, at xix; V. Nathan,
Reflections on Two Decades of Court Ordered Prison Reform 42-48 (unpublished
speech) (transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (attributing a
rise in violence to the prison administration's hostile response to judicial
intervention). Researchers have observed that destabilization may be a transitional
state, leading to the development of new methods of maintaining order. See B.
CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 215-16, 227-29.
253 See e.g, L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 27 (discussing prison officials' adoption
of new substantive standards to avoid litigation and judicial intervention). The
special master in the Texas prison litigation reported that the prison officials who
previously were committed to the view that the trustee system was necessary and
inevitable came to hold the opposite view with equal commitment. See Telephone
interview with Vincent Nathan (Dec. 26, 1988).
254 See, e.g., Hepburn, supra note 40, at 57 (concluding that guard work attitudes
improve when collaborative or participative management is employed).
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT

255 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 45.
256

See M.K.

HARRIS

& D.

SPILLER,

supra note 17, at 26; L.

at 66-68; Special Project, supra note 38, at 528.

YACKLE,

supra note 51,
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nal to those characterizing the dynamics of organizational stasis
when formulating prison policy and practice.
The process of formulating and implementing the remedy can
encourage prison officials to question the existing normative structure and to develop new approaches that maintain both individual
dignity and institutional order.2 5 7 Each of the four judicial
approaches employs a different strategy whereby courts can introduce a new normative standard to the prison.
1. The Deferrer and the Limits of Reliance on the Existing
Normative System
The deferrer introduces the court's competing normative framework by declaring that the existing prison conditions are unconstitutional and ordering the prison administrators to change prison
policies and practices to conform with the constitutional mandate.
The court delegates the responsibility of translating the broad directive into a specific plan to the named defendants-usually the director and the wardens-and their attorneys.2 5 8 The deferrer relies on
the prison administration to communicate the judicially mandated
normative shift to the various participants in the prison system.
The deferrer's capacity to influence the normative perspective of
those within the prison system is limited. The court delegates the
task of norm development and promulgation to those whose normative perspective is determined by the demands of maintaining order
within the prison.2 5 9 Many of those charged with contextualizing the
constitutional norm will attempt to tailor it to the existing normative
257 See, e.g., J. Baiamonte, The Need for a Systemic Policy Approach to Jail
Overcrowding: A Case Study ofJefferson Parish, Louisiana, 1971-1987 (unpublished
paper) (on file with the University oJPennsylvaniaLaw Review) (detailing the adoption of
a systemic approach to jail overcrowding involving the warden, criminal justice
coordinating council, district attorney, pre-trial release services, state judiciary, and
bail system, in response to Holland v. Donelon, No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. May 16,
1972)); supra notes 243.
258 See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d
804 (8th Cir. 1971). Contrast this approach to the one taken in the same case for
developing a remedy to deal with the medical program. The court required the
defendants to bring in experts to study the system and come up with specific
recommendations for improvements, which were then incorporated into a court
order. See Third Supplemental DecTee, cited in M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note

17, at 99. Thus, in specific areas where the court perceived the need for expertise,
the court deviated from its general deferrer approach and adopted the director
approach to remedy formulation. See supra text accompanying notes 245-46.
259 See supra notes 43-58 & 109-20 and accompanying text.
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perspective within the prison. This minimizes the likelihood of provoking any serious deliberation about acceptable prison practices.
The deferrer's commitment to the preservation of administrative independence reinforces the norm of maintaining internal
autonomy within the prison system and affords key actors enough
latitude to vitiate the remedy's impact. Even those prison officials
who might share the court's substantive critique of prison conditions
and practices may resist the introduction of norms from outside the
prison system. 2 60 Defendants may actively resist judicial involvement by delaying their response, refusing to respond, or openly challenging the court's authority and legitimacy. 2 6 ' Specifically,
defendants may ignore the existence of the court order or fail to
inform lower level workers of its mandate.2 62 They may deliberately
undermine court-order changes by promulgating them with a wink
and a nod. 6 3 Or, they may engage in passive resistance by translating the broad constitutional directives into superficial or
unmeasurable changes that minimize judicial involvement or
impact. 2 64 These administrative responses mirror those of line
260

See Kimball & Newman,JudicialIntervention in CorrectionalDecisions: Threat and

Response, 14 CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 7-9 (1968); Rubin, The Administrative Response to Court
Decisions, 15 CRIME & DELINO. 377, 377-79 (1969); Special Project, supra note 38, at
530; see also M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 93 (discussing reform-

minded prison commissioner's expression of resentment toward court's continued
intervention in Arkansas).
261 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 700 F. Supp. 1180, 1190 (D.R.I. 1988) ("At
virtually every point in the long history of this case, the Department has relied on the
complexity of the problems, which this Court has never denied, as an excuse to plead
for more time. Yet despite this Court's generosity in being responsive to these pleas,
year after year has passed and still the Department has failed to make convincing
efforts to implement viable iolutions."), aff'd, 887 F.2d 258 (1st Cir. 1989); V.
Nathan, supra note 252, at 45 ("The signals of obstruction and predictions of ultimate
vindication emanating from departmental headquarters . . . reached wardens and
their institutional subordinates, as well as inmates, . . . through television sets and
radios reporting defiant statements and hostile reactions by TDC's leadership .... ").
262 See, e.g., Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Supp. 917, 924-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(recounting prison official's attempts to circumvent or ignore the court order), af'd,
643 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.), modified, 643 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832
(1981); M.K. HARRIS & D.SPILLER, supra note 17, at 103 (asserting that in Finney v.
Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), the administrators did not
routinely inform departmental employees of the substance of court orders and
explain their impact on daily job performance, or inform employees of their
responsibility to comply with the orders); id. at 159 (discussing the ignorance of some
management staff in Jefferson Parish Prison of a court order limiting the prison
population).
263 See, e.g., B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 131-33 (describing how
prison officials undermined norm condemning guard brutality by refusing to
discipline and subsequently promoting guards who brutalized inmates).
264 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 71-72 (noting that the
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workers resisting reform directives of prison administrators. 2 65 As
long as court orders remain broad and ambiguous, defendants can
easily evade compliance.

26 6

The deferrer strategy affords little or no opportunity for the
court to affect the normative perspective of those not directly
accountable to the court. Within the prison, the court relies on
prison officials for dissemination of its normative vision. Yet the
dynamics of the prison limit the administrators capacity to communicate effectively with subordinates and mobilize the corrections
bureaucracy.2 67 The prison bureaucracy, and guards especially,
often views the court's intervention as naive, biased, and illegitimate. 268 Furthermore, if the court is perceived by inmates and counselors as deferring to the prison administration, inmates may become
disillusioned with the court, viewing it as part of the system that
oppresses them rather than as a vehicle for change. 26 9 The deferrer
does nothing to reduce the predictable opposition of legislators,
governors, and parole board members to a change in normative perspective, stemming from the increased additional responsibilities,
costs, and political risks accompanying such change. 270 The deferrer
thus fails to alter the existing organizational dynamic.
By delegating to the defendants the task of introducing the concommissioner of the Arkansas prison system eliminated armed "trustee" guards with
unarmed "floor walker" guards who continued to perform many of the same
functions); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 209-10 (describing the Attorney General's
proposed plan to deal with the overcrowding problem by shuffling prisoners back
and forth between jails and prison& so that no inmate would be forced to spend more
than a few months in crowded jail); Alexander, supra note 51, at 968 (discussing the
creation of substitute procedures by administrators that accomplish the same result
as procedures invalidated by the court).
265 See note 43 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & 1). SPILLER, supra note 17, at 97 (noting that the
plaintiffs' attorneys believed that the ambiguous orders in Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), were "virtually unenforceable" and that Commissioner
Sarver warned that general and non-specific orders "made it possible for unwilling
defendants to evade compliance").
267 See supra notes 85-127 and accompanying text; T. Storey, supra note 110, at
37 (noting that an administrator felt that "one of the primary reasons for DOC's
failure to break down resistance was their inability to educate and explain why the
changes were good for staff"). This is a problem ofjudicial intervention generally,
which can be minimized by other judicial approaches, particularly the catalyst, but
not completely avoided. See infra notes 320-32 and accompanying text.
268 See J. DIIuLIo, supra note 252, at 219; L. LOMBARDO, supra note 25, at 78;

Special Project, supra note 38, at 497-98, 532-33.
269 See Note, supra note 84, at 1077 n.80.
270 See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text. See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D.
SPILLER, supra note 17, at 97 (noting that in Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
Ark. 1970), when the Commissioner attempted to justify certain reforms by declaring
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stitutional norm to the prison, the deferrer is caught on one horn of
the dilemma. The court embraces the normative perspective of
prison autonomy and control that characterizes and preserves the
status quo.
2.

The Director: Norm Development Without Internalization

The director attempts to introduce new norms to the prison system by developing and imposing specific standards and programmatic requirements designed to institutionalize the general
normative requirements of the Constitution. 27 ' The director
assumes direct responsibility for assembling the information necessary to formulate the remedy's particular provisions and for
develop2 72
ing the specific terms and requirements of the remedy.
Typically, the director limits or excludes the defendants' participation in the formulation of the remedy's provisions. 273 Some
courts rely exclusively on the trial record as the basis for their plan,
and may even announce the order in the same opinion that establishes defendants' liability.2 74 Others will seek additional information, either from the parties or court appointed experts. 2 75 The
court may adopt provisions used by courts in other litigation or provisions submitted by plaintiffs' counsel. It may also use a courtappointed expert to make recommendations or develop an entire
plan concerning the appropriate remedy. 276 The director may
that the federal court ordered them, legislators responded that the proposed reforms
exceeded the court's requirements).
271 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1142 (5th Cir. 1982), modified, 688 F.2d
266 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART,
supra note 29, at 126; L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 101.
272 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 101-04 (reporting that the judge formed
a commission and ordered it to monitor the prison's compliance with his orders).
273 The court may evolve into a director by initially inviting defendant's
participation in the plan formulation process and, when defendants fail to respond
adequately, assuming direct control. See, e.g., Knop v. Johnson, 685 F. Supp. 636,
640 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that in response to defendants' unwillingness or
inability to deal with racially derogatory conduct "in a realistic, firm manner... [t]he
Court has no alternative... but to usurp some measure of the defendants' discretion
as administrators" and mandate particular disciplinary actions).
274 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 20 (noting that Judge Johnson took
evidence not only to establish relevant facts but to establish a basis for remedial
order).
275 See, e.g., Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 23 (M.D. Fla. 1975)
(appointing a panel of medical doctors to conduct comprehensive study of health
services in all correctional institutions in Florida and to report their findings to the
court and to recommend appropriate remedial measures), aft'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th
Cir. 1976).
276 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 253 (noting that the
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obtain information and hear objections from the defendants concerning proposed relief, but this tends to be the full extent of the
defendant's participation. The final order is the product of judicial
decisionmaking concerning the nature of the problems causing
unconstitutional conditions and the appropriate remedy to eliminate
those illegalities. 2 7 7
Although the director avoids repeating the deferrer's failure to
introduce any new normative framework, the court is nevertheless
caught by the remedial dilemma inherent in institutional reform.
Norms developed and introduced by the court are likely to be
resisted or neutralized by those who bear responsibility for incorporating them into their practices.2 7 8 The director bypasses the prison
system's ordinary lines of authority, introducing uncertainty, reducing institutional autonomy, and disrupting the orderly functioning of
the system's strict organizational hierarchy.2 7 9 The director thus
challenges the basic norms and incentives of the organizational
dynamic. 2 80
In the view of many insiders, the court is not a legitimate participant in the dialogue about prison conditions 2 8 1 -only
those who have experienced the daily reality of the prison understand its exigencies. The court is likely to be viewed as a naive outcourt in Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1972) responded to
defendants' noncompliance with general order to remedy unconstitutional
conditions by appointing special master to formulate "a detailed workable plan for
the correction of the conditions found by him to exist at Orleans Parish Prison").
277 See, e.g., id. at 292-93 (discussing a master who formulated the remedy for
the court by talking to inmates, staff and officials, and consulting with experts, but
whose final report was based on his personal judgment concerning the appropriate
remedy).
278 See supra notes 113-16 & 137-43 and accompanying text; see also L. YACKLE,

supra note 51, at 105-06 (recalling that Governor Wallace and other politicians were
dedicated to resisting the court order). Prison officials are less likely to resist the
imposition of court-ordered requirements that do not challenge the control structure
or impinge on their day-to-day activities, particularly if the changes require
additional outside resources. See B. CROUCH & J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 128

(noting that defendants consented to requirements in areas of overcrowding and
medical care but fought court intervention in areas of discipline and inmate trustees).
279 See Special Project, supra note 38, at 497-501; supra notes 204-212 and
accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 28-65 & 82-120 and accompanying text.
281 See, e.g., B. CROUCH &J.MARQUART, SUpra note 29, at 128 (describing how the
prison authorities thought that the judge was a meddling "bleeding heart" ".convict
lover" who imposed frivolous remedies that invaded the state's rights). By imposing
detailed normative standards on the prison, the director frequently generates media
coverage about the legitimacy of the court's role, rather than the need for
administrative or legislative action. For example, in Alabama the media responded
to Judge Johnson's order by criticizing the order and the judge's actions for being
intrusive and favorable to inmates. See L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 104-05.
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sider all too willing to accept the inmate's view of the prison and
impose unrealistic and disruptive demands for change. 28 2 Judicial
intervention thus is perceived as threatening and illegitimate, and
resistance to court orders is considered appropriate and
desirable.

28 3

The perception of illegitimacy is intensified if the prison participants believe that the court lacks a principled basis for adopting a
particular program. Because defendants do not participate in formulating the remedy under the director approach, they do not develop
the understanding, acceptance, or commitment that may emerge
28 4
from a deliberative, participatory process of remedial formulation.
The court frequently fails to explain the basis for a particular provision or the process by which a particular provision is formulated. In
the absence of an articulated approach, a process that takes into
account the concerns of the prison officials, or a legal principle
requiring the adoption of a particular remedy, the director appears
285
to impose her personal preference on the prison.
Norms that are perceived to be unprincipled, disruptive, or illegitimate are not likely to be incorporated into the prison routine or
the general policymaking process. 286 Indeed, these norms are likely
to be ignored,28 7 or to provoke formal resistance through the
appeals process 28 8 and informal sabotage by conveying to those
282 See Special Project, supra note 38, at 519; see also Delulio, Prison Disciplineand
Prison Reform, 89 PUB. INTEREST 71, 82 (Fall 1987) (quoting Commissioner Estelle as
stating that "what these people knew about prisons you could fit into a tiny thimble
with room to spare.... [We] would not be part of simple-minded so-called reforms
that... were bound to kill inmates, injure staff and destroy our programs").
283 See, e.g., Champagne, The Theomy of LimitedJudicialImpact: Reforming the Dallas
Jailas a Case Study, in THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 87, 91 (S. Nagel,
E. Fairchild, & A. Champagne eds. 1983) (noting that the most influential politicians
in Dallas County justified a policy of inaction because they felt the voters would not
approve "'building a country club for these prisoners' ").
284 See Special Project, supra note 38, at 499; cf Diver, supra note 5, at 90
("Virtually all organizational theorists stipulate as one condition for successful
change the participation of those whose behavior must be altered.").
285 See Note, supra note 84, at 1083 n.109.
286 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 288 (discussing how in
Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La 1970), the defendants' belief that
certain orders were neither feasible nor desirable affected the level of compliance).
287 See, e.g., id. at 188 (suggesting that the defendants in Holland v. Donelon,
No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. May 16, 1972) failed to take seriously the orders formulated by
the court); id. at 301 (noting that the sheriff never read the special master's final
report and was not familiar with the specific provisions of final decree, and that if the
sheriff's priorities conflicted with provisions of the decree he simply ignored them).
288 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 129-30 (noting that Governor Wallace
vowed to resist the court order through the appellate review). The court is frequently
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289
within the system a sense of the invalidity of the court's program.
The remedy's provisions may be narrowly interpreted and formalistically applied2 9 ° by simply blending them into existing practice.2 9 '
reluctant to take any significant action during the pendency of the appeal. See, e.g., id.
at 137 (noting that the judge told attorneys from both sides that he would take no
action while the appeal was pending); see also B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note
29, at 128 (discussing resistance to mandated changes in control practices through
informal noncooperation and formal appeals).
289 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 105 (Governor Wallace publicly
condemned Judge Johnson's prison decree, announced his intention to resist by
appealing, and hinted that he would refuse to comply).
290 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 261 (recounting that
when in Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1972), the court adopted a
plan unilaterally formulated by the special master that mandated the creation of a
department of detention and correction, the city effected "[a] temporary and
superficial form of compliance" by hiring a penologist for a year, giving him no
authority with regard to the prison, and failing to replace him after he left the
position); id. at 269-70 (describing how prison officials circumvented due process
requirements by instituting an "administrative" sanction of "banning"-the "loss of
institutional privileges without a simultaneous change of residence or
classification"-which was imposed on a residential unit by the administrative staff).
291 See id. at 176 (noting that the sheriff responded to a recommendation to hire
a qualified classification officer by appointing a deputy sheriff with no relevant
experience or education "interim" classification officer; the sheriff in fact hired a
penologist and reported that he had hired a qualified classification officer and never
filled the position with a permanent appointment).
The saga of a court's attempt to use an outside organization to implement a
classification system in Alabama, recounted in Reform and Regret, provides a vivid
example of the limited ability of the court unilaterally to effect change. See L. YACKLE,
supra note 51, at 137-67. The court ordered the defendants to contract with the
Center for Correctional Psychology ("CCP") to implement a new classification plan
and placed the head of the CCP in charge of the classification effort. The CCP
obtained financial and administrative support and set up the Prison Classification
Project ("PCP") to undertake the reclassification effort.
The prison authorities insisted that they were capable of classifying prisoners
without interference from the outside and resisted the efforts of CCP. They involved
counsel in meetings intended to develop the classification system, which gave the
meetings an "adversary flavor" and magnified mutual suspicions. See id. at 143, 150.
State authorities refused to act on PCP's classification decisions. See id at 157. The
prison official responsible for classification repeatedly challenged the decisions and
actions of the PCP. He refused to make his staff available to work with PCP. The
prison officials filed objections with the court concerning PCP's classification
decisions in an extraordinarily large percentage of the cases. See id. at 158-59. Many
of these objections, which were o-erruled by the court, were based on fundamental
differences between PCP and the Department concerning the criteria for
classification. See id. at 159.
PCP developed new procedures and criteria for classification and reclassified all
inmates in the Alabama system. The court then terminated PCP's involvement in
Alabama's prisons. A year after PCP's departure, an expert reviewed the
classification programs in Alabama's major prisons. He found that the rules and
procedures instituted by PCP were no longer in use. "There was ... little trace of the
work that [PCP] had done .... The prison system's omnipresent bureaucracy, with
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The prison administration can undercut even those provisions that
leave no room for interpretation by developing alternative procedures that neutralize the impact of the court's mandate.2 9 2
The director strategy may frustrate the developmental process
indispensable to the formulation and implementation of the appropriate remedy in a particular prison. In some cases, an effective solution can be developed only through the joint deliberation of
responsible decisionmakers, relevant experts, and prison participants.29 3 Systemic problems, such as overcrowding, often require
the participation of outside policymakers.2 9 4 Moreover, it is in part
through exposure to different approaches and programs that individuals change their perceptions of what works, what is possible, and
what is acceptable. 29 5 Historically, the absence of this type of
exchange has characterized decisionmaking in the corrections conits own norms and practices, closed in to fill the hole left by PCP and, very shortly,
eliminated all evidence that the intruders had ever come." Id. at 164-65.
292 See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 38, at 531-32 (describing efforts by prison
officials to avoid the effects of an order concerning the provision of legal assistance
by imposing restrictions limiting the prisoners' access to counsel); Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Relief from Order and in
Support of Motion to Hold Defendants in Contempt at 14-15, Grubbs v. Norris, 870
F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1989) (Nos. 80-3404, 80-3616, 80-3617) (describing defendants'
"subterfuges designed to make their population appear lower than it was in fact" by
adjusting furloughs and temporary transfers of inmates so that they would be gone
on the last day of the month when population was counted). The capacity to
neutralize the effect of specific remedial provisions imposed by the court will depend,
of course, on the nature of the problem at issue. Some remedial issues, such as those
requiring specific changes in physical facilities, will leave little room for maneuvering
by prison officials. Reforms that require the participation of prison officials for their
implementation, such as introduction of new programs, procedures or privileges for
inmates, leave substantial room for manipulation by prison officials.
293 See supra note 232. This process of norm development may not be necessary
for every type of violation that is the subject ofjudiciai intervention. Specifically, the
remedy may be obvious where the violation at issue involves discreet practices that
inflict immediate and extreme harm and are easily monitored, and for which there is
a clearly accepted prohibition and a straight-forward remedial response, such as a
negative injunction against the use of strip cells as punishment. In these situations,
the delay that inevitably accompanies the deliberative process of remedy formulation
may not be warranted or necessary to produce appropriate, effective relief. See, e.g.,
M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 69-70 (noting that in Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), the court issued specific injunctions against
interfering with inmate access to the court and assigning inmates to racially
segregated cells); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 14, 94-95 (recounting how Judge
Johnson ordered Alabama defendants to close the notorious "dog houses" used for
punitive confinement and to cease accepting inmates).
294 See supra note 150-56 and accompanying text.
295 See Chin & Benne, supra note 23, at 43-48 ("[C]hange ...will occur only as
the persons are brought to change their normative orientations to old patterns and
develop commitments to new ones.").
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text and contributed to the intractability of the status quo. The
directorial approach does nothing to generate a process to
encourage the development of a new normative framework.29
The director also risks institutional co-optation. The court
assumes direct responsibility for implementation, so its success
depends on the attainment of compliance. Overseeing the compliance process, however, is time-consuming, frustrating, and controversial. It thrusts the judge into an unfamiliar and, in many
instances, uncomfortable role. Any perceived negative effects of the
director's remedy are likely to be attributed to the court's failure.
The court therefore has strong incentives to terminate its involve97
ment as quickly as possible.
In response to the difficulties of achieving compliance, the director may tailor the relief ordered to the constraints of the judicial
role. 29 8 The court may relax the requirements set forth in its original order, 299 or choose programmatic standards and goals that can
be measured and easily achieved, regardless of their impact on institutional practice.3 0 0 Thus, the director is particularly susceptible to
a form of goal displacement ithat limits the court's impact on the normative framework of the prison system.
This problem is exacerbated by the limits of constitutional doctrine. Directors may only inject norms grounded in legal doctrine.3 0 1 The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
296 A court may use the threat of a unilaterally crafted remedy to create
incentives for the defendants or the parties to participate in the remedial process. See
supra note 206. This approach of course characterizes the broker. If the parties fail
to respond to the threat, the court then adopts the director approach, with the
limitations described above.
297 The court may also amend its order in an effort to avoid further appeals. See
L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 130-31 (describing howJudgeJohnson backed away from
strict cell space requirements in an effort to undercut Governor Wallace's appeal of a
court order).
298 See, e.g., id. (discussing how Judge Johnson prepared to make changes in the
order to accommodate the reservations of an expert).
299 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 158 (noting that at a
hearing on a motion for contempt, the court in Holland v. Donelon, No. 71-1442
(E.D. La. May 16, 1972), increased the population limit from 110 to 132); Note, supra
note 84, at 1081 n.102 ("[C]ourt's solution to racial segregation was to assign beds
according to race, allowing Spanish inmates to be treated as 'wild cards' (either black
or white)").
300 See, e.g., Note, supra note 84, at 1081 n.102 (the "[clourt's solution to
problem of guard brutality was to develop experimental psychological screening test
for guards; problem of strained working conditions, inadequate training and hostile
relationships with inmates not addressed").
301 Although the legal norm constrains the remedial process under each of the
four judicial approaches, the director is particularly limited because the court is
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punishment is essentially a negative doctrine, prohibiting certain
practices and conditions, but containing no affirmative normative
vision of prison practices. 3 0 2 Constitutional doctrine therefore does
not directly mandate the development of norms that promote and
protect individual integrity, only the elimination of visible abuses.
The Supreme Court's current approach to determining whether
a particular prison condition or practice violates the Constitution
further constrains the director's capacity to affect the normative
framework of the prison system. The Court's recent opinions
emphasize the importance of preserving the discretion of prison officials both in defining the constitutional norm and determining the
proper remedy. 0 3 A majority of the Court appears to endorse
prison officials' unlimited mandate to strike the appropriate balance
between order and individual dignity. However, this approach fails
to take into account the institutional dynamics that prevent prison
officials from reasonably assessing the degree to which individual
needs must be compromised in the interest of maintaining order.3 0 4
The Court thus has relinquished to some extent the task of defining
the constitutional norm for prisons to a system that cannot effecimposing a remedy that derives its authority solely from the legal standard. Under
each of the other approaches, the remedial process affords the opportunity to treat
the legal norm as the starting point rather than the boundary of the remedial process.
The deferrer permits the defendants, in the rare instance that they are capable and
willing, to undertake a more systemic approach to the constitutional violation.
Similarly, the broker allows the parties to agree to a remedy that exceeds the
constitutional norm. See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 525 (1986) ("[A] federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a
consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court
could have awarded after a trial."). The catalyst, by structuring a deliberative
process, encourages the parties to treat the remedial stage as an opportunity to
develop effective strategies for addressing the underlying causes of the legal
violation, even if the resulting remedy exceeds the legal standards.
302 In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), the Supreme Court stated:
No static 'test' can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of
confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment "must
draw it meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society" .... But conditions that cannot be said to
be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not
unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and
even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.
Id. at 346-47 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
303 See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433
U.S. 119, 125 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826-27 (1974).
304 See supra notes 29-55 and accompanying text (describing goal displacement
of order by prison officials).
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tively generate a normative framework requiring the prison to incur
costs or change its routine in order to protect individual inmates.
The Supreme Court's prison jurisprudence constrains the director's capacity to impose her normative framework upon the
prison. 30 5 The court's remedy may not exceed the scope of narrowly
defined constitutional violations. The court must accept and work
within the existing institutional framework and may not unilaterally
impose programmatic changes unrelated to the conditions violating
the constitution."0 6 Particularly given the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the role of the federal courts in finding unconstitutional prison conditions, 30 7 the director's authority is limited
because her remedy derives its legitimacy exclusively from the nar30 8
row constitutional norm.
The court's limited mandate tends to discourage the exploration
of innovative, progressive approaches to eliminating unconstitutional conditions. 30 9 The court is predisposed to adopt short-term,
conventional approaches that may lock in limited, out-dated, and
ultimately ineffective solutions to prison problems. 3 0 Because of
305 Thus, the analysis of the dynamics of organizational stasis not only implies
that a different approach to prison remedies is needed, but also supports a less
permissive substantive standard. This raises the issue of the proper place that
remedial inadequacy should have in setting a substantive rule. This question,
although extremely important to the question of the court's remedial efficacy, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
306 See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding
that the district court went too far in ordering testing, training and various programs
for guards); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 89 (notingJudge Johnson's unwillingness to
second-guess the state's policies of incarcerating inmates in large rural prisons or
involving the parole board in the litigation).
307 See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1981) (holding that in ruling on
the constitutionality of pretrial detention facilities, a federal court should play a
limited role and, absent substantial evidence establishing constitutional violations,
defer to the expertise of corrections officers).
308 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (reversing aspects of
JudgeJustice's order, inter alia, requiring the state to (1) use paroles and furloughs to
reduce overcrowding, (2) only house one inmate in cells that contain sixty square feet
or less, and (3) reorganize the management of a prison facility), modified, 688 F.2d 266
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
309 For example, Judge Johnson in Alabama refused to hear testimony
concerning sentencing and parole policy, and rejected the plaintiffs' motion to
involve the parole board as a defendant. Instead, he focused his attention almost
exclusively on the physical conditions of life in the institutions that already existed.
This approach essentially foreclosed more systemic approaches to the problem of
overcrowding in Alabama's prisons. See L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 89.

310 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 263-64 (concluding that

the court order led to a dramatic increase in shakedowns and a drastic reduction of
inmate movement within the prison); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 102 (stating that
the court ordered frequent "shakedowns" as a means of dealing with violence); id. at
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the defendants' tendency to change only to the extent required by
the court, these limited judicial standards, intended to be minima
below which the prison may not fall, become a ceiling beyond which
the prison will not venture.3 1 ' The director may thereby prevent the
development of more humane, effective, and less costly approaches
312
to imprisonment.
Thus, the director's assumption of direct responsibility for norm
development fails to resolve the dilemma of remedy formulation and
implementation due to the court's limited capacity to institute effective norms without the participation of the prison officials responsible for implementing them.
3.

The Broker and the Limits of the Adversary Process

The broker's bargaining strategy appears to resolve the remedial dilemma by relying on the lawyers to develop the remedy on
behalf of the parties through negotiation. The broker avoids the
appearance of illegitimacy and seemingly reduces internal resistance
to the new normative framework by grounding its remedial requirements in the parties' consent. At the same time, the broker conveys
to the prison administration that the court will not rely exclusively
upon those parties responsible for initially creating the unconstitutional conditions.
The broker's strategy, however, is dramatically affected by the
limitations of the adversary process. The negotiation of norms primarily by lawyers, 3 13 rather than by the prison officials who bear
97 (noting that the population problem was dealt with by imposing a cap, which
diverted the problem to local jails, exacerbating conditions there.); id. at 190
(describing the dismay of prisoners' lawyers because their efforts produced only
more penitentiaries on the traditional model: "[a] new Governor had proved willing
finally to act-but his action had been in precisely the direction the plaintiffs had

wished to avoid").
311 For example, in Alabama the state officials responded to the court-ordered
population cap and 60-square-foot space requirement by constructing "human
warehouses" as quickly and cheaply as possible, "with no attempt to provide

anything beyond the minimum space per prisoner that Judge Johnson's order
prescribed." L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 174-75; see also M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER,
supra note 17, at 369-70 (describing how an order prohibiting curtailment of
privileges for more than six days without a hearing was used to allow staff to avoid
hearings).
312 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 98 (noting an argument by a state
official that prison officials have responded to court orders by building more prisons,
rather than by developing a range of alternative intermediate sanctions).
313 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 390 (concluding that
"the defendants' attorneys, rather than defendants themselves, were responsible for
most of the negotiation and.., input").
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responsibility for implementing them, 3 14 reduces the likelihood that
the prison community will internalize those norms. The key actors
within the prison often view the remedy's provisions as an externally
imposed product developed by lawyers unfamiliar with the special
needs of the prison environment. 31 5 Prison administrators often
convey their lack of commitment to the new normative framework to
the prison hierarchy. As a :result, the line-workers most responsible
for implementing the new normative framework are encouraged to
31 6
neglect or resist the remedy.
Lawyers' adversarial tendencies further limit the broker's capacity to introduce a new normative perspective into the prison. Lawyers frequently adopt extreme positions to enhance their bargaining
strength and cut their potential losses. Plaintiffs' counsel is likely to
focus on the adoption of specific standards that can be easily monitored. 1 7 Defendants' counsel, on the other hand, will concentrate
314 See, e.g., Dickey, The Promise and Problems of Rulemaking in Corrections: The
Wisconsin Experience, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 285, 292 (showing that the system for
segregating dangerous inmates "was largely the result of the advice of the division's
attorneys on what could be defended in court"). The broker will sometimes attempt
to induce agreement by making informal suggestions to the parties concerning
particular remedial issues. In some cases, the defendants treat these informal
suggestions as the equivalent of court orders. See M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra
note 17, at 67. Under these circumstances, the mediator approach suffers from the
same limitations of the unilateral imposition of norms as the director approach. See
supra text accompanying notes 278-312.
315 See, e.g., Dickey, supra note 314, at 292 (finding that a Wisconsin correctional
system that was devised by attorneys to satisfy a court order "was so impractically
elaborate that it was never implemented" (citation omitted)); T. Storey, supra note
110, at 34 (asserting that the Department of Corrections "never really took the
negotiations seriously" in part "because dealing with lawyers and written regulations
was foreign to them"). Representation of defendants by the attorney general, rather
than by department of corrections' counsel, poses an additional conflict between
lawyer and client. The perspective and political interests of the attorney general
frequently differ from those of prison officials.
316 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 387 (noting that staff

members involved in Collins v. Schoonfield, 355 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972),
resented court intervention, and, because there were no apparent penalties for
noncompliance for staff members, decrees were, in the words of a jail staff member,
regarded as " 'just pieces of paper' "); Dickey, supra note 314, at 292 (asserting that
inmates thought to be dangerous were found guilty of violations of other disciplinary
rules justifying their segregation, thereby circumventing the limitations of the policy
developed by the lawyers).
317 See Knowles, supra note 196, at 7; see also M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra
note 17, at 391 (noting that plaintiffs' counsel feared that the defendants would
evade or resist compliance by exploiting vague or general relief, and insisted on a
high degree of detail and specificity); T. Storey, supra note 110, at 35 (plaintiffs'
counsel "was more concerned with creating a binding document which covered as
many aspects of inmate conditionsi as possible"). This concern stems in part from
lawyers' general preoccupation with the liability stages of litigation and their relative
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on minimizing the impact of the resulting decree on their clients.3 1t
Neither side is predisposed to consider carefully the institutional
dynamics of the implementation process, and both sides usually have
319
limitied experience with the problems of implementation.
Thus, the broker's reliance on the adversary process to produce
a normative agreement limits the possibility of an effective process of
norm development. The dilemma remains unresolved.
4. The Catalyst: Creating a Context for Norm Development
The catalyst approach to introducing a new normative framework directly addresses the elements contributing to the prison's
organizational stasis. The catalyst neither defers to the existing normative framework of the prison system nor unilaterally imposes judicial norms. She does not rely exclusively upon the lawyers to
produce an agreement.3 20 Rather, the catalyst structures a process
inattentiveness to the remedial stage. Plaintiffs' counsel also tends to distrust the
defendants and the court to some extent, and thus often insists on standards that can
easily be measured. See Knowles, supra note 196, at 7.
Plaintiff's counsel may also be affected by limitations on the resources and
energy devoted to the remedial stage of the litigation. In addition, counsel's concern
about the availability of fees may influence the approach to the bargaining process.
These factors may constrain plaintiffs' counsel's ability to bargain effectively.
318 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 392 (concluding that
the defendants tended to focus on exactly what was ordered, rather than on more
generalized objectives). Thus, the broker's role in introducing a competing
normative perspective may suffer from the same limitations constraining the
director-the tendency to create a ceiling above which the defendants will not go. See
Dickey, supra note 314, at 291-93.
319 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 390 (noting that
attorneys' "inability to see the forest" contributed to later problems experienced in
seeking compliance); Dickey, supra note 314, at 292 (concluding that the system
developed on paper was highly problematic); T. Storey, supra note 110, at 35
(attorneys knew little about problems of implementing provisions of consent decree).
Specialized prisoners' rights organizations that have been litigating prison cases for
years, such as the National Prison Project, are likely to be more familiar with and
attentive to the problems posed by the remedial stage. If counsel are aware of the
pitfalls of the remedial dilemma, they can overcome many of the limitations of the
broker approach by building provisions that cast the court in the role of a catalyst.
320 Plaintiffs' counsel may cast the court in the catalyst role by building
provisions into a negotiated or proposed decree that require the participation in a
deliberative process of remedial development and trigger automatically the
imposition of sanctions in the event of substantial noncompliance. For example, in
Spear v. Ariyoshi, No. 84-1104 (D. Haw. June 12, 1985), plaintiffs' counsel
introduced the concept of a representative panel of experts to oversee the remedial
process in consultation with members of the prison system and outside experts. See
supra note 242-43. In South Carolina, the consent decree "establishes a panel of
mutually agreed upon experts to evaluate staffing and other needs in the critical areas
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through which the key actors in the prison system develop an effective remedy.

321

The catalyst's strategy permits those seeking change to adopt a
more systemic approach to the problems underlying constitutional
violations. The process involves the actors responsible for implementing the results of the deliberations.3 2 2 The catalyst makes use
of court-appointed facilitators and experts to provide prison officials
with the information and expertise necessary to engage in a deliberative planning process .3" This interaction between experts and participants in the prison dynamic exposes prison officials to alternative
approaches and facilitates the development of more effective solutions to the problems at issue. Through exposure, participation, and
deliberation, the catalyst's strategy reduces the prison system's char3 24
acteristic resistance to change.
The catalyst's strategy avoids the problems that frustrate the
reform efforts of the deferrer, director, and broker. She neither
depends entirely upon the prison officials3 2 5 nor attempts to by-pass
them entirely. 326 Nor does the catalyst rely upon lawyers functioning within the constraints of the adversary process.3 27 The catalyst's
commitment to process and the institutionalization of change
of security and medical and mental health care." KIuger, South Carolina Settlement
Limits Population, Enforces Standards, 5 NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ. 1, 9 (Fall 1985).
321 See supra text accompanying notes 230-32.
322 Although in theory nothing limits the catalyst's capacity to ensure inmates'
and guards' involvement in the planning process, they are usually excluded from
direct participation. To the extent that direct involvement in the process of norm
development facilitates institutionalizing those norms, see supra note 232, the
catalysts' failure to include inmates and guards constitutes a limitation on her
capacity to resolve the remedial dilemma. Counsel can compensate for this limitation
by involving the prisoners and guards in the development of the parties' negotiating
positions. However, there are limitations on plaintiffs' capacity to perform this role,
such as conflicts among members of the class, unwillingness of inmates to
compromise for symbolic reasons and resistance of defendants or the court to
inmates' inclusion in the negotiations. See Note, supra note 84, at 1076-77 & nn.7476; cf Bell, Serving Two Masters:Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (describing conflicts between class members, and
the attorneys' failure to represent all interests adequately).
323 The problems of limited expertise and professional exchange characterizing
the organizational dynamics in prisons accentuate the importance of the catalyst's
attention to process in prison cases. In cases involving institutions that do not share
these problems, this benefit of the catalyst approach may be unnecessary.
324

See, e.g., M.K.

HARRIS

& D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 188 (concluding that

the defendant coroner's involvement with the master in developing plans for keeping
the mentally ill out ofjail appears to have avoided previous compliance problems).
325 The deferrer's strategy; see supra note 190 and accompanying text.
326 The director's approach; see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
327 The broker's strategy; see supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
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directly addresses the dynamics of organizational stasis and permits
the court to develop and institutionalize a new normative framework.
The catalyst's strategy is nevertheless subject to a variety of
potential limitations. The processes set in motion by a catalyst are
time consuming. 2 8 The resulting delay in implementing the remedy
means that inmates are forced to suffer continuing constitutional
injuries.3 2 Where the harm to the inmates is visible and extreme
and the remedy well-established and uncontroversial, the participatory approach to remedy formulation and the resulting delay is
unnecessary and unjustified. Without the catalyst's process, however, meaningful change in prison norms may never occur.
The effectiveness of the catalyst's deliberative process may also
be constrained by the limited involvement of key participants in the
dynamics of organizational stasis. Line-workers are at best tangentially involved in the remedy formulation process. Many of these
actors will be excluded entirely. Furthermore, the impact of the catalyst's strategy is reduced as the court's reliance on lawyers increases.
The court can reduce these liabilities by careful attention to the process by which the remedy is formulated.33 0
The boundaries of the constitutional norm pose an additional
constraint on the scope of the catalyst's normative agenda. Unless
the prison officials choose to embrace more systemic approaches to
the underlying problems facing the prison system, the catalyst may
not require the parties to consider and adopt approaches that exceed
328 It is in part for this reason that courts have turned increasingly to masters
and other compliance aids to oversee the remedial process. This phenomenon has
not gone without criticism. See Brakel, supra note 7, at 164-66; Fiss, Against Settlement,
93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984). However, if properly supervised and trained, masters can
perform an invaluable role in the compliance process and operate within constraints
that respect the limits of the judicial function. See generally Sturm, Special Masters Aid in
Compliance Efforts, 6 NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ. 9, 11-12 (Winter 1985) (noting that the
effectiveness of a master often hinges upon her ability and perceived legitimacy).
329 Because of this time lag, inmates may feel alienated by the process, and
predisposed to engage in disruptive activities that may detract from the remedial
endeavor. Recalcitrant defendants may very well use delay as a tactic to avoid
implementation. See Note, supra note 84, at 1074-77. One way to minimize the
extent of inmates' harm is to award damages to compensate for the injury caused by
ongoing constitutional violations. See infra note 345-47.
330 See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1974) (representative
of corrections department included as part of Office of Compliance Coordinator);
Wright, Revived Settlement Halts Trial in Arizona Case, 5 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 4, 6
(Fall 1985) (magistrate insisted that the Director of Corrections be present at the
bargaining table, so that the settlement meetings became a forum not only for
bargaining but for the education of the prison administration).
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the scope of the legal violation. 3 1 Under these circumstances, the
catalyst may be unable to prevent the parties from adopting shortterm solutions that may ultimately perpetuate the problems underlying unconstitutional prison conditions.
Unlike the other approaches, however, the catalyst has the
potential to induce prison officials to tackle prison problems systemically by exposing them to alternative approaches and involving them
in the information-gathering and planning process. The catalyst
requires prison officials to engage in a deliberative process at least
with respect to identified legal violations, perhaps empowering them
to use skills obtained there in other areas. Moreover, the catalyst
may adopt a systemic view of the causes of constitutional violations
that accounts for the underlying organizational dynamics.
Most significantly, the extent of the catalyst's capacity to force
the development of new nonrative standards may be limited by the
willingness of prison officials to embrace the process of norm development. The process structured by the catalyst cannot take place
without the cooperation of the participants in the prison dynamic.
The two-pronged nature of the catalyst approach enables the court
to overcome this potential obstacle. By combining the process of
norm development with the imposition of sanctions for failure to
engage in this process, the catalyst creates incentives for intransigent
public officials to participate in the deliberative process or to give
33 2
way to new participants who support the new normative agenda.
Thus, the catalyst's strategy, although not without limitations, is well
suited to foster the development of a new normative framework in
the prison.
B.

The Court's Capacity to Create Incentives to Undertake Change

The incentive system in prisons tends to reinforce the status quo
333
and discourage efforts to change routines, policies, and norms.
Courts can create incentives to induce prison participants to take the
steps necessary to eliminate unconstitutional conditions. The court's
authoritative position and the public nature of judicial proceedings
33 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 554 (1979) ("Courts must be
mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial
answers to them must reflect that fact, rather than a court's idea of how best to
operate a detention facility."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (indicating that "[o]nce a right and a violation have been
shown," the duty of the court is to correct the offending condition).
332 See infra notes 379-92.
33 See supra notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
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enable a court to generate changes in the community's perception of
the prison and the value of reform. The public nature of judicial
proceedings exposes the community to the need for reform in prisons under court order. A remedy containing standards and deadlines creates a mechanism to hold the prison administration publicly
accountable for its performance.3 3 4 Conduct that formerly eluded
detection or supervision is subject to public scrutiny and measured
against judicially approved goals and standards.3 3 5 By fostering a
more receptive political environment for prison reform, the court's
public pronouncements can enhance the capacity of individuals or
groups within the prison system to obtain resources for particular
programs.3 3 6 The court may put willing participants in contact with
influential authorities ordinarily inaccessible to them. Increased
public and professional support for reform changes the typically conservative incentive structure of prison administrators.
Judicial support for attaining expertise and meeting minimum
standards may elevate the professional standards of the corrections
profession. The court's attention to prison administration enhances
the visibility, status, and prestige of the corrections profession. 3 7 A
number of commentators have linked judicial intervention with the
increasing professionalization of corrections, at least at the adminis334

See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 34 (describing increase in staff in

anticipation of upcoming hearing).
335 Compliance hearings may stimulate efforts to comply, as do deadlines. See
M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 18.
336

By using the court as a scapegoat, administrators are sometimes able to

make improvements that the public otherwise might not tolerate. See id. at 110. For
example, administrators under court order may obtain resources that were previously
unavailable, thereby enhancing their power to bring about change. See, e.g., id. at 2425, 111, 411-12 (describing an increase in appropriations for prisons following
judicial intervention in each case studied); id. at 209 (describing how a bond issue for
the construction of a new jail "failed every time it had been presented to the voters
prior to litigation," and passed after the case received public attention); id. at 314-15
(describing how litigation reportedly played an important role in raising funds for the
prison in Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970)); Champagne, supra
note 283, at 96 (recounting how the court in Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411
(N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 983 (1975), forced large expenditures for jail improvements). As a
result, guards and counselors may receive additions to their staff and training. See,
e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 24 (documenting increases in staff
resulting from litigation).
337 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 110 (finding that
corrections litigation contributed to unified department and the appointment of well
qualified individuals); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 40-41 (noting that after Newman v.
Alabama, 460 U.S. 1083 (1982), the prison was the subject of several major studies
concerning the condition of Alabama's penal system).
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trative level. 3 38 In response to court intervention, some corrections
departments have created the position of implementation officer,
which frequently serves as a stepping stone to high level management positions. 33 9 Other corrections professionals have become
involved as consultants and experts in connection with pending or
threatened litigation. These more sophisticated professional standards, techniques, and communications systems may act as an external incentive to conform to the demands of a more professional
community.
The court can directly alter the incentive structure by rewarding
administrators for compliance. It can merely praise particular individuals or the system as a whole for any progress. It can restore to
the prison system some degree of autonomy or discretion. Most significantly, it can reduce or terminate its active involvement with the
prison system. 34 0 Corrections officials thus have strong incentives to
comply with court orders as a means of limiting further intervention.
338 SeeJ.JACOBS, supra note 29, at 54-55, 57; M. Feeley & R. Hanson, supra note
252, at 11; cf L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 257-58 (describing how the Alabama
corrections department in the wake of Pugh and James attracted a new, young,
cerebral group of professional administrators).
Guard training is sometimes a component of court orders addressing the
problem of violence. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1144, 1148-49 (5th Cir.
1982), modified, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). But cf
Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F. 2d 1237, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[To require prisons to have
adequate recruiting, screening and training programs is an impermissible judicial
involvement with the minutiae of prison administration."). Recently, training
programs in some systems have begun to take into account the legal requirements
and constraints within which guards must operate. Some training programs now
include components focused on legal standards and a number of states now require a
high school diploma as a prerequisite for employment as a guard, a trend which has
been noted by the courts. See Aguilera v. Cook County Merit Board, 760 F.2d 844,
848 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 907 (1985); NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT &
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL MANPOWER SURVEY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM 1, 85 (1978) (77% of the responding institutions required high school
diplomas for employment as custodial officer).
39 See, e.g., Black v. Ricketts, Civ-III PHX CAM, Court Monitor's Third
Progress Report (D. Ariz.) at 5 (touting top level administrator designated by
Director "as responsible for the coordination and direction of all compliance
efforts"); Memorandum from Perry Johnson, Director, to Deputies and Wardens
(February 1, 1984) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (announcing
the formation of a planning and oversight committee and the appointment of a
project director responsible for overall monitoring of all activities pursuant to the
Decree).
340 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 17, 401-03 (noting that
the court in Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972), used
relinquishing jurisdiction as an incentive for compliance, and that the defendants
actively pursued compliance in an effort to persuade the court to relinquish
jurisdiction).
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Their superiors are given an incentive to replace incompetent 3lead41
ership with individuals capable of satisfying judicial standards.
Courts can impose substantial costs on those who cannot or will
not comply with the court's order. One important sanction is the
exposure of failure, incompetence, or scandal.3 4 2 Officials whose
conduct is otherwise invisible to the public must face public criticism,
humiliation, and potential discharge if they fail to respond effectively
to court mandates.3 43 The exposure of brutal and inhumane conditions coupled with judicial condemnation of public officials for their
intransigence or incompetence can create external political pressure
3 44

for change.

A court has the power to impose direct costs for failure to comply. It can increase its degree of supervision and reduce the discretion and autonomy of prison officials in the face of continued refusal
to develop a plan to achieve compliance. Courts can force the prisons to internalize the cost of continued constitutional violations by
requiring the corrections department to compensate inmates for the
341 "In Holt, Hamilton, and Collins, a change in personnel involving the highest
level correctional official was believed to have aided the compliance process." M.K.
HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 15. The new personnel appointed in Collins
"had no obligation to defend the status quo," supported the court orders, and were
described as "capable" and possessing a "'marked change in attitude.'" Id. at 38485.
342 Litigation can contribute to the exposure of new information revealing
shocking conditions and practices that do not comport with public expectations. See,
e.g., id. at 9, 410 (noting that Collins "generated considerable publicity ....
Commissions were established . . ., special studies were undertaken, [and] media
attention increased" such that the Baltimore city jail, which had operated in relative
isolation, was subjected to considerable public attention).
343 The prison administration in command in Rhode Island when the litigation
in Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977), began was "strictly
political" and had no experience with, or expertise in, corrections. See The
Organizational Consequences of Remedial Law, supra note 46, at 17. The pressure
and visibility created by the law suit led to their dismissal and replacement with more
qualified leadership.
344 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 9, 84-85, 182-84, 38283 (discussing how the participants in Holt v. Sarver, Hollandv. Donelon and Collins v.
Schoonfield believed that the media's exposure of facts about the respective prisons
during the course of the litigation greatly contributed to the creation of a political
climate conducive to prison reform and influenced the legislature to adopt a more
progressive attitude toward prison reform). In the wake of litigation, public opinion
appears to have shifted sufficiently for the legislature to feel an impact. See id. at 1011. Public exposure contributed to a political climate conducive to change. See id. at
86; L. YACKLE, supra note 5 1, at 66. Officials who desire reform sometimes use media
coverage to obtain support for the court order. In Alabama, the Commissioner
invited the press into the prison after the court issued an extensive remedial order in
an effort to pressure the legislature into increasing prison appropriations. See id at
64-65.
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continuing deprivation of their constitutional rights. This can be
done by finding the defendants in contempt for failing to comply
with the court order, assessing the damage caused inmates as a result
of continuing noncompliance, and awarding these damages to
inmates as compensation for the harm caused by the defendants'
contempt.3 4 5 Individuals who are responsible for constitutional dep3 46
rivations may be held accountable through damages awards.
A court may also impose coercive civil contempt sanctions to
induce compliance. 34 7 Coercive contempt fines run against the
department, and can be used to fund programs to achieve compliance.3 4 8 Finally, courts may order the defendant's to release inmates
or even close 9 the institution in response to the defendant's
4
3

intransigence.

345 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 171-72 (describing Judge Pointer's use
of contempt to levy fines for noncompliance and require part of the fine to be paid
directly to inmates in Thomas v. Gloor, No. 77-P-66-S (N.D. Ala. Apr. 16, 1980)).
346 See Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1985) (court
awarded inmates $45,000 in compensatory damages from city and director ofjail and
$5000 in punitive damages for denial of medical care and infliction of
unconstitutional conditions); Williams v. Lane, 646 F. Supp. 1379, 1409-10 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (inmates entitled to award as compensation for pain, suffering, mental anguish,
and lost wages caused by prison authorities' unconstitutional conduct). But see P.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT:

CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS

59-81

(1983) (arguing that imposing personal liability creates perverse incentives to engage
in self-protection and risk minimization).
347 See, e.g, Officials
Sentenced injail Case, N.Y. Times, March 17, 1987, at A16, col.
5 (reporting that "Santa Clara County Supervisors... were sentenced to jail terms
... for violating a judge's order to provide more jail cells to ease overcrowding");
Miller v. Carson, 550 F. Supp. 543, 548-49 (D. Fla. 1982) (court held defendants in
civil contempt and imposed a fine of $5000 per day for violations of maximum
capacity provisions of permanent irjunction).
348 See, e.g., Campbell v. MacGruder, Memorandum Opinion (September 30,
1983), cited in, Marsh v. Barry, 705 F. Supp. 12, 13 n.1 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding the
mayor of Washington D.C. and top correctional personnel in contempt for violating
an overcrowding order and fined them $50,000 plus $1000 per day for each day noncompliance continued); Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding
prison officials in contempt and requiring payment of fine into inmate fund to be
used to implement decree), modified, 643 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832
(1981). In Puerto Rico, the defendants have been in contempt for over a year and
substantial fines have accumulated and are being used to fund compliance efforts. See
Telephone interview with Vincent Nathan, supra note 205.
349 See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 520 F. Supp. 1059, 1062 (D. Colo. 1981) (ordering
that "Old Max" [Canon Correctional Facility Max] be closed); Benjamin v. Malcolm,
564 F. Supp. 668, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying motion to modify orders limiting
population of city jail); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 95 (noting that Judges Johnson
and Hand "enjoin[ed] state authorities from 'accepting or permitting the acceptance'
of new prisoners into the system until the population of the four major institutions
was reduced to . . . 'designed capacity'.); id. at 171-72 (describing Judge Varner's
order in Bibb v. Montgomery County, 76-380-N (M.D. Ala. 1976), that required
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In sum, the court has at its disposal a range of rewards and sanctions that can influence the incentive structure within the prison system. In the following sections the four managerial strategies are
analyzed to determine the ability of each to use these judicial tools to
change the prison's incentive structure.
1. The Deferrer and the Limits of Normative Authority
The deferrer relies primarily, if not exclusively, on the symbolic
and persuasive authority of judicial pronouncements to create the
impetus for change within the prison.3 50 This passive approach to
promoting compliance has little or no effect on the preexisting
incentive structure. The perception among the prison system's key
actors that the court intervention is illegitimate, ill-advised, and
counterproductive reduces the symbolic power of the court's pronouncements.3 51 In the absence of direct incentives to take the court
seriously, prison officials have powerful incentives to minimize judicial impact.
Prison administrators face considerable pressure from both
above and below to maintain the status quo. Unless prison officials
view the court as a higher moral and legal authority, they treat the
court as one of many constituents to which they must respond. The
prison administration faces considerable pressures to minimize its
efforts to undertake the reforms necessary to comply with the court's
orders. 35 2 If officials believe that no negative consequences will flow
from noncompliance, there is little to counteract their reluctance to
risk the disruption and resistance that may accompany change. Once
the prison administration discovers the court's reluctance either to
impose sanctions or to assume an active role in overseeing compliMontgomery County officials to release a number of inmates whom the Judge, on the
Sheriff's advice, decided were not dangerous).
350 See supra text accompanying notes 190-203. To the extent that the deferrer
establishes deadlines for compliance and holds hearings, she adds a dimension of
accountability and public scrutiny that may induce officials to act. This is particularly
true if the hearings receive media attention.
351

See, e.g., M.K.

HARRIS

& D.

SPILLER,

supra note 17, at 360 (stating that the

warden "feared that by upholding [the] petitions of prisoners the courts were
'building up an army of revolutionaries inside our jails' "). The judge's general
reputation and stature may, at least initially, affect the parties' perception of the
seriousness and legitimacy of the court's orders. See, e.g., id. at 93, 94 (concluding

that the district court judge earned respect of defendants by his stern demeanor and
his reputation as a "tough" judge; consequently, defendants followed letter of court
orders); T. Storey, supra note 110, at 22 ("From the moment Lasker was drawn as the
judge for our trial, the City was very anxious to talk to us real quick.").
352

See supra text accompanying notes 109-20.
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3 53
ance, it has little incentive to take court intervention seriously.
Unless the prison administration is predisposed to pursue reform, it
is likely to pursue a strategy that minimizes the effects of the court's
intrusion and encourages the court to accept the defendants' control
over the agenda.
The deferrer fails to create incentives even for the reformer who
shares the court's normative perspective. Because the court delegates to the current administration responsibility for effecting
change, the reformer cannot use the court as a scapegoat to justify
unpopular programs.3" 4 The reformer risks antagonizing both internal and external constituencies by publicly conceding that reform is
necessary and that court intervention is legitimate.3 5 5
The deferrer's reliance on the prison administration for compliance leaves intact the prison's preexisting incentive structure supporting the status quo. Guards are not generally directly
accountable to the court and face little danger of sanction for ignoring or defying the deferrer's pronouncements. They are unlikely to
be rewarded for facilitating the court's orders and may in fact be
penalized by their peers for supporting the court.3 5 6 They have no
investment in remedial provisions that were developed and imposed
by administrators or their lawyers. Resentment of outside interference combined with the internal pressures to resist administrative
reform will usually motivate guards to oppose judicially inspired
change.
The deferrer approach tends to discourage inmates from
embracing court intervention to accomplish reform. When inmates
realize that the court has delegated the responsibility for instituting
reform to the prison officials, they are likely to reduce their reliance
on litigation to challenge prison conditions.3 57 If inmates are essentially excluded from the remedy formulation and implementation
353 Perceived judicial reluctance to use sanctions diminishes the responsiveness
of defendants to court orders. See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at
15 ("The judge's reluctance to enforce compliance reinforced the defendants'
unwillingness to comply with provisions with which they disagreed or which
presented difficulties from a management standpoint."); id. at 308 (concluding that
the defendants' knowledge of the judge's reluctance to impose sanctions diminished
the court's capacity to impose effective enforcement mechanisms).
354 See, e.g., id. at 97 (recalling that a Commissioner noted that general court
orders provided little political protection).
355 See, e.g., id. at 16, 95 (noting that in Holt v. Sarver, the administrator's
receptivity to the litigation antagonized the legislature, which was openly hostile to
court intervention).
356 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
357 See Note, supra note 84, at 1077 n.80.
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process and observe no concrete changes flowing from judicial intervention, they have little incentive to cooperate with court-ordered
change. Prisoners may then pursue reform through disruption and
violence.
The deferrer also is unlikely to create indirect incentives by
mobilizing public opinion. The court's informal suggestions and
general pleas for compliance are unlikely to trigger the public
response that creates an environment receptive to change. 5 8 The
deferrer introduces few incentives for prison officials to undertake
the changes necessary to eliminate unconstitutional prison
conditions.
2.

The Director and the Limits of Assuming Control

The director attempts to achieve compliance by assuming direct
control over aspects of remedial formulation and prison management.3 59 However, the court cannot unilaterally implement administrative reform, and it lacks the capacity to use administrative control
to alter organizational behavior structures. The court functions
outside the prison system's hierarchy and has little direct contact
with or control over many of those whose cooperation is necessary to
achieve compliance. The court's power to hire and fire, or otherwise
to exercise direct administrative control, lies at the margins of the
boundaries of the ourt's legitimate authority and is subject to legal
challenge. The director's range of activity is defined by the scope of
the legal violation, further limiting its potential to influence the con3
duct of prison officials.

60

The director's assumption of control challenges the strong commitment to autonomy that pervades the prison system. 3 6 ' By
attempting to assume control, the court creates incentives to chal358 If the prison administration is supportive of the court mandate and has the
political support of its superiors, these parties may be able to generate sufficient

political support for prison reform to pressure an affirmative legislative response,
even under the deferrer approach. See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17,
at 95-96 (noting that when the prison administration changed, the legislature
appropriated additional funds to facilitate compliance); id. at 166-67 (concluding
"that the Hollandsuit provided an impetus and helped persuade the parish council to

approve the necessary funds" for a medical program that "went far beyond what was
required by the court orders").
See supra text accompanying notes 204-18.
See supra notes 301-08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-81 and accompanying text (explaining roots of
institutional preoccupation with autonomy). Prison administrators are likely to be
threatened by the court's assumption of authority over prison matters. See, e.g., L.
359

360
361

YACKLE,

supra note 51, at 114 (noting that Commissioner Locke was threatened by
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lenge the its authority and resist its intervention. Prison officials
exploit the court's desire to achieve compliance by creating the
appearance of compliance without actually changing prison practices.3 6 2 Alternatively, these officials may respond to judicial oversight by formalizing their contact with the court, hardening their
commitment to their positions, and challenging the court's activities
on appeal.3 63 This response delays the implementation process, is
likely to halt the momentum of the reform effort, and may lead the
court to reduce its involvement and defer to those in the prison.
By assuming direct responsibility for compliance, the director
also enables prison officials to disclaim responsibility for initiating
reform and to minimize their involvement in the reforms undertaken
by the court . 3 ' The judge's political independence enables her to
initiate reforms that would be politically risky for insiders to initiate
directly. However, risk-aveirse officials have incentives to distance
themselves publicly from reform initiatives and may refuse to take
the steps necessary to ensure success. Those hostile to court intervention may abdicate responsibility for developing new techniques
and approaches to maintain order within judicially-defined boundaries, and may even attempt to undermine the court's compliance
efforts. Any resulting disruption can be blamed on the court and
used to prove the illegitimacy of the court's role. The predictable
public controversy is likely to divert attention from the underlying
prison conditions and undercut the public pressure to undertake
change.
The director also fails to motivate non-parties, such as the legislature and the parole board, to assume responsibility for their role in
perpetuating the prison problems. The director's assumption of
control challenges the authority of the state and thus creates incenthe court-appointed experts summoned to Alabama because of the determination
that he could not handle his job).
362 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 261 (recounting that a

penologist hired in response to court order "reported that his hiring was a shallow
gesture intended only to placate the court"); supra note 292 (describing prison
officials' attempts to disguise the true prison population).
363 See Note, supra note 84, at 1076 n.73 (documenting efforts of prison officials
to formalize contact with court and to deal only through counsel).
364 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 109 (noting how state political figures
attempted to disclaim responsibility for prison conditions by "fastening blame
entirely on the commissioner and the board" in the aftermath of Newman v.
Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975), and
James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974)).
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tives for outsiders to resist cooperation. 6 5 The director imposes no
3 66
additional costs on these agencies for their noncooperation.
In fact, by visibly adopting the director approach, the court profoundly limits the range of effective incentives available to it. The
director cannot fault intractable parties for noncompliance because
the court, rather than the defendants, has assumed ultimate responsibility for implementation. Furthermore, once she has assumed
direct control, the director can no longer threaten prison administrators with the prospect of reduced discretion and autonomy. The parties are likely to perceive the director's discomfort with her role and
her unwillingness to assume greater control. Because the director
also exhibits reluctance to use the court's formal sanctioning power
as an incentive, 6 7 it has no further methods to induce change in the
3
behavior of the parties.

68

Prison officials are likely to capitalize on the director's vulnerability by increasing their resistance to the court's orders.3 69 The
court's success, rather than the defendants, is at risk. By resisting
and challenging the court's authority, the officials may force the
court to assume a more deferential stance, either by exhausting the
court or winning a reversal on appeal.37 0 Defendants always have
365

"'buck

See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 180, 181 (noting that
passing'" [among a variety of responsible agencies] was a common

problem").
366 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 113 (discussing the parole board's

indifference toJudgeJohnson's entreaties to change its parole policies; the board was
not reprimanded for its resistance, and was not forced to comply with the judge's
requests). In fact, some outsiders use their resistance to the court for political
purposes and generate attention and support by standing up to the federal court. See
infra note 449 and accompanying text.
367 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
368 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 21 (explaining how Judge Johnson's
unwillingness to use contempt affected the defendants' perception of the need to
comply: "[Judge] Johnson's preference for giving state authorities ample time to
change their ways and only threatening to exercise his contempt power was put
forward as evidence that his orders were questionable in the first instance"); cf T.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 6 (1960) (arguing that the credibility of a
threat is related to the threatener's commitment to enforce the threat).
369 In Alabama, plaintiffs asked Judge Varner to order the State Comptroller
and State Treasurer to be added as parties and ordered to spend particular funds on
prisons. Thejudge postponed action on the motion, "hoping that the threat of new
orders . . . would pressure the Legislature into authorizing funds on its own."

Instead, the Legislature reduced the budget for the prisons by seven million dollars.
"The evidence is that the Alabama legislature . . . called Judge Varner's bluffanticipating that the older, more conservative man would balk at forcing state
expenditures directly." L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 195-96.
370 See L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 226 ("Knowing that Varner could not order
the release of more prisoners, and guessing that the judge would not impose heavy
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the option of complying in the future if the threat of further action
appears imminent. Thus, the director is limited in her capacity to
alter the conduct or incentives of those whose cooperation is essential to reform.
3.

The Broker and the Limits of Praise and Threats

The broker uses the court's informal bargaining power to cajole
the defendants, through praise and threats, into taking the steps necessary to create incentives to induce compliance. 3 7 'The broker's
informal approach may be effective in stimulating some compliance,
particularly if the parties believe that the court's threats of future
sanctions are serious.3 7 2 Moreover, an agreement between the parties that requires the defendants to increase resources and involve
experts as a part of its reform process may provide incentives for
prison participants to comply with the court's order. Nevertheless,
the broker's bargaining approach suffers from many of the same
defects that constrain the deferrer's capacity to alter the prison's
373
existing internal incentive structure.
The informality and invisibility of the broker's methods tend to
limit public exposure and the potential pressure that flows from it.
More importantly, the broker's informal pressures do not affect
many of the key actors within the prison system, and are likely to be
neutralized by the system's powerful disincentives to change. Prison
officials will balance the immediate risk of disruption and loss of
autonomy against the uncertain threat of future sanctions. The
threats are an effective incentive only if taken seriously by the prison
fines or put important state officers in jail, [the governor] now wished to proclaim
victory and to withdraw .... (emphasis omitted)).
371 See supra notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
372 In Holland, participants reported that "the judge's act of calling . . .
defendants into his chambers was effective in making things happen" because it
made defendants feel they were "personally responsible and that compliance was a
serious matter." This perception was subsequently buttressed by the court's
moderate escalation of sanctions in the form of attorney's fees. See M.K. HARRIS & D.
SPILLER, supra note 17, at 198-99.

373 The lawyers, particularly plaintiffs' counsel, can compensate for these
limitations by including in the agreement terms that automatically create incentives
for compliance. For example, in Alabama, plaintiffs' counsel built into their
agreement compliance deadlines which would trigger hearings. See L. YACKLE, supra
note 51, at 193-94. The parties can also agree to the automatic imposition of
sanctions, release, or fines in the event of noncompliance. See Harris v. Pernsely, 654
F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (E.D. Pa.) (discussing a consent order that included a
moratorium on prison admissions if population cap was exceeded), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1041 (1987).
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administration. 74 The broker loses her power to influence conduct
to follow through on her threats to sanction
if she fails repeatedly
3 75
noncompliance.
4.

The Catalyst: Combining Internal Process With External Pressure.

The catalyst's management strategy is designed to use both positive and negative incentives to induce the members of the prison
system to implement change. The catalyst's synthesis of traditional
judicial sanctions and a deliberative remedial process enables the
court to create sufficient pressure to induce prison officials to undertake compliance and yet defuse the resistance that sometimes follows
coercive intervention.
The catalyst structures a process of remedial formulation and
enforcement that focuses attention on the prison problem. This
strategy can increase public support for and interest in prison reform
and elevate the stature of corrections professionals. By strengthening the political leverage of the prison system's key actors and creating structures for joint planning, the catalyst enables prison officials
to interact with politically powerful figures normally inaccessible to
them.17 ' Administrators may have increased access to governors,
legislators, state judges, and national experts in corrections.3 77 Line
workers and inmates may have access to court-appointed officials
and to superiors seeking information about the status of prison conditions and input into planning. If prison officials lack the skills and
expertise necessary to make effective use of the process structured by
374 See T. SCHELLING, supra note 368, at 11.
375 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, .upra note 17, at 287-88 (the "court's
tolerance of noncompliance over an extended period fostered skepticism" over
whether the court would enforce its orders; defendants perceived that court would
not impose contempt sanction, so that defendants were "largely left free to ignore
specific provisions with which they disagreed or which they considered impractical");
L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 233 (discussingJudge Varner's threat to use contempt if

state officials did not release inmates on their own; his "tough talk failed to produce
results" because no one "believed that Judge Varner would actually take severe
measures").
376 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 193-94 (discussing how
the master set up conferences with prison administrators, parish officials, state
judges, the coroner, and other officials whose assistance was needed to achieve
compliance).
377 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 205-08 (noting that the
master in Holland v. Donelon, No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. May 16, 1972), made parish
officials sensitive to ways their activities could affect population level, and enabled jail
officials to influence action of state judges, the sheriff,jail staff members and parish
council by establishing a process of consultation and planning with jail
administrators and other parish officials and keeping a general spotlight on the jail).
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the catalyst, court appointment of intermediaries and experts creates
opportunities for information exchange and coordination. 78 Unlike
the director, the catalyst vests the prison officials with full managerial
responsibility for compliance. The benefits of increased expertise
and resources flow directly to the prison community. This enhanced
responsibility and capacity provides the incentive and the opportu379
nity to attract more qualified, individuals into the profession.
The catalyst uses its formal powers to convince the responsible
public officials that the only way out of judicial intervention is compliance. The court structures a system of accountability that provides ongoing incentives for change. Regular information gathering
and reporting obligations, along with deadlines for particular com380
pliance activities, pressure the defendants to achieve compliance.
378 See First Report of Special Master in Harris v. Pernsley, No. 82-1847 at 6
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1987) (recommending that Philadelphia prison system submit a
proposal to the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency for the
establishment of Population Control Unit within prisons); Draft Memorandum from
Prisons Superintendent (Aug. 25, 1988) (documenting that Philadelphia prisons
received grant from PCCD to establish Population Management Unit and appointed
manager to facilitate flow of information between agencies). A number of individuals
have developed expertise as compliance officers, and they have begun to
communicate regularly about common professional concerns. A manual for special
masters in prison litigation was prepared by the National Institute of Corrections.
The role of court-appointed compliance officials includes tapping available expertise
in the corrections field to aid defendants in their compliance efforts. See NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL

MASTERS 12-13 (1983). In Puerto Rico, the master undertook to bring in experts
from outside the state to aid the defendant in revamping its system. See Telephone
interview with Vincent Nathan, Special Master in prison cases in Ohio, Texas,
Georgia, New Mexico and Puerto Rico (Dec. 26, 1988) (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
Plaintiffs' counsel may also bring to the litigation substantial information
concerning the availability of expertise and outside resources. For example, the
National Prison Project has developed substantial expertise in remedial options that
may provide assistance at the remedial stage. See, e.g., Letter from AlvinJ. Bronstein
to Judge Pettine (Dec. 9, 1988) (responding to court's request that plaintiffs' counsel
provide court and defendants with list of options and programs that have proven
effective in other jurisdictions for reducing overcrowding in prisons and jails) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
379 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 207-08 (asserting that
by focusing attention on jail, public officials' responsibility for it, and the court's
insistence on compliance, the court facilitated retention of new top level and
administrative staff and increased involvement of parish council and others in jail);
supra note 341.
380 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 194 (noting that the jail
manager reported that the master's presence during compliance inspections served
as stimulus for improvements); id. at 305 (discussing the defendants' expressed view
that compliance reports served as reminder that court was concerned about
compliance progress).
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Deadlines taken seriously by the court force prison officials to
engage in goal-oriented behavior and to measure their conduct in
relation to performance goals .3 8s Regular compliance review generates the public exposure and education crucial to creating a political
3 82
environment in which reform can occur.
The catalyst uses negative sanctions to pressure prison officials
into developing an effective remedy and a process for its institutionalization. By imposing sanctions with political and financial impact
on key participants in the prison dynamic, the catalyst personalizes
responsibility for compliance and alters the political balance that
maintains the status quo. 383 Coercive and compensatory contempt
(damages awarded to inmates to compensate for injuries caused by
ongoing noncompliance with the court's decree) internalizes the
costs of noncompliance by imposing a continuing tax on the maintenance of unconstitutional prison conditions.3 84 This expenditure
forces public officials not directly accountable to the court to take the
social and personal costs of noncompliance into account in allocating
resources and establishing policy.
The public and political pressure generated by the catalyst's
imposition of sanctions can provide prison administrators with the
incentives and support necessary to withstand internal resistance to
change.3 8 5 The prison administrator is likely to confront substantial
political pressure to take the steps necessary to avoid continued state
381

See, e.g., id. at 205 (arguing that the spotlight on jail sensitized officials to

their activities' effects on population level); id. at 400 (in Collins v. Schoonfield,

compliance deadlines appeared to have influenced rate of compliance). If deadlines
are to serve this function, defendants must perceive that failure to meet them will

result in sanction by the court. This does not mean that deadlines cannot be
modified if circumstances justify an extension. The importance of enforcement also
underscores the importance of setting reasonable time frames at the outset.

382 Otherjudicial approaches may have the same effect if the court holds regular
compliance reviews or hearings.
383 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 200 (concluding that

the participants in Holland v. Donelon, No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. May 16, 1972), viewed
contempt motions and award of attorneys' fees as a way of forcing defendants to take
court orders seriously, to establish priorities, and end the "'buck passing' "). If the
defendants perceive contempt to be a likely consequence of noncompliance, the

filing of a contempt motion may be sufficient to prompt some action toward change.
See, e.g., id. at 165, 169-70 (noting that in Holland, council moved toward compliance

only after plaintiffs filed contempt motion).
384 The imposition of fines and damages awards alters the prison dynamic,
which ordinarily promotes action by imposing costs of public exposure and political

risks on those who seek reform. Once continuing fines and damages awards are
entered, the only way to eliminate ongoing visibility and public disapproval is by
achieving compliance.
385 See supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
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payment to inmates.38 6 Faced with mounting fines, compensatory
contempt awards, and public exposure, the prison administrator cannot avoid criticism by acquiescing in the status quo. The potential for
continuing political and financial consequences creates further
incentives for administrators to educate line workers concerning the
legal norms and to take steps to hold them accountable for violations. The possibility of personal damages awards against the line
3 87
workers provides a direct deterrent to unconstitutional conduct.
If prison officials demonstrate continued inability or unwillingness to
manage the compliance process, the resulting public exposure of
incompetence and cost of judicial sanctions may pressure political
authorities to remove inadequate administrators and staff and bring
in competent officials who can participate effectively in the remedial
3 88
process.

If the unconstitutional conditions persist, the catalyst may
implement more drastic measures to limit ongoing harm and create
additional incentives for compliance. The court may order prison
administrators to release inmates 38 9 or close a prison. 90 Releasing
See supra note 384.
This increased accountability may demoralize the line staff, motivating them
to passively resist or avoid taking any affirmative steps that would expose them to
scrutiny. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 346, at 71-77. There are some indications that
this response may be only a temporary reaction to the initial stages of active judicial
386
387

involvement. See, e.g., B. CROUCH & J. MARQUART, supra note 29, at 230-31
(discussing how the security staff learned to use those sanctions legally available to
them for inmate control, enabling the staff to regain some degree of autonomy and
develop a new prison order). This potential response may be minimized by the
catalyst's strategy of increasing participation in and understanding of the changes in
policy. See, e.g., B. Chilton, supra note 90, at 78 (noting the appointment of
monitoring teams based on selections by inmates, prison officials and the court). The
guards' union provides a ready vehicle for such inclusion in the deliberative and
implementation process. Guard union involvement may defuse some of the
opposition to change that characterizes the prison dynamic. See supra note 147.
388 See supra note 250, 338, 34 1 & 343 (describing change in personnel resulting
from court intervention).
389 Court-imposed population limits actually may be welcomed by the prison
bureaucracy. Such limits substantially ease the burdens of day to day life and create
pressures outside the system to allocate more resources to the prison system without
requiring substantial change in the day to day routine. In Alabama, one of the state's
defense witnesses conceded at trial that "the system was so desperately crowded that
most staff would welcome a judicial order forbidding the acceptance of more
prisoners." L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 90.
390 See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 928, 1047 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (prohibiting admission of new inmates to prison for five days); Grubbs v.
Norris, Nos. 80-3404, 80-3518, 80-3616, 80-3617 (M.D. Tenn. October 25, 1985)
(precluding the admissions of inmates into reception centers); Champagne, supra
note 283, at 91 (describing how in Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex.
1972), aff'd in parl and rev'd in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
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inmates, in particular, may create additional public pressure on
elected officials to take the steps necessary to avoid such unpopular
actions in the future. 3 9 1 Court-ordered releases may also enable
prison officials to reduce the prison population without incurring the
3 92
substantial political heat that is often generated by early releases.
These more extreme measures may lead to unintended and
potentially negative consequences. The defendants may decide to
transfer inmates to equally inadequate prisons, 3 93 to double- or
triple-cell prisoners,3 9 4 or to build new prisons rather than confront
the systemic problems causing prison overcrowding. 39 5 The state
may attempt to avoid responsibility completely by privatizing some
or all aspects of the prison.3 96 The strategy of releasing inmates in
response to noncompliance may transform the catalyst unwittingly
983 (1975), the judge ordered the jail closed to further admissions unless jail site
selected).
391 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 175 (noting that prison authorities were
said to "'hope' that a release order from [the court] would 'wake the people and the
legislature up' so that money would be allocated for the prisons").
392 See, e.g., id. at 176 (noting that the Commissioner of Corrections was
prepared to release short term inmates in waves on the condition that the judge
order him to take this action); id. at 212 (asserting that the judge himself chose
prisoners to be released in order to spare the governor and commissioner the
political costs of making decisions of this kind).
393 See, e.g., id. at 97, 122 (noting that "Ulail prisoners and county sheriffs were
the first to feel the impact of the cap on the prison system's population" because the
decrease in prison overcrowding came at the price of ever-increasing crowding in
local jails, where conditions continued to deteriorate). Thesejails were subsequently
subject to litigation resulting in the imposition of population caps. See id. at 171-72.
The Commissioner of Corrections in Alabama responded to each new order by
moving prisoners from the jail concerned to some other jail that was not yet subject
to a similar court order. See id. at 171; see also M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note
17, at 209-10 (noting that the population cap led to transfer of inmates to inadequate
facilities).
394 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 206 (noting that "the legislature's
reaction to the release of prisoners ... was to approve plans to 'expand' [two new]
prisons by assigning two prisoners to cells originally designed for one").
395 See, e.g., id. at 98 (noting that one prison official "meant to deal with
crowding in state prisons not by reducing the population in existing institutions, but
by building new facilities"); Telephone interview with Vincent Nathan, supra note 205
(noting similar responses in other prison officials) . Although building new prisons
may temporarily alleviate some overcrowding, it is widely perceived that prison
officials cannot build their way out of the overcrowding problem and that the attempt
to do so diverts attention and money from more long-range solutions that hold more
promise. See B. CORY & S. GETTINGER, TIME TO BUILD? THE REALITIES OF PRISON
CONSTRUCriON 5 (1984); Hall, Systemic Strategies to Alleviate Jail Overcrowding 4-5
(National Institute ofJustice 1987).
396 See, e.g., Cody & Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional Institutions: The
Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1987) (documenting Tennessee's attempt
to privatize its entire corrections system).
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into a director if the criminal justice system treats such releases as a
solution to the overcrowding problem and eschews attempts to
develop7 more systemic, long-term strategies for addressing this
39

issue.

There also are doctrinal and institutional constraints on the
availability and effectiveness of negative sanctions. The prison
administration may attempt to excuse noncompliance by showing
impossibility or good faith.3 9 ' Defendants may also seek to avoid
contempt by bringing the prison into compliance with the court
order in time for the contempt hearing, only to allow the offending
conditions to recur after the contempt motion is denied.3 99 Com-

pensatory contempt as a remedy for noncompliance may be problematic due to the difficulty of establishing the value of intangibles
such as pain and suffering and dignitary harm.4"' In addition, some
courts believe that incarceration inherently involves some amount of
397 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 196 (noting that prison officials
"actually seemed to welcome the prospect of a release order" to ease the
overcrowding problem). The Fifth Circuit appears to have recognized and approved
of this result, ordering the consolidation of a series of jail cases so that a single
federal district judge could "assist the state legislature" in managing overcrowding.
See Hamilton v. Morial, 644 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1981).
398 See Tate v. Frey, 673 F. Supp. 880, 883 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (declining to hold
wardens in contempt for violating population cap because they lack control over
decision to admit inmates to jail). Good faith is not usually a defense to civil
contempt but tends to influence a reluctant court's willingness to find contempt. See,
e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1524 (1 1th Cir. 1984) ("Intent and good
faith, while relevant to the amount of punishment, are not defenses to the charge.").
But see e.g., United States v. Darwin Constr. Co., 873 F.2d 750, 754 (4th Cir. 1989)
(noting that good faith can be a defense to civil contempt in the Fourth Circuit).
399 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 169-70 (noting that the
defendant did not respond in any way to due process requirements until the plaintiffs
initiated contempt proceedings nine months after the court order was entered).
400 In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978), the Supreme Court held that,
in the absence of proof of consequential injury, only nominal damages could be
awarded for the denial of procedural due process. The Court concluded that
"'although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due
process itself is compensable under § 1983, we hold that neither the likelihood of
such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding
compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused." Id. at
264.
A "per diem" methodology is frequently used to compensate prisoners for
violation of their constitutional rights. See Madison County Jail Inmates v.
Thompson, 773 F.2d 834, 842 (7th Cir. 1985); O'Connor v. Keller, 510 F. Supp.
1359, 1375 (D. Md. 1981) (noting that the plaintiff was awarded $100 per day for
each day he was confined to an isolation cell in violation of his right not to be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment).
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pain, suffering, and loss of dignity and so refuse to1 award substantial
40
damages for such injuries in the prison context.
The catalyst's approach to promoting compliance is limited by
appellate decisions in some jurisdictions. The Eleventh Circuit, for
example, overturned a district court's order releasing inmates
because the district court failed to use a contempt sanction first to
enforce its order.4 0 2 Moreover, the use of contempt sanctions to
coerce compliance has not been upheld uniformly by the circuit
courts.40

3

Most importantly, negative sanctions carry the risk of increasing
resistance to the court's intervention. Contempt sanctions may
undercut the defendants' willingness to cooperate with the court and
heighten their intransigence. Severe sanctions may make heroes or
martyrs out of the most uncompromising resisters.40 4 Less vocal
opponents of the court's intervention may attempt to minimize the
court's impact by complying only to the extent necessary to avoid
further contempt sanctions. However, the catalyst's synthesis of negative sanctions with a participatory remedial process reduces the
threat of prolonged resistance. In order to avoid further sanctions,
defendants must participate in an interactive process that educates
them concerning the need for reform and promotes their acceptance
of, and commitment to, the new normative agenda. The combination of external pressure and internal process compensates for the
limitations of each component of the catalyst approach. Even with
these limitations, the catalyst approach offers the greatest potential
401 See, e.g., Madison County Jail Inmates v. Thompson, 773 F.2d 834, 842-43
(7th Cir. 1985) (declining to award class-wide damages to jail inmates for cruel and
inhumane punishment where some of the conditions complained of were caused by
prisoners); see also L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 98-99 (relating an instance where a
judge was reluctant to award damages).
402 See Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1083 (1983).
403 See, e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1984)
(declining to follow the recommendation of Newman v. Alabama regarding the use of
contempt sanctions).
404 The public response to the release of inmates may also provide fuel for a
political backlash, particularly where there are public officials willing to exploit the
situation for political gain. This is what occurred in Alabama, where the Attorney
General blamed the federal court and the governor for the release of inmates, and
attempted to "capitalize on public anxiety over the release of convicts and thus to
increase his political popularity-both affirmatively by resisting the release order in
court, and negatively, by suggesting that [the governor] favored the release of felons
and contrasting the governor's stance with his own." L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at
202-203 (footnote omitted).
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for introducing incentives that break the prison stasis and enable
meaningful compliance.
C.

The Court's Capacity to Foster the Development of an InformationGathering System

Prison officials often lack basic information about the nature and
limitations of their operations. Information needed to make
programmatic improvements typically does not flow to decisionmakers. 40 5 As part of the process of monitoring and reporting
on compliance with court orders, courts can require the development of a comprehensive information base about current conditions
within the prison,4 "6 develop information-gathering systems that fill
the communication gap, and make valuable information available on
a routine basis to decisionmakers. 40 7 This information base precludes the use of secrecy to maintain illicit practices and can be used
to stimulate and focus reform efforts.
In response to court-ordered reporting requirements, prison
administrators must develop a mechanism for gathering information
about compliance efforts.4 °8 In some prison systems, administrators
have created positions devoted to the task of monitoring compliance
with court orders.40 9 Other departments have developed and implemented grievance mechanisms and other administrative procedures
that enable inmates or guards to bring complaints to the attention of
the administration.41 0
Courts often rely on plaintiffs' counsel or court-appointed offiSee supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Harris v. Pernsley, Order (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1988, paragraph 4(a)
(requiring defendants to provide computerized information on detainees); M.K.
HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 18.
407 Court intervention may also stimulate factual investigation by other
branches of government. See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 148
(noting that after the complaint was filed in Holland v. Donelon, No. 71-1442 (E.D.
La. May 16, 1972), the grand jury conducted an investigation and issued a report
concerning conditions at Jefferson Parish Prison).
408 See, e.g., id. at 18 (describing the types of mechanisms used for monitoring
compliance); id. at 206 (concluding that the suit in Holland led defendants to initiate
regular reports on the status ofjail inmates; these reports could be used to decrease
jail population).
409 See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
410 See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 38, at 545-46 (noting that the fear of
judicial imposition of court procedures led to improved grievance procedures); L.
YACKLE, supra note 51, at 253 (detailing how the Commissioner of the Alabama
prison system negotiated an agreement with the Implementation Committee under
which isolated inmate complaints would be referred to a new grievance system to be
established within the prison).
405
406

1990]

RESOLVING THE REMEDIAL DILEMMA

cials to develop information gathering systems that include interviews, inspections, and document reviews. 4 1 ' Through regular and

intensive observation of particular prison practices, masters and
monitors are able to gather a more complete and accurate picture of
practices than is available from internal sources of information. The
development and dissemination of reliable information about prison
conditions forces prison officials to acknowledge existing problems
and may create public pressure to take corrective action. 4 12 The
information generating role of the court is often pivotal to breaking
the dynamic of prison stasis.
1. The Deferrer and the Limits of the Reactive Method of
Information-Gathering
The deferrer plays no independent role in structuring the information gathering, reporting, and monitoring functions. The parties
and their counsel bear full responsibility for fact-gathering. Thus,
the court does nothing to compensate for the absence of accurate
and useful information about prison practices or conditions.41 3
Plaintiffs' counsel typically is unable to compensate sufficiently
for the prison's inadequate information gathering mechanisms.
Once the trial is over, plaintiffs' counsel frequently lack the time,
energy, and resources to monitor vigilantly the status of prison conditions and practices.4 14 Moreover, communications between prison
411 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 193 (describing how the
master in Holland visited the jail twice a week on a surprise basis, inspected the
facility, interviewed inmates and staff, and met with the prison administrators and jail
managers to discuss his findings and suggestions); id. at 393 (noting that the Collins
court relied primarily on the plaintiffs' attorneys for monitoring extent of
compliance); L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 47-48 (describing how Judge Johnson
invited the Justice Department to conduct an investigation of the prison involved in
the Newman v. Alabama litigation).
412 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 94 (asserting that prison
officials eliminated unconstitutional prison conditions once they were brought to
light through litigation); Telephone interview with Vincent Nathan, supra note 205, at
30-31 (describing how the court appointed investigators developed factual record
that was ultimately accepted as accurate by counsel, prison officials and state
leadership, and was followed by a search for solutions to problems reflected by the
findings of the special master).
41S See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 73-74 (noting that the
court did not develop a complete record exposing the extent and nature of ongoing
brutality and mental harassment). This approach may be attributable to the view that
correctional problems do not require expertise and to the desire to minimize the
defendants' resentment. See id. at 89-90.
414 See, e.g., id. at 20 (noting the plaintiffs' counsel's efforts to monitor
compliance diminished over time); id. at 191-92 (stating that in Holland, the plaintiffs'
attorneys' "time and energy for compliance monitoring dwindled over time" and that
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officials and plaintiffs' counsel tend to be adversarial. The prison
administration may restrict plaintiffs' counsel's access to the
prison, 415 and is likely to challenge information obtained from plaintiffs' counsel rather than use it to determine whether a corrective
response is necessary.
Judicial intervention in and of itself does not create incentives
for defendants to develop information. Because the deferrer is not a
presence within the prison system, she does not generate the opportunity or incentive to share information with the court. From the
prison official's perspective, the less the court knows about prison
conditions, the better. Any information that is provided to the court
could be used against the prison to justify greater judicial oversight.
Line workers and their supervisors have neither the opportunity nor
the incentive to provide information to their superiors concerning
the inadequacies of the present system.4 16 Information gathered by
attorneys for either side is likely to reflect the adversarial nature of
formal judicial proceedings and will fail to capture the complexities
of the problems and potential solutions. Thus, the deferrer does little to alter the information available to the prison officials, the court,
or the public.
2.

The Director and the Hazards of Self-Monitoring

The director assumes control of the process of gathering information primarily by relying on a court-appointed agent to monitor
compliance with the court's order 41 7 and by inspecting the prison on
a regular basis. This approach greatly enhances the visibility of the
court within the prison and enables the court to develop a more
accurate picture of the status of compliance efforts. In this way, the
the master stated that the attorneys for the plaintiffs were not very helpful or
cooperative during the compliance phase); id. at 396-97 (noting that the limitations
on plaintiffs' counsel's "time and energy, combined with the massive nature of the
relief ordered, resulted in an inability to maintain the monitoring in the manner
desired").
415 See, e.g., id. at 190-91 (describing how in Holland, plaintiffs' attorneys
reported that prison officials discouraged and at times denied them access to the
prison, and required them to specify particular inmates to visit and provide
background materials before each visit).
416 See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
417 The director may set up a procedure resembling a grievance mechanism.
For example, in Pugh v. Sullivan, Judge Johnson forwarded the inmate letters he
received, which asserted complaints about prison conditions, to the Human Rights
Committee for investigation and resolution. See L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 115-16.
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director overcomes the problems engendered by the deferrer's reliance on the parties to generate information.
The director's role in generating information about the state of
the prison system, however, is constrained by the court's implementation activities. Prison officials resisting active judicial oversight will
try to limit the court's access to information. To the extent that
information gathering is formalized, it is less likely to contain the
variety of conflicting perspectives that comprise the prison system.
The director also must evaluate the adequacy of her own conduct or programs. This self-evaluation poses an additional challenge
to the legitimacy of the court's role and the reliability of the court's
assessment of compliance progress. It is quite difficult to maintain
neutrality and the appearance of impartiality under these circumstances. 41 8 Yet neutrality and fairness are key to the court's persuasive authority and legitimacy.
The information that is gathered may enhance the court's
knowledge of the deficiencies of the existing system, with the possible effect of forcing the prison officials to acknowledge the existence
of those deficiencies. 4 19 However, information disclosure does little
to facilitate the exchange of information within the prison system
that often fails to occur in the absence of intervention. By using its
own formal and informal processes to gather information, the court
essentially absolves the prison officials of the necessity of developing
internal monitoring systems that could be used to inform the policymaking process in the future.4 20 The system's capacity to generate
the information necessary to self-correct remains unchanged.4 2 '
418

The difficulty of maintaining neutrality is illustrated by Judge Johnson's ex

parte meetings with plaintiffs' counsel to discuss strategy for preserving his orders on
appeal. See id. at 42-43.
419 See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
420 In Texas, the master's office, rather than the prison system itself, developed
an extensive network of information sources and channels. See B. CROUCH & J.
MARQUART, supra note 29, at 130-31. Once the court departs, there is a serious risk
that the inadequacies in information exchange that enabled the initial constitutional

violations will re-emerge.
421

There is no distinctive approach to information gathering that characterizes

the broker. The broker may use any of the approaches described in this section to
gather information, which is then used to achieve agreement among the parties
concerning the remedy. For this reason, the broker's capacity to improve prisons'
information gathering mechanisms is not separately analyzed.
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The Catalyst: Information-Gathering as an Integral Part of the
Remedial Process

The catalyst combines court-controlled monitoring with the
requirement that the prison system develop information systems that
educate both the responsible officials and the court about the status
of compliance and the possible approaches to improving prison conditions. The information gathering requirement is incorporated into
both remedy formulation (and reformulation) and compliance monitoring. The prison officials must present the court with sufficient factual support to justify the particular programs they adopt. Prison
officials also must establish internal information systems to satisfy
the court's demands for informed decisionmaking and submit regular status reports.4 2 2 The catalyst may thereby stimulate the adoption of computerization, grievance mechanisms, and reporting
4 23
systems that provide for regular input from staff and inmates.
Thus, the catalyst provides incentives for those within the prison to
develop mechanisms for bridging the information gap among policymakers, supervisors, and line-workers.
The catalyst uses information-gathering requirements to establish its presence within the prison and create pressure toward compliance without assuming direct responsibility for, or control over,
the management of the institution.4 24 Because responsibility for
implementation remains with prison officials, the catalyst minimizes
the conflicts generated by the director's dual role of administrator
and enforcer. At the same time, the catalyst may enhance the capacity of the responsible officials to detect and anticipate problems and
plan accordingly.
The cooperation and involvement of competent prison officials,
of course, is a prerequisite for the development of a constructive
problem-solving approach to implementation. Prison officials may
resist developing and utilizing information. The catalyst may not

require the administration to gather information about aspects of the
prison unrelated to the legal violation before the court. To the
extent the monitoring process becomes adversarial, the reliability of
422 See Champagne, supra note 283, at 91-92 (noting that in Taylor v. Sterrett, the
court ordered regular progress reports which led to specific recommendations for
remedying jail problems).
423 See supra notes 406-08 and accompanying text (detailing improved
information gathering as result of court reporting requirements).
424 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 394-95 (concluding that
the defendants' obligation to file regular compliance reports in Collins v. Schoonfield
had the effect of exerting pressure toward compliance).
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the information provided by defendants is likely to decline. Workers
may withhold or distort information that they fear may be used to
change their routines or increase supervision of their activities. Officials may resist incorporating information gathered by the court, or
for litigation, into their overall decisionmaking and planning
42 5
process.
The catalyst creates both incentives and structures for workers
to cooperate in obtaining and providing information, reducing the
likelihood of sustained resistance to the court's information gathering function. This enables the catalyst to bridge the information gap
that currently exists within many prison systems.
D.

The Court's Capacity to Empower Change Agents Within the Prison

Members of the prison community who support change often
lack political and organizational power. Judicial intervention can tip
the balance of power in the direction of change. By acknowledging
the constitutional necessity for change, the court enhances the visibility and the legitimacy of the internal reformers. The judicial imprimatur adds leverage to corrections' requests for budgetary
increases. 42 6 Judicial intervention may enhance public support for
prison reform by exposing unconstitutional conditions and practices
and legitimizing inmate grievances. 4 27 Court-ordered reform may
facilitate the growth of new advocacy groups both in the legislature
and in the private sector. Prison staff committed to change may have
increased access to power. 4 28 Judicial intervention thus may compensate for the absence of an effective political constituency for
prison reform.
425 The success of the information gathering process may be dependent upon
the continuation of the litigation; when the court's active involvement ceases, the
newly developed sources of information and planning may disappear. However, the
specter of renewed judicial intervention should prison conditions deteriorate
dramatically may provide on-going incentive to maintain effective information
channels.
426 The prison officials themselves frequently understand and seek to harness
their increased leverage as a result of a court mandate. See L. YACKLE, supra note 51,
at 92 (asserting that the defendants hoped that the court would order the
expenditure of much larger sums of money and that "the new commissioner, Mr.
Locke, would be able to take the decree to the legislature and succeed with ajudicial
order where Sullivan had failed without one." (footnote omitted)).
427 See, e.g., M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 26-27 (noting that
prison litigation brought "nightmarish realities to public view," forcing legislators to
respond to public concerns).
428 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 102 (discussing Judge Johnson's order
that new guards be hired in numbers sufficient to adequately staff prison).
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The Deferrer: The Power Dynamic Remains Unchanged

The deferrer places her symbolic and normative power behind
the officials responsible for achieving compliance. Respect for the
judiciary and its authoritative pronouncements may increase the
reformers' power by legitimizing demands for reform and requests
for increased resources. However, the court's normative influence
within the prison bureaucracy is limited.4 2 9 Similarly, many of those
outside the prison system do not perceive themselves as responsible
or accountable for the conditions within the prison.4"' The deferrer's strategy fails to generate support for the view that reform is
imperative. Politicians may believe that judicial involvement in state
executive functions is inappropriate, particularly when such involvement forces the legislature to appropriate public funds for prison
reform. Media coverage and the resulting public pressure for reform
often diminishes when the liability stage of the litigation ends.
The deferrer does not buttress her normative authority by
employing the power of the state to enforce its mandate. 4 3 ' The
court instead relies on the limited power of the formal defendants to
mobilize necessary support for particular programs. Guards and
inmates can effectively resist reforms that require a change in their
routines and practices, and have incentives to do so. 4 3 2 Legislators
ignore requests for additional expenditures. 4 33 Criminal justice
agencies can refuse to participate in efforts to coordinate policy to
reduce prison population.43 4 Governors can withhold political and
budgetary support for change.43 ' The deferrer does little to
increase the leverage of those seeking change within the prison system or to protect them from the political consequences of their
actions.
Because the deferrers' intervention is hortatory and symbolic,
participants in the prison dynamic understand that there is no realistic likelihood of a direct confrontation with the court. Not surprisingly, they frequently remain opposed to reform and continue to
engage in behavior that frustrates the director's compliance
429 See supra
430 See supra
431 See, e.g.,

notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
note 153 and accompanying text.
M.K. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 17, at 105 (noting that
"[t]here was a conspicuous absence of enforcement mechanisms throughout most of
the Holt v. Sarver litigation").
432 See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
433 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
434 See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
435 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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efforts.4 3 6 The same factors that limit the capacity of prison officials
to improve prison conditions in the absence of judicial intervention
disable them from unilaterally eliminating these conditions. By relying exclusively on the defendants to remedy unconstitutional prison
conditions, the court incorporates these limitations into the remedial
process. In many cases, the deferrer simply avoids meaningful
change necessary to eliminate unconstitutional conditions.4 3 7
2.

The Director and the Limits of the Court's Administrative
Power

The director attempts to use her power to assume control over
implementation to achieve compliance directly. 4 8 The director's
information-gathering activities may bring about public exposure
that generates political support for court-ordered change. This may
shift the power balance, at least temporarily, in the direction of
change.43 9 If the director is able to increase prison resources and
staff, these new influences may shift the power balance and enable
some reform. The director may implement programmatic changes
that do not require substantial cooperation or additional legislative
support and can be easily monitored.4 40 Thus, the director may
accomplish discrete reforms that prison administrators may be
unable or unwilling to pursue due to the political pressure to maintain the status quo.
However, the court, by assuming the director role, directly confronts the existing power structure of the prison system. In some
respects, the director steps into the shoes of the administrator, with
greater visibility, less political vulnerability, less flexibility, and sub436

See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 225-26 (describing how the momentum

of the Alabama litigation was lost and how the Governor became less willing to
cooperate with the court after the Court of Appeals limited the trial court's authority

to release inmates or hold state executive authorities in contempt).
437 This does not mean that deference is never an appropriate judicial strategy.
Once the prison dynamic is broken, either through judicial intervention or political
response, and defendants have developed effective internal systems of monitoring
and self-correction, deference may be appropriate to reward defendants' compliance

progress and encourage the maintenance of internal mechanisms for change.
438

See supra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.

439

See, e.g., M.K.

HARRIS

& D.

SPILLER,

supra note 17, at 166-67 (noting that

court intervention provided the impetus for the establishment of a medical care

program with Tulane University that was far superior to prior arrangements, and
went beyond what was required by a court order then in effect).
440 See, e.g., id. at 367 (noting that in Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D.
Md. 1972), the court ordered strict limitations on the use of strip cells, leading

defendants to abandon them and weld their doors shut).

906

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:805

stantial controversy over the court's role. By attempting to exercise
power directly, the court may solidify positions opposed to change
and polarize the competing interests within the prison. The court's
influence over those operating within the prison is limited. 44 The
same factors that limit the prison administrator's power over the
internal hierarchy constrain the court's power to alter patterns and
practices within the prison. The perceived illegitimacy of the court's
administrative role limits its managerial power.
The director faces additional limitations stemming from its limited mandate. The court cannot assume complete administrative
responsibility. It may only intervene to the extent necessary to
respond to particular constitutional violations. The broader managerial strategies that could enhance the court's capacity to institutionalize its reform agenda may not be adopted because they are
beyond the director's mandate.4 4 2
The director's power to affect the conduct of external actors also
is limited. The court has no direct control over outsiders whose participation is necessary for compliance. Although the court can generate public pressure for change, the controversy over the court's role
in the prison may deflect public concern about the prison conditions
and diminish the possibility that political pressure will force state
officials to institute reforms. Outsiders may be unwilling to cooperate with the court out of fear that this would somehow legitimize the
44 3
court's directorial role and encourage increased court activity.
There are substantial incentives to resist the director's overtures,
because the court appears unable or unwilling to impose any sanctions in the face of noncompliance and may in fact back down in the
face of continued noncooperation. 44 4
Thus, the court's power to achieve compliance directly is limited
when employing the director approach. The question remains
whether the director can empower the participants in the prison
dynamic to implement change. The director, by mandating and
undertaking reform on behalf of inmates, gives visibility and legitimacy to inmates' concerns. The court's activist intervention encourages inmates to use the court to enhance their conditions, status, and
power within the prison. Inmates may rely on their access to the
See supra notes 281-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 303-12 and accompanying text.
443 Cf L. YACKLE, supra note .51, at 89 (noting that Judge Johnson refused to
involve the parole board in the litigation, and that the board "never assisted
significantly in the drive to reduce Alabama's prisoner population").
444 See supra note 367-70 and accompanying text.
441
442
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court, rather than their capacity for disruption and violence, as a
means of pursuing their concerns about prison conditions if the
court is perceived as an effective advocate of their interests.
As the director assumes direct responsibility for implementation, there is a tendency to limit direct contact with inmates and to
define the court's goals in terms of limited objectives, rather than
inmates' interests. The court compromises to stay within the scope
of its authority and achieve compliance. If inmates begin to identify
the court with the administration and to perceive a divergence of
interests, they may withdraw cooperation and support, and pursue
their interests in other ways.
The director may also enhance the guards' power by reinforcing
the importance of the security function and increasing the number of
guards employed. However, the director does not alter guards'
access to decisionmakers or their capacity to exercise control over
their day-to-day working conditions. 44 5 Many of the court's actions
threaten to limit guards' autonomy in their management of inmates.
By bringing in resources and staff to pursue noncustodial goals, the
director may further threaten the guards' status and autonomy.
Guards are predisposed to perceive the director as an adversary
whose power must be contained. They are likely to engage in a
dynamic similar to their interaction with a reform administrator.4 46
Guards retain the power of withdrawal, resistance, and disruption.
They can neutralize court-ordered reforms by tailoring them to the
existing routine. They can try to divert attention from court-ordered
reforms to security concerns that are likely to take precedence in the
face of threatened disruption of order. 44 7 The court has limited
power to prevent or control this conduct.
The director's impact on the transformative potential of counselors and staff is also likely to be problematic. True, the director
may increase the status and numbers of counselors by underscoring
the importance of the counselor's function, establishing particular
programs, and bringing in people who are sympathetic to the counselor's perspective. The director, however, has little or no effect on
the counselor's role in the prison's decisionmaking processes.
445 The director partially could overcome this limitation by requiring the prison
administration to set up structures that give guards access to the director, such as
grievance systems or regular training programs. Unfortunately, these types of orders
have been reversed by Courts of Appeals for exceeding the scope of the court's
authority. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982).
446 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
447 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Counselors remain peripheral to the primary goal of the institution-the maintenance of order. They continue to depend on the
guards for movement within the prison, information, and latitude to
perform their noncustodial duties. Indeed, the perception that
counselors and the court share an identity of interests polarizes the
counselors relationships with others within the prison. As a result,
counselors encounter increased resistance to their participation in
the management of the prison.
Finally, the director is unlikely to have a significant effect on the
capacity of the prison administration to bring about change. The
prison administration remains stymied by the lack of structures for
obtaining reliable information about prison conditions, the limited
extent to which it can influence the conduct of the guards and counselors, and the absence of political and financial support for prison
reform. 4 4 8 In the absence of any direct costs, political or financial,
stemming from resistance, outside politicians are likely to use the
prison controversy for their own political ends and to resist prison
officials' reform efforts.44 9 If the administration is perceived as an
ally of the court, its capacity to influence either its internal or external constituencies may be fuirther diminished.4 50
Thus, if the courts respond to defendants' failure to eliminate
unconstitutional conditions by assuming direct managerial control
over implementation, they are unlikely to empower those individuals
critical to altering the dynamics of organizational stasis. Although
the director approach may accomplish discrete programmatic
reforms, it is likely to fail as a general approach to resolving the
dilemma, and may have regressive effects on the development of
more creative, systemic approaches to the problems facing prisons.
3.

The Broker: Variations on the Theme of Deference

The broker essentially remains outside the power dynamic of
the prison system. Because of its heavy reliance on lawyers to negotiate and communicate with the court concerning compliance, the
prison participants remain essentially unaffected by the negotiation
448 See supra notes 133-56 and accompanying text.
449 See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 125-26 (discussing the tactics used by
Alabama's Governor and Lieutenant Governor to turn the prison controversy to their
political advantage, with little or no effect on actual prison conditions).
450 See, e.g., Giari, supra note 59, at 461 (noting that Oklahoma legislators forced
the resignation of a director of corrections when he was perceived to be sympathetic
to court intervention).
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process. 45 ' The broker's exclusive reliance on agreement and renegotiation, even in the face of continued noncompliance, undercuts
the potential pressure that the court could bring to bear to change
the power dynamics supporting the status quo. Thus, although the
broker may achieve agreements to undertake change, it does not
generate the public pressure, visibility and leverage necessary to
enable responsible officials within the prison system to carry out
those agreements.
4. The Catalyst: Empowerment Through Participation and
Pressure
The catalyst attempts to use its power to create processes that
effectively confront unconstitutional prison conditions. The catalyst
augments the potential influence of its normative authority with the
power generated by employing traditional judicial authority to
impose sanctions and award compensation. This approach also uses
judicial power to structure a remedial process that has the potential
to empower participants to undertake change by enhancing their
knowledge and access to those whose cooperation is necessary to
achieve compliance.
The public pressure imposed on prison and state officials
through the exposure of prison conditions and the imposition of
costs for noncompliance creates a new source of power for those
usually stymied by the absence of executive and legislative support
for reform. The options of invisibility and avoidance of disruption,
ordinarily chosen by many prison officials and politicians, are eliminated. In fact, under the catalyst's regime, the only way to reduce or
eliminate judicially created costs is through reform. Because these
costs affect actors outside the prison system, the catalyst may
empower the prison officials to enlist the cooperation of the governor, the legislature, the parole board, and other government actors
whose conduct directly bears on prison conditions. This new-found
support may then empower reformers to withstand the internal disruption and resistance that limits their capacity to implement
change.
The catalyst, of course, will not always successfully create a
dynamic that empowers meaningful change. Public officials are
sometimes willing to incur huge political and financial costs simply to
451 But see supra note 373 (describing the capacity of lawyers to compensate for
some of the limitations of the broker by building into their agreement provisions for
altering the power dynamic).
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stand up to the court. If the defendants continue to resist in the face
of sanctions, the catalyst is forced to choose between the Scylla of the
deferrer and the Charybdis of the director. Particularly where the
ongoing violations subject inmates to imminent and permanent
injury, the constitutional duty to remedy ongoing violations warrants
assumption of the director role to accomplish discrete programmatic
reforms, even though this approach is unlikely to alter the dynamic
of organizational stasis. Even the most intransigent officials may
reach a limit in terms of their perception of costs the public will tolerate in the name of political autonomy. Moreover, during the
period of resistance, inmates receive compensation for the ongoing
injury caused by the defendants' resistance, and some may be
released if the conditions are sufficiently severe to justify this remedy. These measures also have the effect of increasing the pressure
on resistant officials to undertake institutional self-correction. Thus,
the catalyst creates processes, opportunities and pressures that can
empower those within the prison system, particularly the prison
administration, to undertake meaningful reform.
CONCLUSION

The current state of prisons represents one of the enduring failures of our social institutions. Certainly, court intervention will not
eradicate the deeper, more Fundamental problems that are endemic
to the current institutional structure. Any court intervention is ultimately limited by the existing institutional and political structure, the
court's limited mandate, and the profound difficulty of achieving
bureaucratic reform. At best, effective judicial intervention can alleviate the most immediate and profound suffering perpetuated by the
dynamics of organizational stasis and foster the development of
more humane and sophisticated approaches to corrections.
However, given the dynamics of organizational stasis, in many
prisons change is unlikely to be undertaken in the absence ofjudicial
intervention. This Article has shown that the court has the potential
to influence this dynamic in the direction of reform, but that the
court's capacity to resolve the dilemma will depend, at least in part,
on the approach adopted by the court to manage the compliance
process. Courts inevitably choose managerial strategies in overseeing the compliance process, and those choices govern the extent to
which the court is likely to influence the norms, incentives, information sharing, and power structure of the prison system in ways that
tend to bring about meaningful change.
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By adopting a strategy that capitalizes on the strengths of the
court's traditional judicial power, the catalyst approach has real
potential to address the dynamics of organizational stasis that lock in
unconstitutional prison conditions, and yet remain within the boundaries of the judicial role. Given the superiority of the catalyst
approach as a means of resolving the dilemma, steps should be taken
to promote its adoption by trial courts faced with the task of managing the compliance process. The doctrinal barriers to the catalyst's
capacity to use incentives to bring about change should be reduced
or eliminated. Trial courts should be afforded substantial discretion
in using contempt and release orders as a response to non-compliance. Inmates should be permitted to recover damages as compensation for continued noncompliance, despite the frequent intangible
nature of their injuries.
Perhaps more importantly, it is imperative that courts recognize
that effective use of their traditional judicial powers can maximize
their capacity to promote institutional self-correction and preserve
the judicial character of their intervention. Mechanisms for sharing
ideas and information among trial judges concerning their role and
increasing their awareness of the strategic choices and their consequences must be developed. This may require using judicial conferences, the Federal Judicial Center's resources, and other means
beyond the formal judicial opinion, which does not ordinarily perform this educative function with respect to the trial court's managerial strategy."
Appellate courts also play a pivotal role in determining how trial
courts manage the remedial process and how they allocate power
and responsibility for achieving compliance. Appellate courts must
recognize and accept the dynamic, managerial role the lower courts
play in the implementation process, and create incentives through
452
the review process for trial judges to adopt the catalyst approach.
The four approaches analyzed above provide a starting point for
future inquiry into effective strategies for judicial intervention. One
fruitful area of inquiry is the extent to which the nature of the violation at issue influences the effectiveness of a particular judicial
approach. For example, it has already been pointed out that the
director approach may be particularly effective in introducing discrete changes in practices or conditions that do not require systemic
cooperation or changes in basic routine, such as the abolition of a
452 The role of appellate courts in institutional reform litigation is the subject of
a forthcoming article.
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particular type of punishment or a one-time change in the physical
facilities.4 5 3 Effective redress of other types of prison problems,
such as violence, arbitrary disciplinary practices, and other problems
involving changes in daily routines or inmate guard relations will
likely require the catalyst approach. The catalyst can also prompt a
systemic response to overcrowding-perhaps the most pressing issue
facing prisons today.4 5 4 A combination of judicial approaches may
be warranted if a particular litigation involves both discrete and systemic issues.
Finally, it is worthwhile to explore the implications of the contextual and strategic approach to remedies set forth in this Article for
other areas of institutional reform. There may be other judicial
approaches that characterize intervention in other contexts and are
likely to be effective in generating change in that particular institution. Political and institutional variables, such as the existence of a
statutory mandate, the degree of centralization and bureaucratization of the institutions at issue, the level of consensus about the legal
norm, the level of expertise required to address the issue, the capacity and political strength of the interested parties and the degree of
public access to the institutions at issue will influence the analysis of
the relative effectiveness of each judicial approach. This type of
institutional analysis may also be useful in considering the relative
effectiveness of nonjudicial interventions, such as legislative and
administrative programs designed to achieve change.
By examining the dynamics underlying a particulaf institution's
failure to comply with the law, we can better understand the extent
to which the court can effectively intervene. With this greater understanding of their potential and limits,judges will be better situated to
resolve the remedial dilemma by adopting ajudicial strategy that fosters institutional self-correction.
453

See supra note 293 and accompanying text.

Prison officials and line workers are likely to support any court activity
designed to reduce overcrowding because it does not disrupt their routine and makes
their jobs easier and safer. Indeed, some guard unions have filed law suits
challenging the legality of overcrowded prisons. See, e.g., Fennell, Islands of Violence.
The Crisis of America's PrisonsandJails, 8J. OF Soc., POL. & ECON. STUD. 81, 89 (1983)
454

(acknowledging that "corrections officials sometimes welcome... court orders that
force public spending for sorely needed renovations or even new ...
view expanding the sphere of inmates' rights as counterproductive).

prisons," but

